The Caucasus: Which Role for Turkey in the

Transkript

The Caucasus: Which Role
for Turkey in the European
Neighborhood?
DENİZ DEVRİM* and EVELINA SCHULZ**
ABSTRACT
The Turkish proposal of a Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform
(CSCP), and its impact on existing
EU initiatives covering the same
region, represents a challenge for
the future shape of the European
neighborhood. This article
analyzes the evolution of the
CSCP since its launch in summer
2008 until now and presents the
platform’s approach and main
ideas. A core question will be
whether the Turkish proposal
will be complementary to or in
competition with other European
initiatives such as the Eastern
Partnership or the Black Sea
Synergy. Different stakeholders’
perceptions of the CSCP will also
be outlined. Finally, an outlook
will be given which will explore
Turkey’s role for the stability at
the EU’s south-eastern borders as
well as its impact for the European
Neighborhood Policy.
T
he fifth EU-enlargement round
in 2004 and 2007 resulted in the
acquisition of new neighbors, presented the
EU with new opportunities and challenges,
and has given it a greater weight on the international scene. Being a Black Sea power
since the accession of Bulgaria and Romania
in 2007, the EU has given special attention to
its eastern neighbors and has developed new
initiatives under the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP
presents the overall framework for the relations between the EU and its neighbors and it
is meant to provide an opportunity for close,
privileged relations, especially in political and
economical terms. Within this greater framework, other regional initiatives have been developed recently. The military escalation in
South Ossetia between Georgia and Russia in
August 2008 not only gave the drive to the EU
to accelerate the works on the proposed East* Programme Coordinator, Center for International Relations and
Development Studies, [email protected]
** Advisor, European Commission, [email protected]
Insight Turkey Vol. 11 / No. 3 / 2009
pp. 177-193
177
DENİZ DEVRİM and EVELINA SCHULZ
There is a need to re-assess
Turkey’s foreign and regional
policies and its possible
impact on the EU´s eastern
neighborhood
ern Partnership (EaP), but also inspired
Turkey to propose a Caucasus Stability
and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). At
the same time, the question of regional
cooperation within the EU’s Black Sea
Synergy (BSS) was re-opened. However,
as the Turkish initiative and the two EU
initiatives cover a very similar geographical scope but have different centers of
gravity, there is a need to coordinate their parallel development. This coordination
will be a particular challenge for the future shape of the ENP and will give Turkey
an important role in this region.
The military conflict in South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia has brought
the south Caucasus back on the international and European agendas. This conflict
has reminded Western countries that the south Caucasus is home to frozen conflicts which have impeded peace and stability in the region. In order to re-address
the region problems there was a new impulse for enhanced engagement with
the region, an impulse that has re-launched the debate on what policy approach
would give stability and security to the south Caucasus. Turkey used this moment
to demonstrate its commitment and engagement in the region and presented the
CSCP. The initial reactions to the Turkish proposal from the EU have been positive and Turkey’s engagement in the region has been welcomed. In addition, the
assessment of the recent developments in Eastern Europe has re-enforced the perception of Turkey as a crucial strategic player in the region. The European Commission (EC) recognized the important geopolitical role of Turkey by repeatedly
mentioning this role in EU accession progress reports since 2000, and by explicitly welcoming the CSCP in its last progress report in 2008.1
Taking into account the existing framework of the ENP, new regional EU
initiatives, and Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, there is a need to re-assess
Turkey’s foreign and regional policies and its possible impact on the EU´s eastern neighborhood. For the last decade, EU-Turkish relations have been mostly
marked by Turkey’s membership aspirations and its foreign policy agenda was
very much in line with the EU´s approach. However, Turkey’s engagement in the
south Caucasus and the Black Sea region, as well as the idea of the CSCP, are examples of a certain shift from Western-oriented policies to a more autonomous
Turkish foreign policy.
There is a wide range of interpretations and opinions on Turkey’s recent approach to international politics. On the one hand, some stakeholders among Tur-
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The Caucasus: Which Role for Turkey in the European Neighborhood?
key’s Western allies worry that Turkey’s
Turkish foreign policy’s new
interest is increasingly moving away
approach highlights Turkey’s
from the West and shifting towards the
importance as a soft power and
Muslim Middle East and they are startshows its compatibility with
ing to question to what extent Turkey’s
EU foreign policy
new ambitions remain compatible with
the West’s strategic objectives. Those
who follow this line of thought explain Turkey’s foreign policy shift with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,
AKP) in 2002.
Other stakeholders argue that Turkey’s growing international role is not necessarily incompatible with EU or US policies. This view claims that Turkey’s aspirations to play an independent role in its immediate neighborhood should be seen
as complementary and not contradictory to its more traditional Western-oriented
policies.
