Evidence from an Emerging Economy - Turkey

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
IZA DP No. 1614
Economic Performance and Unemployment:
Evidence from an Emerging Economy - Turkey
Hakan Berument
Nukhet Dogan
Aysit Tansel
May 2005
Forschungsinstitut
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
Economic Performance and
Unemployment: Evidence from
an Emerging Economy - Turkey
Hakan Berument
Bilkent University
Nukhet Dogan
Gazi University
Aysit Tansel
Middle East Technical University
and IZA Bonn
Discussion Paper No. 1614
May 2005
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IZA Discussion Paper No. 1614
May 2005
ABSTRACT
Economic Performance and Unemployment:
Evidence from an Emerging Economy - Turkey ∗
This article examines whether various macroeconomic policy shocks have different effects on
overall unemployment rate and the unemployment rate by different levels of education in
Turkey. These effects are assessed for total, male and female unemployment rates
separately. To examine the relationship, a quarterly VAR model with a recursive order is
employed to estimate the effects of real GDP, price, exchange rate, interbank interest rate,
money supply and unemployment for the period from 1988:01 to 2003:04. Main findings
indicate that a positive income shock reduces total unemployment while positive exchange
rate and interbank interest rate innovations both increase the unemployment rate during the
initial periods. The responses of high school educated unemployment rate to five
macroeconomic variable shocks are different than the response of other educational
unemployment rates. Furthermore, the overall results across gender are similar.
JEL Classification:
Keywords:
E24, C32
unemployment, economic performance and vector autoregressive regression
Corresponding author:
Aysit Tansel
Economics Department
Middle East Technical University
Ankara 06531
Turkey
Email: [email protected]
∗
The authors gratefully acknowledge the Financial Support from the Turkish Academy of Science
(SBB-4024).
1. Introduction
This article examines whether various macroeconomic policy instruments have
different effects on overall unemployment rate and the unemployment rate by different levels
of education. These effects are assessed for male and female unemployment rates separately
as well as for the total. The focus is on the unemployment rate by education levels. Bulutay
(1996) argues that unemployment rates across different education levels have different
characteristics. For example after the February 2001 crisis, unemployment rate was 13.31
percent for high school graduates while it was 4.08 percent for the literate without diploma.
Moreover the unemployment rate for high school graduate females was 20 percent while for
males 11.47 percent. The unemployment rate for the literate without diploma was 1.53
percent for females and 7.16 percent for males. In the analysis that follows we compare how
various shocks affect the female and male unemployment rates as well as the overall
unemployment rate. The overall unemployment rate reflects the labor market conditions for
the entire labor force. Since the labor force participation of males is much higher than that of
the females, the movements in the male and overall unemployment rates are expected to be
similar to each other.
In this study, the specific exogenous changes whose effects on unemployment are
assessed include changes in output, exchange rate, prices, interest rate and other
macroeconomic factors. Using econometric techniques, Vector Autoregression (VAR)
specifications are estimated for the effects of changes in various macroeconomic factors on
the overall unemployment rate and unemployment rates by education levels. These effects are
estimated for the period 1988:01 to 2003:04.
In the literature only a handful of studies have been done to investigate the role of
fundamental macroeconomic variables on the unemployment rate. To the best of our
knowledge, there are two theoretical studies. These are by Agenor and Aizenman (1999) and
Daitoh (2003). Agenor and Aizenman (1999) theoretically analyzed the implications of fiscal
and labor market policies on output, wages and unemployment in a general equilibrium model
for a small open developing economy. They found that there is no close relationship in the
short run between changes in output and the unemployment rate. Daitoh (2003) theoretically
investigated how the low interest rate policy in the commercial banking sector affects the
urban unemployment in a small open Harris-Todaro model. His results suggested that in a
Harris-Todaro economy where the agriculture plays a dominant role in the domestic
employment and production, the financial liberalization aggravates the rate and volume of
urban unemployment. The papers most similar to ours are by Zavodny and Zha (2000) and
2
Algan (2002). Zavodny and Zha (2000) examined the relationship between monetary policy
and race-specific unemployment rate in the US and concluded that black unemployment rate
does respond slightly differently than the overall unemployment rate to macroeconomic
variables. Algan (2002) examined the response of unemployment to aggregate demand,
aggregate supply shocks using a structural VAR model for France and the US. He observed
that the aggregate demand, aggregate supply framework is well suited for the US but poorly
explains the French labor market. Our study assesses the effects of various macroeconomic
shocks (beside the aggregate demand and supply shocks) on the various components of
unemployment rate. The present study is the first application to Turkish data of examining the
relation between macroeconomic policy instruments and the unemployment rate. There are
various advantages of using Turkish data. First, Turkey is one of the predominant emerging
markets. Second, Turkish financial and labor markets are not heavily regulated and Turkish
real wages are flexible. Therefore, economic shocks are transmitted to labor markets easily.
Third, high variability of the Turkish economic variables decreases the Type-II error – the
error that is made when an incorrect null hypothesis is not rejected. Main findings of this
paper indicate that a positive income shock reduces total unemployment while a positive
exchange rate and interbank interest rate innovations both increase the unemployment rate
during the initial periods. Furthermore, the results show that the responses of the female and
male unemployment rates to the five economic shocks are mostly similar across different
educational levels except for the high school level.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the trends in the overall
unemployment rate and the unemployment rates by education levels for males and females, in
Turkey. The data used in this study are described in Section 3. The econometric model used to
estimate the relationship between various macroeconomic factors and the unemployment rate
is explained in Section 4. The estimation results are discussed in Section 5. Conclusions
appear in Section 6.
2. Trends in Unemployment Rates
We first give a brief account of the recent developments in the Turkish economy for
the period 1988 to 2003. Figure 1 plots the GDP per capita in USD. During this period, there
were four major shocks in the Turkish economy. The first one was in 1991 and was due to the
adverse effects of the Gulf War. The second major shock occurred in 1994 due to the
mismanagement of the domestic debt. A stabilization policy was put into effect in April.
Interest rate and the exchange rates soared. There was a devaluation of the Turkish lira by
3
almost 70 percent. The economy contracted by about six percent. However, the recovery was
quick and in the following year the growth rate was eight percent. The third major shock was
in 1999. During the first half of the 1999 the delayed effect of the Russian crisis on the
Turkish economy was felt. In the second half of the 1999 two major earthquakes struck the
eastern Marmara region which is the industrial heartland of the country with substantial
adverse effects on output and employment. Fourth major shock was the financial crisis of
November 2000 followed by the February 2001 crisis. This was the severest shock in the
history of the Turkish Republic. The GNP declined by about 9.6 percent in 2001. The effects
of this crisis were both prolonged and widespread as compared to the previous crises.
In order to visualize the evolution of the unemployment we plot the rates by gender
over the 1988-2003 period in Figure 2.According to the State Institute of Statistics of Turkey
(SIS), unemployed are defined as all persons 15 years of age and over who are not employed
during the reference period, who have taken specific step(s) to obtain a job during the last six
months and are available to start work within 15 days (See SIS, 2004). The figure shows the
biannual rates before the 2000 and the quarterly rates for the 2000 and after due to data
availability.
It is believed that the unemployment rate should follow the trends in the
economy. However, it is not possible to see the impact of the major shocks on the
unemployment rate with the biannual data. In contrast the quarterly rates reflect the effects of
the 2001 crisis and the ensuing recession.
Figure 2 shows that the total unemployment rate follows the trends in the male
unemployment rate. However, female unemployment rate shows fluctuations over time
although following the same trend. There is some increase in the male unemployment rate in
1994 and then in 1999, but the increasing trend is evident after 2000 due to the effect of 2001
crisis and the recession that followed.