The first argument fails to consider the variety of factors that are decisive for
Turkey’s new foreign policy approach, such as Turkey’s geopolitical weight in its
neighborhood and Turkey’s wish for ensuring the stability of its neighbors. Turkish foreign policy’s new approach highlights Turkey’s importance as a soft power
and shows its compatibility with EU foreign policy. The EU and Turkey both aim
to resolve conflicts to create a stable neighborhood. Turkey’s growing regional
prominence could make an important contribution in helping promote peace
within the region, while at the same time pursuing its own foreign policy agenda.
Turkey’s enhanced regional profile might indeed be regarded as a benefit in the
long run and it will probably also increase Turkey’s strategic attractiveness for its
Western partners.
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Approach: The Case of the Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform
For decades, Turkey’s foreign policy agenda was shaped by the Cold War conditions and NATO membership. The end of the bipolarity in international politics
and the rapprochement of the Central and Eastern European states to the EU,
followed by their accession in 2004, have had an important impact on Turkey’s regional role and geopolitical orientation. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, Turkey was strongly Western oriented and worked hard on its aim to start
EU accession negotiations in 2005. Since then, Turkey has gradually shifted towards a more independent foreign policy approach. Nowadays, Turkey is looking
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The platform is indeed part of
a broader initiative to assert
Turkish geopolitical influence
not only in the Caucasus region
but also in other surrounding
regions
for new and more “marge de manoeuvre”
and elaborates a multidimensional vision of its foreign policy by establishing
multiple relations with its neighbors and
becoming an important regional power.
The CSCP initiative is an example of this
tendency and underlines Turkey’s will to
act as a regional power by proposing its
own solutions and initiatives to promoting stability in the region.
The three south Caucasus states, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
became independent in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ever
since, the south Caucasus has been subject to different territorial disputes: the so
called frozen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh (between Armenia and Azerbaijan),
and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (both between Georgia and Russia). Nevertheless, the existing international conflict resolution mechanisms, for example the
OSCE Minsk Group,2 did not deliver the expected results and the south Caucasus
has remained a region with ongoing bilateral conflicts.
Turkey’s recent engagement in the south Caucasus identifies these shortcomings and attempts to confront them. In order to re-build confidence among the
countries, creating a forum for dialogue between countries in conflict is an important starting point. In line with Turkey’s new foreign policy approach, which
among other things emphasizes having “zero problems” with its neighbors, Turkey not only shows its interest in having an impact on the political agenda in the
South Caucasus, but it also represents its ambitions to influence regional politics.
Considering its geopolitical position, Turkey’s aim to act as a mediator in the region could be successful and could open a window of opportunity for a further
détente in the region.
The desire to create a platform in order to establish a dialogue in the region was
declared by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on August 11, 2008,
immediately after the Russian-Georgian conflict. The CSCP develops the idea of
a 3+2 format for the region, involving the three south Caucasus states (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia), as well as the two regional powers, Russia and Turkey. In
2008, the initiative was officially presented to different players in the region: to
President Medvedev in Moscow (Russia) on August 13, in Tbilisi (Georgia) on
August 14, and in Baku (Azerbaijan) on August 20.
The goal of the CSCP is to strengthen regional peace, stability and security
as well as ending tensions and developing good relations. The new initiative is a
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cooperative attempt at conflict prevention, multilateral security, and regional stability.3 In addition, it aims to secure the vulnerable energy export routes running
from the Caspian Sea to Europe. The potential role of the platform in anticipating
potential problems and developing preventive policies was explicitly underlined
by Turkish President Abdullah Gül: “If there is stability in the region and if problems can be solved before they grow in magnitude and if there is a secure environment then this will bring economic development and welfare to the people in the
region.”4
The efforts to find a solution carried out by Turkey in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian conflict by proposing the CSCP is therefore a concrete example of a
new approach in Turkey’s foreign policy. The platform is indeed part of a broader
initiative to assert Turkish geopolitical influence not only in the Caucasus region
but also in other surrounding regions.5
However, Turkey’s idea to launch an initiative for the south Caucasus is not
entirely new. In the late 1990s, then Turkish President Süleyman Demirel proposed a similar regional initiative, the South Caucasus Stability Pact,6 also aiming
to establish security, stability and development in the region. Having the format
of a pact, the proposal was politically more ambitious than the platform currently
proposed by Erdoğan. Creating a platform instead of a pact is understood as a
rather smooth rapprochement between the participating countries as it has as the
main objective to create confidence and trust. Considering that this time Russia is
part of the initiative, contrary to the earlier proposal from the 1990s, and relations
between Turkey and Russia have improved, the political environment to find a solution for the region is more favorable today than it was ten years ago. Therefore,
Turkey’s new initiative for the region has more prospects of being successful.7
Since Erdoğan’s first official visits to Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, meetings
have taken place at the margins of international summits such as at the OSCE
summit in December 2008, where representatives of all four countries were consulted.8 In 2009, a number of high-level bilateral meetings took place, including
Gül’s visit to Russia in February, and several meetings at the margin of the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) meeting in Yerevan where the CSCP was discussed between the then Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and the Russian
Foreign Minister Lavrov as well as with the Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Mammad. During Gül’s visit to Moscow in February 2009, Turkey
and Russia confirmed that the CSCP was a constructive initiative that would help
overcome the lack of confidence among the countries in the region.9
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Still lacking is an official meeting or summit at the ministerial level to formally
inaugurate and establish the platform. Official statements about possible participation of the four countries in Turkey’s initiative are also missing. However, the
development and future effectiveness of the Turkish initiative will depend on the
approval of the CSCP by the countries in the region. In addition, the view of the
EU and its member states concerning Turkey’s engagement in the region will have
a crucial impact on the international perception of the CSCP. It will also be important how the CSCP will be placed in relation with other existing EU initiatives,
such as the EaP or the BSS.
Perceptions of and Reactions to the CSCP by the Countries in
the Region
When Turkey first proposed the CSCP, some considered the idea to be ill conceived due to the several bilateral conflicts among the five countries that were
to take part in the initiative. However, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia quickly
welcomed the idea. Georgia, initially reluctant, later agreed to be part of it. Unresolved bilateral conflicts, namely between Azerbaijan and Armenia and between
Russia and Georgia, as well as the lack of official diplomatic relations between
Turkey and Armenia, make the region a conflict-prone one. Traditional strong
bilateral ties between some of the countries lead to a situation where every issue is
linked to each other. Therefore, the CSCP has a difficult task to promote regional
cooperation and its effectiveness will mainly depend on the willingness of the
three south Caucasus countries and Russia to cooperate.
Azerbaijan and Armenia
In general, the reaction of both Azerbaijan and Armenia to the CSCP have
been positive. However, both countries became hesitant as soon as Turkey took
concrete steps to improve relations in the region. Azerbaijan especially opposed
Turkey’s moves to normalize its relations with Armenia when a window of opportunity was opened for Turkey and Armenia in April 2009 with Switzerland
proposing a roadmap to establish diplomatic relations between both countries.
Erdoğan’s visit to Azerbaijan in May 2009 ended the concerns of the Azerbaijani
government about a possible rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia and
underlined once more that the improved ties with Armenia did not change Turkey’s stance regarding Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Taking into consideration Azerbaijani worries, Erdoğan stressed in Baku in May 2009 that Turkey would not
open the borders with Armenia without a solution on Nagorno-Karabakh.10 Armenia’s reactions after the Turkish visit to Azerbaijan have also been very harsh,
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and it was announced that cooperation between Turkey and Armenia might come
to an end. Nonetheless, according to the recent reports secret talks between Armenia and Turkey, facilitated by Switzerland are still underway.
Turkish-Azeri relations are marked by long historical and cultural bondage.
Turkey politically supports Azerbaijan’s position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict11 and has frozen its diplomatic relations with Armenia in the aftermath of
the conflict in 1993. In addition, Azerbaijan and Turkey consider themselves
important energy partners. Azerbaijan welcomed the Turkish initiative to create a platform for dialogue in the region and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar
Mammadyarov said that stability in the South Caucasus would be good for the
countries in the region.12
However, having a special tie to Turkey, Azerbaijan is relatively reluctant to support steps that would improve Turkey’s relations with Armenia, worrying about
a possible downgrading of its own special relationship with Turkey. Before being
assured by Turkey that a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh issue was necessary in
order to take any steps to normalize ties with Armenia, Azerbaijan reacted very
harshly as it sees any steps leading to an improvement of relations between Turkey
and Armenia with suspicion. Therefore, the long-term support from Azerbaijan
for the CSCP will depend on the precondition that the process of normalization
of relations between Armenia and Turkey continue to be linked to the resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Therefore, Turkish official reactions to Azerbaijan’s criticisms underline the
need to see normalizing ties with Armenia in parallel with a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In his speech in the Azerbaijani parliament in May 2009
Erdoğan underlined that the international community should uphold the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan while at the same time support dialogue between
Baku and Yerevan. However, Turkey’s demands to link the Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict complicate the solution of the
problems between Ankara and Yerevan.