Unemployment rates by education levels are shown in Figure 3 for females and in
Figure 4 for males. Figure 3 shows that, unemployment rate of the university graduates for
females are above the average unemployment rate. Another observation is that the
unemployment rates of the junior high school and vocational high school graduates are more
cyclical than the unemployment rate of the other education levels. Figure 4 indicates that for
the period between 1994 and 1997 male unemployment rates showed a steady decrease in all
education levels. However, after the 2001 recession, male unemployment rate increased
substantially for all education levels. These figures indicate that unemployment rate of high
school graduates are higher than that of the other education levels for both males and females.
Further the unemployment rates of university graduates increased sharply after the 2001
4
crisis. As it is well known even, the graduates of the prestigious universities were adversely
affected, by the crisis.
3. Data
Quarterly data from 1988:01 to 2003:04 are used in this study. Macroeconomic
indicators are real GDP(Y), price (P), exchange rate (EXCH), interbank interest rate
(INTERBANK) and money supply (M1) plus repo (M). They are obtained from electronic
database system of Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), (CBRT, 2004). The
other data set which includes the total unemployment rates and the unemployment rates by
education and gender were compiled from data delivery system to the State Institute of
Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey (SIS, 2004). During the period 1988-1999, The
Household Labor Force Surveys (HLFS) were conducted twice a year in April and October.
In the year 2000, application frequency, sample size, estimation dimension, questionnaire
design and some other aspects of the HLFS were changed. Since 2000, the households have
been followed quarterly. Since we didn’t have quarterly data for the 1988-1999 periods, we
estimated the missing quarters by using the interpolation method.
4. Model Specification
A quarterly VAR model is used to estimate real GDP, price, exchange rate, interbank
interest rate, money supply and the unemployment relationship for the period from 1988:01 to
2003:04. Real GDP is used as a measure of income. Price level is measured by the GDP
deflator. The Exchange rate is defined as Turkish Lira value of the official currency basket
which is composed of 1 USD and 0.77 Euro. Interest rate is interbank’s overnight interest
rate. Finally, M1+repo are taken as the measure of money supply. There are two reasons for
including repo in the money supply aggregates (Berument, 2004). First, most of the repo
transactions were overnight, hence this money aggregate was liquid. Second, agents prefer to
repo their savings rather than open deposit accounts since the repo rates are considerably
higher.
In order to address the seasonality, seasonal dummies are included in the VAR as
exogenous variables. For the three domestic financial crises in April 1994, November 2000
and February 2001 three exogenous dummy variables are also included. The coefficients on
the dummy variables for the 1991 and 1999 shocks to the economy were not statistically
significant and therefore, excluded from further analysis. Finally, because of the change in the
5
definition of M1 and repo, one more dummy variable is included in the VAR model after
1996.
The order of the variables in the VAR system is important. Ordering should imply that
first variable affects all the remaining variables contemporaneously, but others affect it with a
lag. Our variables are ordered as real GDP, price, exchange rate, interbank interest rate,
M1+repo and unemployment. It is assumed that GDP affects all the remaining variables
contemporaneously, but others affect it with a lag, but not contemporaneously. For example,
when exchange rate is the monetary policy variable, it is further assumed that monetary policy
actions have contemporaneous effects on interbank interest rate, M1+repo and
unemployment.
Similar assumptions were made by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1999) and Berument (2004). The model was estimated using log levels for all data except the
interbank interest rate. The lag length of two for the VARs was determined by the Schwartz
Bayesian selection criterion.
5. Empirical Evidence
Figures 5 to 12 report the impulse responses of the core VAR model that include real
GDP, price, exchange rate, interbank interest rate, M1 plus repo and unemployment by
educational statuses with two lags for 20 periods. The error bands for the impulse responses
are drawn at the 90% levels of confidence. The standard errors are calculated by
bootstrapping with 3000 draws.
Figure 5 plots how one standard deviation shock given to five macroeconomic
variables as well as the unemployment rates themselves affect the behavior of unemployment.
For expositional purposes, first we will interpret how the unemployment changes with income
innovations. The upper left one, in Figure 5A, B and C show how one standard deviation
shock to income decreases the total, female and male unemployment for the whole period. All
responses are statistically significant except for the initial periods for the total, female and
male, as well as the second quarter for the female. This result is consistent with various
econometric studies such as by Algan (2002) who finds that a positive demand shock
decreases the unemployment rate permanently for France and the US. However this effect is
not statistically significant at the 10% level for France. Similarly, Zavodny and Zha (2000)
find that tight monetary policies (negative demand shock) increase the unemployment. Hence,
our results are parallel with the results of these two studies.
Next we elaborate on how unemployment is affected by income innovations across the
education levels. We consider Illiterate, Literate without any Diploma, Primary School,
6
Junior High School, Vocational High School, High School and Higher Education
classifications. In order to save space, we will elaborate only the statistically significant
estimates.
In Figures 6.A and C, the responses of total and male illiterate to positive income
innovation are negative and statistically significant, except for the response between 2 and 3
periods. Figure 6.B suggests that female illiterate has a negative impact after first quarter.
However, after 3-periods, responses are statistically significant. Figures 7.A, B and C show
that one standard deviation shock to income decreases total, female and male unemployment
of literate without any diploma for the whole period. However, the first three quarters and
after 9-periods, one standard deviation shock to income decreases the total unemployment,
and this effect is statistically significant. For females, the effects are statistically significant
for initial levels and after the 7th period. Finally for the males, only the period between 2 and 3
is statistically significant.
Figures 8.A, B and C report response of Primary School Unemployment to income
innovation for the total, female and male unemployment. These three types of unemployment
decrease for the whole period. Figures 9.A and C, show that one standard shock to income
increases total and male junior high school unemployment at the initial level but decrease
them for the rest of the periods. They are statistically significant after 7th period. However, the
female junior high school unemployment responses are negative for the whole period and
statistically significant after the tenth quarter. In Figures 10.A and C, the responses of total
and male vocational high school unemployment are negative. The effects between the 1st and
3rd as well as after the 10th periods are statistically significant.
Figure 11 reports the analysis for the high school unemployment. One standard
deviation shock to income increases total, female and male high school unemployment for the
all periods. However, only the total and male high school unemployment effects are
statistically significant at the initial level. Figures 12.A, B and C show that one standard
deviation shock to income decreases total, female and male higher education unemployment
after around 9 quarters and the effects are statistically significant. In sum, the general trend is
that a shock on the income decreases the unemployment of different educational levels except
the high school unemployment, which is statistically significant only at the initial level.
Turkey is a small open economy. It mostly imports raw materials, intermediate
products, and machine & equipment for its investment. Therefore, it is plausible that
exchange rate movements affect the state of the economy adversely and increases
unemployment. Exchange rate also affects the economic performance through the net exports.
7
Higher exchange rate encourages exports and discourages imports (see Berument and
Pasaogullari, 2003, on the discussion of the effect of depreciation on the Turkish economic
performance). Therefore, next we assess how unemployment by various levels of education
responds to the exchange rate innovations.
Figures 5.A, B and C show that one standard deviation shock to exchange rate
increases the total, female and male unemployment for 8, 10 and 6 quarters respectively. After
that they are affected negatively. However, none of them are statistically significant. In
Figures 6 to 12, first row of second column reports the response of unemployment by
different educational levels to the exchange rate innovation. Most of the education levels have
positive impact for the first periods. After that they have negative impact. However, the
confidence intervals clearly indicate that the effects of shocks on the unemployment are not
statistically significant.
We next assess the impact of changes in money on total unemployment and
unemployment by different educational levels and gender. The one standard deviation shock
to the money causes the unemployment to decrease but only changes in total and male
unemployment are statistically significant at the initial level. Money shocks drive up
unemployment for the literate without diploma while unemployment rates for the other
education levels are moved in the opposite direction. These decreases are statistically
significant at the initial level for unemployment of junior high school, high school and higher
education levels.
A shock on the price has a negative and significant effect on total unemployment and
unemployment by different educational levels after about 3 periods except for the high school
unemployment. The responses of the high school unemployment are positive and statistically
significant for the total and male unemployment after 9 periods, for the female unemployment
after 5 periods.