Armenia has welcomed the CSCP, underlining that Turkey and Armenia could
cooperate in the framework of the initiative. After the Russian-Georgian conflict,
Armenia pointed out that it had become even clearer how vulnerable the region
was. Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian said “In our region, co-operation and
security are issues that we have to discuss on a permanent basis. Hence, we can
only welcome the idea of a project that aims to improve co-operation, mutual
trust and security—even if there are still certain points to be clarified, beginning
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with the format and mechanisms of this platform.”13 While welcoming the initiative in general terms, the Armenian Foreign Minister said that besides the format
and the implementation “other aspects” had to be clarified.”14
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia became the most important
Russian ally in the south Caucasus. Armenia’s tensions with its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey, allowed for the maintaining of Russian dominance over Armenia, as demonstrated by the continued presence of a Russian military base in
Armenia and Armenia’s economic and political dependence on Russia. Having a
problematic relationship with Turkey, Armenia might be cautious when it comes
to upgrading Turkey’s role as a regional power within the CSCP. Armenia’s support for the future development of the CSCP will depend on the development of
the Turkish-Russian relationship. Under the condition that Russia actually supports the CSCP in the long run, an improvement of relations between Russia and
Turkey could, to a certain extent, downgrade the special relations between Armenia and Russia.
Georgia
The initial reaction of Georgia to the CSCP was negative. Georgia said that
it would not sit at the same table with Russia unless it fully withdrew its troops
from Georgia. After the military conflict with Russia in 2008, Georgia was more
reluctant to the idea of participating in a common stability platform as proposed
by Turkey as the disputes between Georgia and Russia, concerning Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, remain unresolved.15 The two countries have opposing goals:
Whereas Russia, shortly after the ceasefire, officially recognized the independence
of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 26, 2008, Georgia demands for the
restoration of its full territorial integrity. Nonetheless, despite its earlier statements, Georgia overcame its initial hesitation and said it would be part of the
proposed platform.16
Russia
For the time being, Russia seems to be the most disposed stakeholder in the region to support the idea of the platform. In September 2008, the Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia regarded the idea of the platform “positively” and that the CSCP was “a mechanism for limiting the conflict potential of
the region and increasing stability,” adding that the countries of the region should
solve their problems by themselves.17 In February 2009, Turkey and Russia signed
a Joint Declaration where they underlined that the CSCP was a constructive ini184
tiative that would help to overcome the lack of confidence among the countries
in the region.18
By participating in this regional initiative, Russia can renew its image as an important player in the region. Russia’s unilateral recognition of the independence of
the two regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia contradicted international law and
has created frictions in the United Nations and elsewhere.19 Its participation in a
regional platform aiming to establish trust and confidence would offer a possibility for Russia to improve its international image after the latest military conflict.20
Its strategic incentive to participate in the CSCP is also grounded on the goal to
keep an influential position in the region. Since the CSCP does not include the
EU and the USA, it is perceived by some as a dominion by Russia and Turkey
over the region. Moscow could use the CSCP as an opportunity to re-establish
control in its historic zone of influence without having to work with a European
initiative. Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether Russia would in the end
support a regional cooperation that strengthens the ties among the three south
Caucasus countries themselves. Furthermore, attributing Turkey a leading role
in the region could possibly undermine Russia’s traditional role as the dominant
regional power.
Diverging Interests in the Region
Regarding the highly delicate nature of bilateral relations in this region, trying to improve relations through a multilateral framework is the right approach.
The CSCP could present the appropriate framework for that purpose. Nevertheless, Georgia’s reluctance at the beginning to join the CSCP, Russia’s view of the
platform as a basis to reinforce its sphere of influence in the southern Caucasus,
and Azerbaijan’s reactions towards steps leading to a normalization of relations
between Turkey and Armenia show that a joint policy in this region remains a
great challenge. Given the divergent strategic interests of the five countries, the
probability of obstacles in the further development of the CSCP is high. A set
of different traditional ties and alliances between the countries complicates the
establishment of a platform that aims to create trust and transparency. At present,
the five countries do not share a common vision or identity that would serve as an
incentive to resolve the remaining conflicts.
For example, the countries have different positions in respect to membership
aspiration or integration with the EU. While the western Balkan countries share
the objective of EU integration and realize that closer cooperation within the region is indispensable, this motor for regional integration does not exist within the
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south Caucasus countries.21 Therefore, the strategic incentives to participate in
the platform might differ. The CSCP might be used by the countries for pushing
their own geopolitical orientations and not for promoting a common vision for
the region. The interests of the three south Caucasus countries differ concerning
the relations with the EU. Whereas Georgia clearly underlines its EU aspirations
and aims for membership, Armenia and Azerbaijan are less keen on doing so.