After examining the one standard deviation shock to the price, we will interpret the
innovation to the interbank interest rate. Positive interbank interest rate innovations are often
taken as an indicator of monetary policy (Christiano et al., 1999). One standard deviation
shock to the interbank interest rate increases the total unemployment for 11 quarters but only
the first quarter of the increase in total unemployment is statistically significant. Figure 5.B
reports the results for female unemployment. The increase in unemployment is observed for
the first quarter, but the evidence is not statistically significant. Figure 5.A and C show effect
of one standard deviation shock to interbank interest rate on total and male unemployment.
8
Both of the unemployment increase for eight quarters but the increases are statistically
significant for the first quarter only.
Figure 6.A shows that the response of total illiterate unemployment to interbank
innovations is positive for the first quarter. After one period the response falls below zero for
the rest of the 20-periods. However it is statistically significant only for the period between 2
and 3. Figure 7.B shows that an initial response of female unemployment for literate without
diploma to one standard error shock to interbank interest rate is positive. Then the response
turns out to be negative for the rest of the periods. However, it is statistically significant only
for the periods between 2 and 3. Figures 8 and 10 report that one standard deviation shock to
interbank interest rate increases unemployment for Primary School and Vocational High
School graduate males as well as the total. These increases are statistically significant at the
initial levels.
For the remaining categories, the impulse responses do not reveal any
statistically significant effect of an interbank interest rate innovation on unemployment.
Finally, we will interpret of the response of the total unemployment and the
unemployment by various educational levels to their own shock. Figures 5.A, B and C show
that the initial response of unemployment to its own shock is strongly positive after
approximately 2 periods then the unemployment declines sharply. Total and male
unemployment responses are statistically significant at the initial levels and after 9 periods but
for female unemployment it is significant just for the initial period. The responses of
educational levels of the unemployment to their own shocks are positive for the total, female
and male unemployment. These increases are statistically significant for most of remaining
unemployment categories across gender and education levels.
We conclude that total, female and male unemployment responses to five economic
shocks are mostly similar across different educational levels except for the high school level.
Discussion
Overall, female and male unemployment respond to economic shocks similarly.
Moreover, the directions of most of the unemployment classifications to economic shocks are
similar across different education levels. However, when we compare unemployment
education classifications, response of the High School Unemployment to five macro
economic shocks are different from other educational levels. It is important to recognize that
high school unemployment is around 20% of the total unemployment. Therefore this effect is
important.
9
It is also important to recognize that shocks to interbank interest rates and money do
not have a long-run effect on any type of unemployment. However, the Total Unemployment
responds to these two variables in the short run. Exchange rate does not have statistically
significant effect on any class of unemployment in any horizon but it affects total and female
High School Unemployment.
The effect of exchange rate on total and female Total
Unemployment exists only for the first period. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
used these three variables as policy tools in the past. Since none of these variables do have
statistically significant effects on unemployment in the long-run, this clearly suggests the
ineffectiveness of the monetary policy in the long-run. However, in the short-run, the effect is
limited. Therefore, this study suggests that the policies of the Turkish Central Bank are not
responsible for the high level of unemployment experienced.
On the other hand, income, prices and unemployment shocks themselves have
persistent effect on unemployment. Positive income and prices shocks decrease
unemployment across all categories except the High School Unemployment.
Male and
female High School Unemployment increase with positive income and price shocks. It is
important to recognize that income and price shocks affect all unemployment variables in the
same directions. This may suggests that not the supply but demand side shocks were the main
determinants of unemployment in the past. Moreover, shocks to unemployment, most of the
times, have a persistent effect. This supports the hysterisis argument – unemployed will have
less chance to be employed in the future due to marketability.
In conclusion, we can say that the demand policies rather than the monetary policy as
well as the unemployment itself are the main factors that explain the behavior of
unemployment. This may suggest that policy makers should use not monetary but demand
policies as well as the labor market regulations to hamper the unemployment.
6. Conclusion
This study examines whether exogenous shifts in income and monetary policy have
different effects on overall unemployment rate and the unemployment rate by different levels
of education by gender in Turkey. In order to investigate the relationship between
macroeconomic variables and unemployment, the VAR method is applied for the 1988-2003
period using quarterly data.
The empirical evidence suggests that positive income shock decreases total
unemployment. This finding is consistent with Algan (2002) and Zavodny and Zha (2000).
We further find that positive income shock decreases the total unemployment and the
10
unemployment by different levels of education except the unemployment at the high school
level. Unemployment at the high school level which is statistically significant at the initial
levels is found to increase with a positive income shock. With regards to the exchange rate
innovations the results indicate that unemployment rate increases during the initial periods
after which unemployment rate decreases. A positive innovation in the money indicates that
unemployment for junior high school, high school and higher education levels have negative
effects and statistically significant at the initial levels. Next, one standard deviation shock to
the price decreases the unemployment of different educational levels after about 3 periods and
they are statistically significant. The results further suggest that a positive innovation in the
interbank interest rates increase the unemployment rate unambiguously during the initial
periods. Further unemployment rates at different levels of education increase also.
Macroeconomic variable effects on overall unemployment rate and the unemployment
rates by different levels of education are also assessed for the total, male and female
unemployment rates separately. The model used indicates that total, female and male
unemployment responses to five economic shocks are mostly similar across different
educational levels except for the high school level.
Lastly, shocks to interbank interest rates and money do not have a long-run effect on
any type of unemployment; only the Total Unemployment responds to these two variables in
the short run. On the other hand, income, prices and unemployment shocks themselves have
persistent effect on unemployment.
11
References
Agenor Pierre R. and J. Aizenman, 1999, “Macroeconomic Adjustment with Segmented
Labor Markets”, Journal of Development Economics, 58, 277-296.
Algan, Yann, 2002, “How Well Does the Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply Framework
Explain Unemployment Fluctuations? A France-United States Comparison”, Economic
Modelling, 19, 153-177.
Berument Hakan, 2004, “Measuring Monetary Policy for a Small Open Economy”,mimeo,
Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara.
Berument, Hakan and Mehmet Pasaogullari, 2003, “Effects of the Real Exchange Rate on
Output and Inflation: Evidence from Turkey”, Developing Economies, 41(4), 401-435.
Bulutay, Tuncer, 1996, Education and the Labour Market in Turkey: Proceedings of a
Seminar Held in Ankara, State Institute of Statistics, Ankara.
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 2004, http://www.tcmb.gov.tr (10.03.2004)
Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum, and C. Evans, 1999, “Monetary Policy Shocks: What
Have We Learned and to What End?”, Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1a, Chapter 2
ed. Michael Woodford and John Taylor, North Holland.
Daitoh, Ichiroh, 2003, “Financial Liberalization, Urban Unemployment and Welfare: Some
implications of the Artificial Low Interest Rate and the High Wage Rate Policies in LDCs”,
Journal of Development Economics, 72, 163-179.
State Institute of Statistics, 2004, http://www.die.gov.tr (10.03.2004)
Zavodny M. and T. Zha, 2000, “Monetary Policy and Racial Unemployment Rates”, Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review, Fourth Quarter, Volume 85, Number 4, 1-16.
12
Figure 1: GNP per Capita (In USD)
3500
3300
3100
2900
US$
2700
2500
2300
2100
1994
2001
1900
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1988
1500
1989
1700
Year
GNP per capita
Figure 2: Unemployment Rate by Gender
14
12
8
6
4
2003-4
2003-2
2002-4
2002-2
2001-4
2001-2
2000-4
2000-2
1999:2
1998:2
1997:2
1996:2
1995:2
1994:2
1993:2
1992:2
1991:2
1990:2
0
1989:2
2
1988:2
Rate
10
Year
Male Unemployment Rate
Female Unemployment Rate
Total Unemployment Rate
13
Figure 3: Female Unemployment Rate by Educational Level
Turkey-Female
40
35
30
Rate
25
20
15
10
5
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
0
Year
Under Primary Sc.