Azerbaijan, being strategically important in terms of energy security for the EU
and making very little progress in terms of democracy and good governance, has
so far not pronounced strong EU membership aspirations. Armenia might as well
be hesitant when it comes to EU membership due to its dual geopolitical orientation between Russia and the EU: On the one hand, Armenia has close political relations with Russia, being economically dependent on its ally, and therefore
avoids expressing strong EU aspirations in order not to affront Russia. On the
other hand, the EU is an important partner for Armenia, due to the ENP and the
influential Armenian diasporas in the EU and the US.
EU Initiatives in the South Eastern Neighborhood
Russia and Turkey are not the only players in the south Caucasus. The EU also
has an interest in having good and stable relations with its neighbors in southeastern Europe. With the last EU enlargement in 2007, the EU also became a
Black Sea power and hence has an even bigger interest in developing closer relations with the region. The EU pays attention to the region in order to secure its
idea of the “ring of friends”22 around its own external borders.
For the time being, the ENP represents the overall framework organizing
the relations between the EU and its neighbors. The ENP is meant to provide an
opportunity for close, privileged relations, especially in political and economic
terms, and a degree of integration going beyond normal cooperation with other
countries.23 After having long ignored the south Caucasus, the EU finally discovered its new neighbors and included them in the framework of the ENP in 2004.24
Even though the EU´s engagement has not been visible in recent years, a slow but
constantly increasing interest for the south Caucasus can be seen, especially after
the EU enlargement in 2007.
Apart from the general ENP framework, different specific EU initiatives for
regional cooperation in Eastern Europe exist which are allocated within the ENP.
After the re-launching of the ENP to the south leading to the establishment of the
Union for the Mediterranean in July 2008, the EU proposed an initiative for its eastern neighbors and the EaP, based on the existing ENP framework, was promoted,
186
especially by Eastern European EU member states. A Polish-Swedish proposal was
launched in May 2008,25 and following the military conflict in the southern Caucasus, the European Council reaffirmed its wish to set up the EaP and asked the EC
to accelerate its work on the proposal.26 The EC published a statement on the EaP
on December 3, 2008 which was discussed in the Council during the spring 2009
summit in order to be inaugurated in Prague on May 7, 2009.27
The EaP aims to improve the EU´s relations towards its eastern and south-eastern European neighbors.28 Its geographical scope is a 27+6 format: The twentyseven EU member states and six partners in the neighborhood (Belarus, Moldova,
Ukraine in the east, and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the south east). However, it is possible to invite Russia and Turkey as observers on a case-by-case basis.
Another EU initiative is the so-called Black Sea Synergy (BSS). Since the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU has become an integral part of the Black Sea
region and therefore it has also a vested interest in security and stability around
the Black Sea. As a complementary to the bilateral projects already initiated by the
ENP in form of the action plans or specific country strategies, the BSS29 promotes
stability in the littoral countries.30 In July 2008, just after the Paris summit, the BSS
received new impetus when the European Parliament declared itself in favor of
the future establishment of a so-called Union of the Black Sea, which would have
the Union for the Mediterranean as a model, and would be a concrete follow-up
to the BSS.31
Turkey’s New Platform: Competing with the EU Initiatives?
In the EU´s eastern neighborhood, regional forms of cooperation are en vogue
and, as shown above, various projects have been initiated by the different players
in the region. Whereas the BSS and the EaP are EU-initiated projects, the BSEC
and the CSCP are developed by regional players.32 However, the initiatives coming
from the EU and Turkey overlap in geographical scope. Therefore, it is important
to analyze the similarities, synergies or complementarities and there is a need to
coordinate the parallel development of all initiatives launched in the European
neighborhood.
First, one can state that the geographical scope covered by these initiatives is
slightly different: The EaP is an EU-27+6 format which includes the EU-27, the
three eastern European ENP countries, plus the three south Caucasus countries.