Primary Sch.
Junior High sc.
Voc.High Sc.
University
Average
High Sc.
Notes: Under Primary School includes the illiterates plus the literate without diploma.
Figure 4: Male Unemployment Rate by Educational Level
Turkey-Male
16
14
12
8
6
4
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
0
1989
2
1988
Rate
10
Year
Under Primary Sc.
Primary Sch.
Junior High sc.
Voc.High Sc.
University
Average
High Sc.
14
Figure 5: Responses of Unemployment to Economic Shocks
A: On Total Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Unemployment
Y
0.50
EXC H
0.8
M
0.32
0.16
0.25
0.6
0.00
0.00
0.4
- 0.25
- 0.16
- 0.50
0.2
- 0.32
- 0.75
0.0
- 1.00
- 0.48
- 1.25
-0.2
- 0.64
-0.4
- 0.80
- 1.50
- 1.75
0
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
11
P
0.75
IN TER BAN K
0.0035
0.50
0.0028
0.25
0.0021
0.00
0.0014
- 0.25
0.0007
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
12
7
8
9
10
11
12
7
8
9
10
11
12
U nemploy ment
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
- 0.50
0.0000
- 0.75
- 0.0007
- 1.00
- 0.0014
0.0
0
1
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
11
-0.2
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
12
B: On Female Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Unemployment_f
Y
0 .5 0
EXC H
0.8
M
0.4
0 .2 5
0.2
0.6
0 .0 0
-0 .0
0.4
- 0.2 5
-0 .2
- 0.5 0
0.2
-0 .4
- 0.7 5
0.0
- 1.0 0
-0 .6
- 1.2 5
-0 .2
-0 .8
- 1.5 0
-1 .0
-0 .4
- 1.7 5
0
1
2
3
4
6
5
7
8
9
10
11
P
0 .5 0
11
10
11
12
10
11
12
U nemploy ment_f
1 .00
0 .0 0 2
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
12
IN TER BAN K
0 .0 0 3
0 .2 5
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
12
0 .75
0 .0 0
0 .0 0 1
- 0.2 5
0 .50
0 .0 0 0
- 0.5 0
0 .25
- 0.7 5
- 0.0 01
- 1.0 0
0 .00
- 0.0 02
- 1.2 5
- 0 .25
- 0.0 03
- 1.5 0
0
1
2
3
4
6
5
7
8
9
10
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
12
11
0
12
1
2
3
4
6
5
9
8
7
C: On Male Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Unemployment_m
Y
0 .5 0
EXC H
0.8
M
0.4
0 .2 5
0.2
0.6
0 .0 0
- 0.2 5
0.4
-0 .0
0.2
-0 .2
- 0.5 0
- 0.7 5
- 1.0 0
0.0
-0 .4
-0 .2
-0 .6
- 1.2 5
- 1.5 0
-0 .8
-0 .4
- 1.7 5
0
1
2
3
4
6
5
7
8
9
10
11
P
0 .8
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
12
9
10
11
IN TER BAN K
0 .0 0 4
0
12
1
2
3
0 .6
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
8
9
10
11
12
U nemploy ment_m
1.0
0.8
0 .0 0 3
0 .4
0.6
0 .0 0 2
0 .2
0.4
0 .0 0 1
- 0 .0
0.2
- 0 .2
0 .0 0 0
0.0
- 0 .4
- 0.0 01
-0 .2
- 0 .6
-0 .4
- 0.0 02
- 0 .8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
15
Figure 6: Responses of Illiterate Unemployment to Economic Shocks
A: On Total Illiterate Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Illiterate_t
Y
1
EXCH
2.0
M
1.6
1.5
1.2
0
1.0
-1
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.0
-2
0.0
-0 .5
-3
-0 .4
-1 .0
-0 .8
-1 .5
-4
10
5
0
15
IN TER BANK
0 .0 07 5
1
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
P
2
0 .0 05 0
0.8
0 .0 02 5
0.6
15
20
15
20
Illiterate_t
1.0
0
0 .0 00 0
0.4
- 0 .00 2 5
0.2
-1
-2
-3
- 0 .00 5 0
0.0
- 0 .00 7 5
-0 .2
-0 .4
- 0 .01 0 0
-4
10
5
0
15
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
B: On Female Illiterate Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Illiterate_f
Y
3.6
EXCH
3
2.4
M
2.0
2
1.5
1
1.0
1.2
0.0
0
0.5
-1
0.0
- 1.2
- 2.4
- 3.6
- 4.8
10
5
0
15
-0.5
-1.0
IN TER BANK
0.0125
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
P
3
-2
-3
15
20
15
20
Illiterate_f
1.0
0.0100
2
0.8
0.0075
1
0.6
0.0050
0
0.0025
0.4
-1
0.0000
-2
0.2
- 0.0025
-3
- 0.0050
0.0
-4
- 0.0075
-5
- 0.0100
10
5
0
15
-0.2
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
C: On Male Illiterate Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Illiterate_m
Y
0.8
EXCH
2.0
M
1.5
1.5
-0.0
1.0
1.0
-0.8
0.5
0.5
-1.6
0.0
0.0
-2.4
-0.5
-0.5
-3.2
-1.0
-1.0
-4.0
-1.5
-1.5
-2.0
-4.8
0
10
5
15
P
1.6
10
5
0
20
5
0
20
IN TER BANK
0.0075
0.8
15
10
15
20
15
20
Illiterate_m
1.00
0.75
0.0050
-0.0
0.0025
0.50
0.0000
0.25
-0.8
-1.6
-0.0025
0.00
-0.0050
-0.25
-2.4
-3.2
-0.50
-0.0075
-4.0
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
16
Figure 7: Responses of Literate without any Diploma Unemployment to Economic Shocks
A: On Total Literate without any Diploma Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Literate wdip_t
Y
2
EXC H
2.0
M
1 .50
1 .25
1.5
1
1 .00
1.0
0 .75
0
0.5
0 .50
0.0
-1
0 .25
-0 .5
0 .00
-2
-1 .0
-3
-4
10
5
0
15
- 0 .50
-2 .0
- 0 .75
IN TER BAN K
0 .0 0 6
0
0 .0 0 4
-1
0 .0 0 2
-2
0 .0 0 0
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
P
1
- 0 .25
-1 .5
Lite ra te w dip _ t
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
-3
- 0.0 02
-4
- 0.0 04
0.0
-0 .2
-0 .4
- 0.0 06
-5
10
5
0
15
10
5
0
20
15
5
0
20
B: On Female Literate without any Diploma Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Literate wdip_f
Y
3.6
EXC H
5.0
M
3
2.4
2
1.2
2.5
0.0
1
- 1.2
0.0
- 2.4
0
- 3.6
-2.5
- 4.8
-1
- 6.0
-2
-5.0
- 7.2
0
10
5
15
2.5
10
5
0
20
P
15
0.012
20
Literate w dip_f
1.0
0.8
0.008
0.0
5
0
20
IN TER BAN K
0.004
0.6
0.000
0.4
- 2.5
- 0.004
0.2
- 0.008
0.0
- 5.0
- 7.5
0
10
5
15
- 0.012
-0.2
- 0.016
-0.4
5
0
20
10
15
10
5
0
20
15
20
C: On Male Literate without any Diploma Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Literate wdip_m
Y
1.4
EXC H
1.5
M
1.25
1.00
1.0
0.7
0.75
0.0
0.5
- 0.7
0.0
- 1.4
-0.5
0.50
0.25
0.00
- 2.1
-1.0
- 2.8
-1.5
- 0.25
- 0.50
- 0.75
-2.0
- 3.5
0
10
5
15
P
0.8
10
5
0
20
15
IN TER BAN K
0.003
5
10
15
20
15
20
Literate w dip_m
1.0
0.002
- 0.0
0
20
0.8
0.001
0.6
- 0.8
0.000
- 1.6
- 0.001
0.4
- 2.4
- 0.002
0.2
- 0.003
0.0
- 3.2
- 0.004
- 4.0
-0.2
- 0.005
-0.4
- 0.006
- 4.8
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
17
Figure 8: Responses of Primary School Unemployment to Economic Shocks
A: On Total Primary School Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Primary Sch_t
Y
1 .0
EXCH
0.8
M
0.4
0.6
0.2
0 .5
0.4
-0 .0
0 .0
0.2
- 0 .5
-0 .2
-0 .0
-0 .2
- 1 .0
-0 .4
-0 .4
-0 .6
- 1 .5
-0 .6
-0 .8
- 2 .0
-0 .8
-1 .0
-1 .0
- 2 .5
0
10
5
15
P
1 .5
IN TER BANK
0 .0 05 0
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
15
20
15
20
Pr imar y Sc h_t
1.0
0.8
1 .0
0.6
0 .5
0 .0 02 5
0.4
0 .0
0.2
- 0 .5
0 .0 00 0
0.0
- 1 .0
-0 .2
- 1 .5
-0 .4
- 0 .00 2 5
- 2 .0
0
10
5
15
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
B: On Female Primary School Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Prifary Sch_f
Y
0.5
EXCH
1.6
M
0.6
0.4
0.0
1.2
- 0.5
0.8
0.2
-0.0
- 1.0
0.4
- 1.5
-0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
- 2.0
-0.4
- 2.5
-0.8
-0.8
-1.0
-1.2
-1.2
- 3.0
0
10
5
15
P
1.2
15
10
5
0
20
IN TER BANK
0.005
15
20
10
15
20
10
15
20
15
20
10
5
0
20
Prifary Sc h_f
1.00
0.004
0.6
0.75
0.003
0.0
0.002
0.50
- 0.6
0.001
- 1.2
0.25
0.000
- 1.8
- 0.001
0.00
- 2.4
- 0.002
- 0.25
- 0.003
- 3.0
0
10
5
15
10
5
0
20
15
0
20
5
C: On Male Primary School Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Primary Sch_m
Y
1.0
EXCH
0.75
M
0.4
0.2
0.50
0.5
0.25
-0.0
0.00
-0.2
0.0
-0.5
-0.25
-0.4
-0.50
-0.6
-1.0
-1.5
-0.8
-0.75
-1.0
-1.00
-2.0
0
10
5
15
P
1.2
10
5
0
20
15
IN TER BANK
0.0060
0
20
5
Primary Sch_m
1.0
0.8
0.0048
0.6
0.0
-0.6
0.0036
0.6
0.0024
0.4
0.0012
0.2
0.0000
0.0
-1.2
-1.8
0
5
10
15
20
-0.0012
-0.2
-0.0024
-0.4
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
18
Figure 9: Responses of Junior High School Unemployment to Economic Shocks
A: On Total Junior High School Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Junior HS_t
Y
1 .0
EXC H
1.0
M
0 .25
0.8
0 .00
0 .5
0.6
- 0 .25
0.4
0 .0
- 0 .50
0.2
- 0 .5
-0 .0
- 0 .75
-0 .2
- 1 .0
- 1 .00
-0 .4
- 1 .25
-0 .6
- 1 .5
0
10
5
15
1 .2
IN TER BAN K
0 .0 03 2
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
P
0 .8
0 .0 02 4
0.8
0 .4
0 .0 01 6
0.6
- 0 .0
0 .0 00 8
0.4
- 0 .4
0 .0 00 0
0.2
- 0 .8
- 0 .00 0 8
- 1 .2
- 0 .00 1 6
0
10
5
15
10
5
15
20
15
20
J u nio r H S_t
1.0
0.0
-0 .2
20
10
5
0
15
10
5
0
20
B: On Female Junior High School Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Junior HS_f
Y
1.0
EXCH
2.0
0.5
1.5
0.0
1.0
M
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
- 0.5
0.5
- 1.0
0.0
- 0.25
- 0.50
- 1.5
-0.5
- 2.0
-1.0
0
10
5
15
20
P
1.5
- 0.75
- 1.00
15
10
5
0
IN TER BANK
0.006
0
20
10
5
15
20
15
20
J unior HS_f
1.0
0.8
1.0
0.004
0.6
0.5
0.002
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.000
- 0.5
0.0
- 0.002
- 1.0
-0.2
-0.4
- 0.004
- 1.5
0
10
5
15
10
5
0
20
15
0
20
10
5
C: On Male Junior High School Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Junior HS_m
Y
1.5
EXC H
0.75
M
0.4
0.2
1.0
0.50
0.5
0.25
-0.0
-0.2
-0.4
0.0
0.00
- 0.5
- 0.25
- 1.0
- 0.50
-0.6
-0.8
-1.0
-1.2
-1.4
- 0.75
- 1.5
0
10
5
15
1.2
10
5
0
20
P
15
0.0032
5
10
15
20
15
20
J unior H S_m
1.0
0.8
0.0024
0.8
0
20
IN TER BAN K
0.0016
0.6
0.0008
0.4
0.4
- 0.0
- 0.0000
0.2
- 0.0008
0.0
- 0.4
- 0.8
-0.2
- 0.0016
-0.4
- 0.0024
- 1.2
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
19
Figure 10: Responses of Vocational School at High School Level Unemployment to
Economic Shocks
A: On Total Vocational School at High School Level Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Voc.HSLevel_t
Y
1 .0
EXC H
1 .50
M
0 .75
1 .25
0 .50
0 .5
1 .00
0 .25
0 .75
0 .0
0 .00
0 .50
- 0 .5
0 .25
- 0 .25
0 .00
- 1 .0
- 0 .50
- 0.2 5
- 1 .5
- 0 .75
- 0.5 0
- 1 .00
- 0.7 5
- 2 .0
10
5
0
15
P
1 .5
15
10
5
0
20
IN TER BAN K
0 .0 0 6
15
20
15
20
Vo c .H SL e v e l_t
1.0
0 .0 0 5
1 .0
10
5
0
20
0.8
0 .0 0 4
0.6
0 .0 0 3
0 .5
0.4
0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 1
0.2
0 .0
0 .0 0 0
0.0
- 0.0 01
- 0 .5
-0 .2
- 0.0 02
-0 .4
- 0.0 03
- 1 .0
10
5
0
15
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
B: On Female Vocational School at High School Level Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Voc.HSLevel_f
Y
1.2
EXC H
2.0
0.8
M
0.6
0.3
1.5
0.0
0.4
1.0
-0.3
- 0.0
0.5
-0.6
- 0.4
0.0
-0.9
- 0.8
-0.5
- 1.2
-1.2
-1.5
-1.0
- 1.6
10
5
0
15
20
P
2.0
10
5
0
15
IN TER BAN K
0.005
10
5
0
20
15
20
15
20
Voc .H SLev el_f
1.00
0.004
1.5
0.75
0.003
1.0
0.002
0.50
0.5
0.001
0.0
0.25
0.000
- 0.5
- 0.001
0.00
- 1.0
- 0.002
- 1.5
- 0.003
10
5
0
15
- 0.25
5
0
20
10
15
0
20
10
5
C: On Male Vocational School at High School Level Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Voc.HSLevel_m
Y
1.0
EXC H
1.6
0.0
0.8
0.25
- 0.5
0.4
0.00
- 1.0
-0.0
- 0.25
- 1.5
-0.4
- 0.50
- 0.75
-0.8
- 2.0
- 1.00
-1.2
- 2.5
10
5
0
15
P
1.05
10
5
0
20
15
0
20
IN TER BAN K
0.008
0.70
M
0.75
0.50
1.2
0.5
5
10
15
20
15
20
Voc .H SLev el_m
1.0
0.8
0.006
0.6
0.35
0.004
0.4
0.00
0.002
0.2
- 0.35
0.000
0.0
- 0.70
- 0.002
- 1.05