The CSCP excludes the EU but includes the three south Caucasus countries and
Turkey and Russia (3+2 format). The BSS covers the five Black Sea littoral EU
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member states, five ENP countries, including the three south Caucasus countries,
and Russia and Turkey (EU-5+(3+2)+2).33
Secondly, the political focus of the initiatives differs. As the EaP has a pragmatic approach with concrete projects and intends to improve the relations,
basing them on both a bilateral and a multilateral approach, the CSCP could be
complementary in the sense that it tries to establish trust and dialogue between
the south Caucasus countries, Turkey and Russia. As Turkey and Russia are part
of the tensions in the region, they have to be involved in any initiative aimed at
conflict resolution. From a Turkish point of view, the CSCP is not meant to be an
exclusive club, but rather aims to create synergies with existing structures in the
region. Turkey takes into consideration possible complementarities to the BSS or
the newly proposed EaP.34
Thirdly, not only the political focus of the initiatives differs, but also their political center of gravity. Whereas the center of gravity of the EaP lies in Brussels and
does not include the regional players, namely Turkey and Russia, as full participants, the CSCP includes both countries as important actors. Therefore, within the
CSCP the center of gravity clearly belongs to the two regional powers, Turkey and
Russia. The BSS’s centre of gravity is neither Brussels nor the two regional powers,
but the Black Sea region itself. Therefore, the BSS including the Black Sea littoral
EU member states, the EaP countries35 plus Russia and Turkey, could be one structure in which consultation mechanisms aiming to find synergies and exchanging
best practices could be established. Those mechanisms between all existing initiatives are necessary and could consequently boost the aims of all initiatives.
For the successful evolution of all the initiatives it will be important to take
into consideration the possible impact of the new Turkish initiative on the EaP
and vice versa, and on shaping the ENP in general. It will also be important to
evaluate the compatibilities of the CSCP with the BSS. In addition, questions regarding possible consultation mechanisms have to be tackled. An evaluation of
the added value of the parallel developments of the initiatives is important in order to get all concerned stakeholders on board. This coordination will be a particular challenge for the future development of the ENP and will ascribe Turkey
an important role.
An Outlook for Turkey
Even though being a significant initiative, the CSCP could be criticized for
being too vague and without real tangible content. Being in discussion since sum188
mer 2008, the main traits of this platform
Turkey does not see the CSCP
remain unclear to the wider public, espeas duplication but rather as a
cially to the citizens in the region. The abcomplementary initiative to
sence of an official strategy for the CSCP
facilitate communication and
could be explained by Turkey’s extremely
ambitious objective to bring all parties dialogue between the countries
from the region together within one
in the region
platform in order to create stability and
to solve existing problems. This objective requires an enormous diplomatic effort
by Turkey. A first step in this process could be the development of a transparent
and visible communication strategy about the initiative, its aims and methods.
The role the platform would play—especially in relation to the EU initiatives—
remains imprecise. One way for Turkey’s initiative to become more visible could
be the elaboration of a “non-paper” (internal discussion document), presenting
the main objectives of the platform and developing a concrete strategy. In the
mid term, a formalized exchange of views with the participating countries could
be established. In the long term, a conference inaugurating the CSCP would be
essential.
Turkey does not see the CSCP as duplication but rather as a complementary
initiative to facilitate communication and dialogue between the countries in the
region. Nevertheless, the CSCP proposal includes neither the EU nor the USA
as participating parties. Turkey already attempted to address concerns from the
USA and the EU by suggesting that in the future both could be accommodated or
integrated into the initiative. As the CSCP does not include these Western powers,
it is perceived by some as a dominion over the region by Russia and Turkey. Russia
especially could take the opportunity of the CSCP as another step to exclude the
Western powers from the region. Under these circumstances it will be a challenge
for Turkey to establish consultation mechanisms between the CSCP and EU initiatives for the region.
Concerning the EaP, the then Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan declared in
February 2009 that it was a “very important idea,” pointing out that for the Caucasus the most important principle was using dialogue to resolve the problems:
“That is the key for the Caucasus and that is what we have been supporting from
the very beginning.”36 In April 2009, the Turkish Foreign Minister underlined that
Turkey closely followed the EU’s new initiatives in the region, such as the EaP: “In
this connection, we are pleased that the EU Presidency and the EU Commission
are willing to (…) help avoid possible duplication of activities in the region.”37
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One concrete step the EU
could take would be to propose
a common consultation
mechanism in order to identify
possible synergies between the
existing EU initiatives for the
region and the CSCP
Being an EU candidate country, Turkey has always reacted cautiously towards suggestions of getting involved
into the general framework of the ENP.
Turkey aims to avoid the situation where
its participation in the ENP—via the
EaP for example—leads to a complication of its already much disputed status
as a candidate country. But here Turkey
needs to take the opportunity and consider any involvement in EU initiatives as
an important step towards its aim to create a peaceful neighborhood. Thereby,
Turkey could demonstrate its will to find solutions to the existing problems in the
region. Turkey would also benefit from the EaP as it shares the EU’s objectives in
the region, such as resolving conflicts through peaceful means. Turkey should declare more openly and explicitly that the CSCP is complementary to the EaP and
that the synergies with these initiatives are important for a future collaboration in
the region. Developing consultation mechanisms between the existing initiatives
would be helpful in order to avoid any duplication.