-0.2
-0.4
- 0.004
- 1.40
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
20
Figure 11: Responses of High School Unemployment to Economic Shocks
A: On Total High School Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on High School_t
Y
2 .0
EXC H
1.2
M
0.2
1.0
-0 .0
1 .5
0.8
1 .0
-0 .2
0.6
0 .5
0.4
-0 .4
0.2
0 .0
-0 .6
-0 .0
- 0 .5
-0 .2
-0 .8
- 1 .0
-0 .4
-1 .0
-0 .6
- 1 .5
10
5
0
15
P
1 .0 0
IN TER BAN K
0 .0 03 0
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
15
20
15
20
H ig h Sc h o ol_ t
1 .00
0 .0 02 5
0 .7 5
0 .75
0 .0 02 0
0 .5 0
0 .0 01 5
0 .50
0 .2 5
0 .0 01 0
0 .0 0
0 .25
0 .0 00 5
- 0.2 5
0 .0 00 0
0 .00
- 0.5 0
- 0 .00 0 5
- 0 .25
- 0 .00 1 0
- 0.7 5
0
10
5
15
10
5
0
20
15
0
20
10
5
B: On Female High School Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on High School_f
Y
2.0
EXCH
1.5
1.5
M
0.50
0.25
1.0
0.00
1.0
0.5
- 0.25
0.5
0.0
- 0.50
0.0
-0.5
- 0.75
- 0.5
-1.0
- 1.0
- 1.00
- 1.25
-1.5
- 1.5
10
5
0
15
20
P
2.10
10
5
0
0.0030
0.0024
1.05
0.0018
0
20
IN TER BANK
0.0036
1.75
1.40
15
10
5
15
20
15
20
High School_f
1.0
0.8
0.70
0.0012
0.35
0.0006
0.00
0.0000
0.6
0.4
0.2
- 0.0006
- 0.35
0.0
- 0.70
- 0.0012
- 1.05
- 0.0018
0
10
5
15
-0.2
10
5
0
20
15
0
20
10
5
C: On Male High School Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on High School_m
Y
2.4
EXCH
1.50
M
0.2
1.25
2.0
-0.0
1.6
1.00
1.2
0.75
0.8
0.50
0.4
0.25
-0.0
0.00
-0.2
-0.4
-0.4
-0.25
-0.8
-0.50
-1.2
-0.75
-0.6
-0.8
10
5
0
15
5
0
20
P
1.25
-1.0
10
15
0
20
IN TER BANK
0.004
5
1.00
10
15
20
15
20
High School_m
1.0
0.8
0.003
0.75
0.6
0.50
0.002
0.4
0.25
0.00
0.2
0.001
-0.25
0.0
-0.50
0.000
-0.2
-0.75
-0.4
-0.001
-1.00
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
21
Figure 12: Responses of Higher Education Unemployment to Economic Shocks
A: On Total Higher Education Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Higher Edu_t
Y
1 .0
EXCH
0 .75
M
0 .36
0 .18
0 .50
0 .5
- 0 .00
0 .25
0 .0
- 0 .18
0 .00
- 0 .36
- 0 .5
- 0.2 5
- 0 .54
- 1 .0
- 0.5 0
- 1 .5
- 2 .0
10
5
0
15
- 0 .90
- 1.0 0
- 1 .08
15
10
5
0
20
P
0 .5
- 0 .72
- 0.7 5
10
5
0
20
IN TER BANK
0 .0 02 4
15
20
15
20
Higher Edu_t
1.0
0.8
0 .0 01 6
0 .0
0.6
0 .0 00 8
- 0 .5
0.4
- 0 .00 0 0
0.2
- 1 .0
- 0 .00 0 8
0.0
- 1 .5
- 0 .00 1 6
-0 .2
-0 .4
- 0 .00 2 4
- 2 .0
10
5
0
15
10
5
0
20
15
10
5
0
20
B: On Female Higher Education Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Higher Edu_f
Y
2.0
EXCH
0.75
1.0
0.25
0.5
0.00
M
0.50
0.50
1.5
0.25
0.00
-0.25
0.0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.50
-0.50
-0.75
-1.0
-0.75
-1.5
-1.00
-1.00
-1.25
-1.25
-2.0
10
5
0
15
P
1.0
10
5
0
20
0.0
0
20
IN TER BANK
0.004
0.5
15
0.003
0.8
0.002
0.6
10
5
15
20
15
20
Higher Edu_f
1.0
-0.5
0.001
0.4
0.000
0.2
-1.0
-1.5
-0.001
0.0
-0.002
-0.2
-2.0
-2.5
-0.4
-0.003
-3.0
10
5
0
15
5
0
20
10
15
10
5
0
20
C: On Male Higher Education Unemployment
Effects of Shocks on Higher Edu_m
Y
1.5
EXCH
1.0
M
0.50
0.25
1.0
0.5
0.00
0.5
-0.25
0.0
0.0
-0.50
-0.5
-0.75
-1.0
-0.5
-1.00
-1.5
-1.25
-1.0
-2.0
10
5
0
15
P
0.25
10
5
0
20
15
IN TER BANK
0.003
0
20
5
1.0
0.00
10
15
20
15
20
Higher Edu_m
0.8
0.002
-0.25
0.6
0.001
-0.50
0.4
-0.75
0.000
-1.00
0.2
-0.001
-1.25
0.0
-1.50
-0.002
-0.2
-1.75
-0.4
-0.003
-2.00
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
15
20
0
5
10
22
TÜRK SANAY‹C‹LER‹ VE ‹fiADAMLARI DERNE⁄‹
Türkiye’de
‹flgücü Piyasas›n›n
Kurumsal Yap›s›
ve ‹flsizlik
Aral›k 2004
(Yay›n No. TÜS‹AD-T/2004-11/381)
Meflrutiyet Caddesi, No.74 34420 Tepebafl›/‹stanbul
Telefon: (0212) 249 07 23 • Telefax: (0212) 249 13 50
6
B Ö L Ü M
‹fiS‹ZL‹KLE MÜCADELE
POL‹T‹KALARI
6. ‹fiS‹ZL‹KLE MÜCADELE POL‹T‹KALARI *
Türkiye’nin halen karfl› karfl›ya oldu¤u en önemli iktisadi ve toplumsal sorun
iflsizliktir. Kamuoyu anketleri arac›l›¤›yla halk›n böyle düflündü¤ü bilinmektedir.
Öyleyse iflsizlik siyasetçiler aç›s›ndan da bir numaral› sorundur. Uzmanlar aç›s›ndan
da durum farkl› de¤ildir. Kal›c› ve yüksek iflsizli¤in demokratik rejimde yavafl yavafl
yapaca¤› tahribat uzun dönemde demokrasiye olan inanc› zay›flatabilir.
Soruna ne yaz›k ki kolay çözüm bulunmamaktad›r. K›sa, hatta orta dönemde
tam istihdam hayaldir. Ama bugünden iflsizli¤e karfl› çok yönlü bir mücadele
bafllat›lmazsa sorun daha da büyüyecektir. Çal›flabilir nüfusun, art›fl oran› düzenli
olarak düflse de, halen artmakta olmas› ve önümüzdeki en az otuz y›l boyunca artmaya devam edecek olmas›, tar›m›n mutlak olarak istihdam yitirmeye devam etmesi
ve nihayet, e¤itim düzeyi giderek yükselen kad›n nüfusun zamanla daha büyük
say›da tar›m d›fl› ifllerde çal›flma arzusu, iflgücü arz›nda uzun süre yüksek art›fllar›n
yaflanmas›na neden olacak bafll›ca etkenlerdir. Tar›m d›fl› iflgücünün halen 17
milyon civar›nda oldu¤unu ve tar›m d›fl› iflgücünün uzun dönem art›fl e¤iliminin de
% 3 civar›nda seyretti¤ini dikkate al›rsak, yaklafl›k iki buçuk milyon olan iflsizlerin
say›s›n› hiç olmazsa sabitlemek için her y›l en az 500 bin net ifl yaratmam›z gerekti¤i kolayca hesaplanabilir. Bu durumda % 15’e ç›km›fl olan tar›m d›fl› iflsizlik oran›
yavafl bir tempoyla düfler. Ancak oran›n kriz öncesi düzeyine gerilemesi
(% 9.3) bile y›llar alacakt›r. Y›lda 500 bin net ifl, iflsizlikle mücadelede ancak k›smi
bir baflar›ya karfl›l›k gelebilir. Daha fazlas›n› hedeflemek zorunday›z.
Demografik geçifl dönemini yaflayan, ayn› zamanda da kalk›nma sürecini
tamamlamam›fl Türkiye gibi geliflmekte olan ülkelerde büyük miktarlarda ifl yaratman›n tek yolu, yeni üretim kapasiteleri gelifltirmekten, k›sacas› h›zl› büyümeden
geçer. Her ülkenin tasarruf oran›, iç ve d›fl denge k›s›tlar›na göre belirlenmifl yat›r›m
kapasitesi, ekonomik kurumlar›n›n etkinli¤i, baflta insan sermayesi olmak üzere
do¤al kaynaklar› gibi bir dizi temel özellikleri, o ülkenin potansiyel büyüme oran›n›
belirler. Bu büyüme oran›n› uzun dönemde gerçeklefltirmek için makroekonomik
istikrar gerekir. Y›ll›k büyüme oranlar›n›n büyük varyasyonlar göstermeden bu
potansiyel büyüme oran› civar›nda seyretmesi arzulan›r. Aksi takdirde ortalama
* Bu
bölüm Galatasaray Üniversitesi Ekonomi Bölümü Baflkan› Prof. Dr. Seyfettin Gürsel taraf›ndan haz›rlanm›flt›r.
195
büyümenin düflece¤i ve potansiyel düzeyden uzaklaflaca¤› büyüme kuramlar›n›n ve
ülke deneyimlerinin kan›tlad›¤›, çok yayg›n kabul gören bir savd›r.
Türkiye’de ekonomik istikrar h›zla iyileflmektedir. ‹ki buçuk y›ld›r büyüme en
iyimser beklentilerin dahi üzerinde seyretmektedir. 2004’ün ilk yar›s›nda tam
anlam›yla ekonomik patlama yafland›. Ekonomi ilk alt› ayda % 12 büyüdü.
Türkiye’nin potansiyel büyüme düzeyinin bir hayli afl›ld›¤›, h›zl› artan cari aç›k
nedeniyle büyümede sert düzeltemelere maruz kal›nabilece¤inden bile endifle
edilmektedir. Böyle bir büyüme ortam›nda yüksek istihdam art›fllar› beklenirdi.
Oysa istihdam art›fllar› umulan›n alt›nda kald›. ‹stihdam yaratmayan bir büyüme
yaflanmaktad›r. 2002 y›l›nda gerçekleflen % 7’nin üzerindeki büyüme esas olarak
2001 krizinde ortaya ç›kan, iflgücü de dahil, at›l kapasitenin kullan›lmas›yla
sa¤lanm›flt›. Net istihdam art›fl› yaratmamas› do¤ald›. Ancak 2003 y›l›nda % 6’ya
yak›n büyümenin tar›m d›fl›nda sadece 90.000 ifl yaratabilmesi, sanayide ise net
100.000 istihdam kayb›n›n olmas›, firmalar›n kriz sonras›nda iflgücünü daha etkin
kullanmaya bafllamalar›n›n yan›s›ra, eme¤i asgari düzeyde tutacak bir teknoloji seçimi stratejisi izlediklerini, genel olarak hizmetlerde, özel olarak da kamu hizmetlerinde yeterince istihdam yarat›lmad›¤›n› düflündürüyor. 2004 y›l›n›n ilk yar›s›nda
gerçekleflen ola¤anüstü yüksek büyüme nihayet istihdamda bir art›fl sa¤lad›.
Sanayide ve hizmetlerde iki yüz bine yak›n istihdam art›fllar› gerçekleflti. Ancak
büyümenin düzeyine k›yasla bu art›fllar›n da yeterli oldu¤u söylenemez. ‹lk alt›
ayda büyüme % 12’yi bulurken, tar›m d›fl› istihdam art›fl› % 2.5 civar›nda kald›.
Yat›r›mlara, dolay›s›yla yeni üretim kapasitelerinin oluflmas›na dayanan ola¤anüstü
yüksek büyümenin getirdi¤i istihdam art›fllar› tümüyle özel kesimde gerçekleflti.
Kamu istihdam› düflmeye devam etti. Türkiye’nin sürdürülebilir büyümesinin % 6
civar›nda oldu¤u yayg›n bir görüfltür. Ekonominin uzun süre % 10’un üzerinde
büyüyemeyece¤i aç›kt›r. Bu bak›mdan halen büyümenin istihdam yaratma kapasitesinin oldukça yetersiz kald›¤› gerçe¤inin de¤iflti¤ini söyleyemeyiz.
Türkiye ekonomisinde büyüme “istihdam dostu” büyümeye dönüfltürülmedi¤i
takdirde, iflsizli¤in düflmesi flöyle dursun, daha da yükselmesi kaç›n›lmaz olarak
gündeme gelecektir. “‹stihdam dostu” bir büyüme yaratabilmek için de mutlaka
iflgücü piyasas›n›n istihdam art›fl›n› s›n›rlayan yap›sal özelliklerinin belirlenmesi,
ard›ndan bu tür engellerin afl›lmas›na yard›mc› olacak iktisat politikalar›n›n tasarlanmas› gereklidir. Bu çal›flmada söz konusu yap›sal engellerin bir bölümü
araflt›r›ld›. Elde edilen bulgular dikkate al›narak ne gibi öznel istihdam politikalar›,
196
ya da daha genel olarak iflsizlikle mücadele politkalar› önerebiliriz? Son bölümde
bu soru yan›tlanmaya çal›fl›lacakt›r.
Çal›flmam›z, iflgücü piyasas›n›n tüm yap›sal özelliklerini de¤il, ama genelde en
önemli yap›sal kat›l›klar olarak kabul edilen özelliklerini ele alm›flt›r. Birbirini
destekleyen kurumsal ve uygulamal› çal›flmalar sayesinde yap›sal iflsizlik yaratan
bafll›ca unsurlar bilinmektedir: Çeflitli adlar alt›nda al›nan vergi ve primlerin neden
oldu¤u yüksek iflgücü maliyetleri, aksak ücret belirlenme mekanizmalar›, etkin
olmayan ifl arama süreçleri ve uyumsuz vas›flar, iflsizlik tazminat düzeni gibi bafll›ca
etkenler an›labilir. Avrupa ülkelerinin pek ço¤unda halen bir numaral› sorun
olmaya devam eden iflsizli¤in, büyük ölçüde iflgücü piyasas›n›n kat› yap›s›ndan
kaynaklanan yap›sal nitelikteki iflsizlik oldu¤u biliniyor. Türkiye’de durum biraz
farkl›d›r. Yukar›da da belirtildi¤i gibi Türkiye’de iflsizli¤in temel sorunu yap›sal
olarak artma e¤iliminde olan iflgücü arz›n›n karfl›s›nda yeterli istihdam›n yarat›lamamas›d›r. Büyümenin istihdam dostu olabilmesi iflgücü piyasas›nda mevcut
kat›l›klar›n giderilmesiyle yak›ndan ilgilidir. Önlemler ve politikalar rapordaki s›ra
izlenerek dört bafll›k alt›nda incelenebilir.