The CSCP should not be perceived as a Turkish policy aiming to impose its
own visions on the region. It is also important that Russia not just uses the CSCP
to re-instate its influence in the region and then stays away from cooperation with
other EU initiatives. Hence, Turkey should take the opportunity to act as a mediator and offer a consultative forum for all players. A fruitful development of the
initiative would represent a success of Turkey’s new foreign policy approach.
An Outlook for the EU
The Caucasus region is of utmost importance to Europe’s energy security as
it is home to energy sources (Azerbaijan) and important energy transit routes
(Georgia). In addition, the EU has an interest in stabilizing its south-eastern borders. As a candidate country Turkey is a strategic partner for the EU and can act
as a bridge between the EU and the south Caucasus. Not surprisingly, initial reactions from the EU concerning the idea of CSCP have been positive. The EC and
the European Parliament have welcomed Turkey’s role in the region. The reason
why a detailed evaluation from the EU side is missing might be explained with the
fact that, since no official paper on the CSCP exists, neither constructive criticism
nor approval is feasible. Nevertheless, the EU should not miss the opportunity
to welcome an initiative coming from the region itself and to try to support it by
searching for synergies with its own policies.
190
One concrete step the EU could take would be to propose a common consultation mechanism in order to identify possible synergies between the existing EU
initiatives for the region and the CSCP. For the EU initiatives that cover regions in
conflict to be effective, the solution of these conflicts is fundamental. The recent
blocking of the establishment of the secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean due to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian occupied territories
has shown the danger of failing to solve conflicts. In the end, the success and the
value of the CSCP will depend on the results achieved in the field of security and
if trust and confidence are established. Entering a process of solving the existing
conflicts in the south Caucasus would provide the basis for a successful multilateral cooperation, just as what the EaP intends to achieve. As the framework of the
ENP has so far not been successful concerning conflict resolution, the EU should
consider the Turkish proposal as an opportunity to fill this shortcoming.
Another opportunity for the EU lies in an improved cooperation with Turkey
and the EU’s eastern neighborhood. A détente between Turkey and Armenia, as
symbolically initiated by Gül’s visit to Armenia in September 2008, for example,
could be a stabilization factor not only for the south Caucasus region itself but
also for the EU. At the same time, the EU as an independent party could use the
opportunity to be an impartial mediator for the partners in the region. Finally, the
development of trust and confidence and the resolving of conflicts via enhanced
dialogue through the CSCP would be a basis for stabilization in the south Caucasus.
Conclusion
In order to achieve its proclaimed target of peace and stability on the European continent, the EU needs to collaborate with other important players on the
periphery of Europe such as Turkey or Russia. While Russia retains its traditional
powerful position in the eastern European neighborhood and is a key player for
energy supply, Turkey could be characterized as being Russia’s soft power mirror
in the south east of Europe. Turkey as an EU candidate country and sharing an
overlapping eastern neighborhood with the EU in the Balkans and the south Caucasus is a crucial strategic partner and acts as a complementary bridge between
the EU and the south Caucasus.
Using its traditional soft power approach in the region, the EU is aiming to
create a stable and peaceful neighborhood. So is Turkey. Turkey’s renewed efforts
as a regional power are very much in line with the EU foreign policy. Turkey has
also started to use the EU´s example of soft security power in dealing with its
191
neighbors. Therefore, their policies should be understood as complementary. In
order to identify possible synergies between the BSS, the EaP and the CSCP common consultation mechanism are needed. The region as a whole, including Russia
and Turkey, as well as the EU, could benefit, if they succeed in establishing a winwin-situation for all stakeholders.
Endnotes
1. European Commission (2008), Turkey 2008 Progress Report, SEC (2008) 2699, Brussels, November 5, 2008.
2. The OSCE Minsk Group was created in 1992 by the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe with the aim to encourage a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by deploying OSCE multinational peacekeeping forces. To date it has not been possible to reach this aim.
3. Ali Babacan, Speech at OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Helsinki, December 5, 2008.
4. Hasan Kanbolat, “Experts analyze Caucasus Platform, What is Caucasian stability and cooperation? What can Turkey do in the Caucasus?,” Zaman, August 19, 2008.
5. Richard Giragosian, “Changing Armenia-Turkish Relations,” Fokus Südkaukasus, Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, Vol. 01/09, February 2009, p. 3.
6. Mehman Aliyev, “From Balkan Pact to Stability for Caucasus,” Turan Information Agency,
September 29, 2008.
7. For a skeptical view, see: Saban Kardas, “Turkey’s Push for Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,” ADA Biweekly, Vol.1, No.4, September 1, 2008.
8. Michael Thumann, “Erdoğans neue Außenpolitik,“ Zeit Online, February 13, 2008, retrieved
May 20, 2009 from http://www.zeit.de/online/2008/51/tuerkei-aussenpolitik-friedensvermittlung.
9. Joint Declaration between Republic of Turkey and Russian Federation, Moscow, February 13,
2009, see: www.mfa.gov.tr.
10. Cenk Başlamış, “ABD’li Diplomatın Karabağ Bombası,” Milliyet, May 13, 2009; Ümit Enginsoy, “Turkish-Armenian deal on course, Clinton says,” Hürriyet, June 8, 2009.
11. The Nagorno-Karabakh war took place from 1988 and 1994. In May 1994 an unofficial ceasefire was reached through Russian negotiation. Despite this ceasefire, fatalities due to armed conflicts
between Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers continued.
12. Anspress, “Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Comments on Ankara’s Caucasus Stability and Cooperation platform,” September 4, 2008, www.anspress.com.
13. Edward Nalbandian, “Armenia in the World,” Interview, Politique Internationale, March 4,
2009.
14. Niki Gamm, Gül Demir, “Armenian call for solidarity,” Hurriyet, November 24, 2008.
15. The first South Ossetian War took place from 1991 to 1992 between Georgians and the Ossetians. In 1992 a cease-fire was established and defined both a zone of conflict around the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and a security corridor along the border of South Ossetian territories.
16. Burcu Punsmann Gültekin, The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt
to Foster Regional Accountability, Policy Brief, International Centre for Black Sea Studies, No 13,
April 2009.
17. Sergey Lavrov, Press Conference, September 2, 2008, see: www.turkey.mid.ru.
192
18. Joint Declaration between Republic of Turkey and Russian Federation, Moscow, February
13, 2009, see: www.mfa.gov.tr.
19. The EU, NATO, OSCE, the US and many countries have voiced displeasure with Russia’s
decision and have reaffirmed their recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity.
20. Besides Russia, Nicaragua is the only state having recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, backing the Russian stance on the breakaway Georgian regions.
21. Council of Europe (2006), The Establishment of a Stability Pact for the South Caucasus,
Resolution 1525, adopted November 17, 2006.
22. Romano Prodi, Speech/02/619, p. 4.
23. European Commission (2003), Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104.
24. Having in the beginning an uncertainty about whether to include Russia in the ENP or not,
and clearly excluding the Southern Caucasus still back in 2004 for the time being 16 countries are included in the ENP; East: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine; South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia;
South: Algeria; Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian territory, Syria, Tunisia; Libya.
25. http://www.msz.gov.pl/Polish-Swedish,Proposal,19911.html.
26. Council of the EU (2008), Presidency Conclusions, September 1, 2008, 12594/08, Point 7.
27. Council of the EU (2009), Joint Declaration, Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 8435,
May 7, 2009.
28. European Commission (2008), Communication, Eastern Partnership, December 3, 2008,
823/4; the EaP developed two main axes: First, a more enhanced bilateral cooperation between EU
and partner countries leading to further economic and social integration; secondly, a renewed project oriented multilateral cooperation, creating a permanent multilateral framework.
29. The BSS was achieved under the German EU presidency in 2007. Cooperation in areas such
as energy security, securing of borders, transport, environmental protection or water management
are foreseen. The primary objective is to strengthen mutual trust so that conflicts can be solved.
30. The EU’s cooperation with the Black Sea states in the framework of the BSS is a concrete
example promoting regionalisation, as one of the basic principles of the ENP.
31. European Parliament (2008), Resolution on the Commission’s 2007 Enlargement Strategy
Paper, (2007/2271(INI)), P6_TA(2008)0363, July 10, 2008.
32. In June 1992, the Heads of State and Government of eleven countries signed the Summit
Declaration and the Bosporus Statement in Istanbul giving birth to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). It came into existence as a promising model of multilateral political and economic
initiative aimed at fostering interaction and harmony among the involved countries, as well as to
ensure peace, stability and prosperity encouraging friendly and good-neighborly relations in the
Black Sea region.
33. Countries involved in the BSS: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova in the West, Ukraine
and Russia in the North, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the East and Turkey in the South.
34. Ali Babacan, “Turkish initiatives, Calming the Caucasus,” International Herald Tribune, September 23, 2008.
35. With the exception of Belarus as it is not a Black Sea littoral state.
36. Ali Babacan, Speech at 45th Munich Security Conference, February 7, 2009, see: www.mfa.
gov.tr.
37. Ali Babacan, Speech at 20th Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers of Organization of
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), April 16, 2009.
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