6.1. Kay›t D›fl›l›kla Mücadele
Kay›t d›fl› ekonomi en tart›flmal› konulardan biridir. Konu gündeme
geldi¤inde hemen hemen tüm muhataplar sert bir mücadeleyle kay›t d›fl›l›¤›n
küçültülmesini savunurlar. 1990’l› y›llar›n bafl›nda tar›m d›fl›ndaki kay›t d›fl› istihdam›n toplamdaki pay› % 25 iken, bu pay 2001 krizinden sonra % 30’un üzerine
ç›km›flt›r. Durum biraz daha vahim hale gelmifl, kay›t d›fl›l›kla mücadele daha çok
konuflulur olmufltur. Kay›t d›fl› istihdam›n azalt›lmas› için genelde iki neden ileri
sürülür: Kay›t d›fl›l›k kamu gelirlerinde kay›plara, piyasada da haks›z rekabete
neden olur. Bunlar hakl› gerekçelerdir ama dikkat edilirse iflsizlikle do¤rudan ilgili
de¤ildirler. Kay›t d›fl›l›k ile iflsizlik aras›ndaki iliflki daha karmafl›k ve dolayl›d›r.
Araflt›rmada birbiriyle k›smen örtüflen iki katman incelendi: Kay›tl› – kay›t d›fl›
sektörler ile formal-informal sektörler. Kay›t d›fl› sektör hiç bir sosyal güvenlik kurulufluna kay›tl› olmayan istihdam fleklinde tan›mlan›rken, informal sektör 10 kifliden
daha az iflçi çal›flt›ran, ço¤unlukla kendi hesab›na ve evde çal›flma fleklinde
faaliyetini sürdüren ifl yerlerindeki istihdam› tan›mlar. ‹statistikler informal istihdam›n % 90’›n›n kay›t d›fl› oldu¤unu gösteriyor. Kay›t d›fl› istihdam›n da % 78’i infor197
mal istihdamdan olufluyor. Bu özellikleriyle kay›t d›fl›l›¤›n kolayl›kla yok edilemeyece¤ini kabul etmek zorunday›z. Mücadelenin salt idari (cezai) önlemlerle
yap›lmas› durumunda da istihdam kay›plar›na yol açmas› beklenmelidir.
Rakamlar kay›t d›fl›l›¤›n art›fl›nda ekonomik krizlerin etkili oldu¤unu göstermektedir. Her ekonomik daralmada kay›t d›fl› istihdam s›çrama yapm›fl, kriz geçtikten sonra eski düzeyine dönmemifltir. Bir bak›ma kay›t d›fl›l›k yok olma tehdidi
alt›ndaki iflyerlerinin savunma stratejisi olarak da görülebilir. Çal›flanlar aç›s›ndan
ise, kay›t d›fl›l›k iflsizli¤in artt›¤› bir dönemde zorunlu kabul edilmesi gereken bir
durum olarak de¤erlendirilebilir. Ço¤unlukla kendi hesab›na ya da iki-üç kifli istihdam eden mikro firmalardan oluflan informal sektörde, kay›t d›fl›l›k varolman›n
kofluludur. Kay›tl›l›¤›n getirece¤i ek maliyeti bu firmalar›n ço¤u tafl›yamayacakt›r.
S›k› bir idari takiple kay›tl›l›¤a zorland›klar› bir durumda ço¤u kapanacakt›r.1
Dolay›s›yla, istihdam kayb›, iflsizli¤in artmas› gibi maliyetler ortaya ç›kacak, kay›t
alt›na al›nan az say›da firman›n getirisi bu kay›plar› kafl›lamayacakt›r.
Bu nedenle kay›t d›fl›l›kla mücadele dikkatli ve özenli bir strateji gerektirmektedir. Formal sektörün % 10’u kay›t d›fl› olup, kay›t d›fl› istihdam›n da % 20’nin
üzerinde bir bölümünü oluflturur. Öncelikle bu kesimi kontrol alt›na almak gerekir.
Ancak bu kesimde ço¤unlukla küçük firmalar›n söz konusu oldu¤u unutulmamal›d›r. Dolay›s›yla a¤›r iflgücü maliyetlerini bu firmalar›n da kald›rabilmesi sorun
olacakt›r. Kay›t d›fl›l›kla mücadelenin gündeme getirdi¤i istihdam kay›plar› riskini
asgariye indirebilmek için mutlaka iflgücü maliyetleri azalt›lmal›, kay›t alt›na alma
giriflimleri bu indirimlerin ard›ndan ya da daha iyisi eflanl› olarak yap›lmal›d›r.
Araflt›rmada incelenemeyen bir di¤er kay›t d›fl›l›k türü de kimi formal sektöre
mensup firmalarda ücretlerin bir bölümünün aç›ktan ödenmesi yoluyla vergi ve
prime tabi ücret miktar›n›n düflük gösterilmesidir. Bu tür yasal olmayan uygulamalar da bir yandan haks›z rekabete, di¤er yandan da kamuda gelir kay›plar›na
1
E. Taymaz ve fi. Özler’in yeni bir çal›flmas›nda kay›t d›fl›ndaki firmalar›n kay›t alt›na al›nmas›yla meydana gelebilecek
istihdam kay›plar› tahmin edilmifltir. Her ne kadar kat› varsay›mlara dayanan tahmin yöntemi esnek genel denge
modelleri kadar güvenilir sonuçlar vermese de, sorunun boyutunu tan›mlamak için yeterlidir. Kay›t d›fl› sektör iflletmeleri
kay›tl› sektörün tüm vergi ve primlerini ödemeye bafll›yorlar, kâr marjlar›nda da bir düflüklük olmazsa, ürünlerinin fiyatlar› % 10 art›yor. Bu art›fl›n yarataca¤› talep düflüflünün sonucunda imalat sanayinde istihdam kayb› % 4,3 oluyor (150.000
ifl). Buna karfl›l›k kamu geliri art›yor. Kamu geliri sabit kalacak flekilde prim ve vergi oranlar› indirildi¤inde istihdam kayb›
% 1,5’e iniyor. Bu da en az 50.000 ifl kayb› demektir. Hizmet kesiminde ifl kayb› say›s›n›n daha da fazla olaca¤›n›
kolayl›kla kestirebiliriz (E. Taymaz ve fi. Özler, “Labor Market Policies and EU Accession: Problems and Prospects for
Turkey”, ODTÜ, Working Paper, Mart 2004).
198
neden olmaktad›r. Ne yaz›k ki bu kaça¤›n boyutlar› hakk›nda fikir verebilecek
resmi istatistikler mevcut de¤ildir.
Yine de dolayl› verileri kullanarak bir tahminde bulunulabilir. 2003 y›l›nda
özel kesimde SSK’ya kay›tl› ücretli say›s› yaklafl›k 5 milyon 400 bindi. Bu toplamda
3 milyon 175 bin kifli, toplam›n % 58,7’si asgari ücretten (15.267.196 TL) beyan edilmiflti. Bu ola¤anüstü yüksek oran›n çok say›da eksik beyan› gizledi¤i aç›kt›r.
SSK’daki asgari ücretli oran›n›, firmalar›n de¤il bizzat ücretlilerin beyanda bulundu¤u H‹A verileriyle karfl›laflt›rarak eksik beyan›n boyutlar› hakk›nda bir fikir
edinilebilir. H‹A verilerine göre 2003’de ücretlilerin % 38’i 300 milyonun alt›nda
ayl›k kazanç beyan etmifllerdir. Bu s›n›r›n alt›nda kalanlar›n tümü asgari ücrete tabi
de¤ildir. Bir bölümü asgari ücrete çok yak›n gelir düzeyindedir. Bu bak›mdan SSK
verilerinde 16 milyona kadar olan ikinci aral›¤› da ekledi¤imizde, H‹A ile
kar›fllaflt›r›labilir oran % 73’e ç›kmaktad›r. Fark 35 puand›r. ‹flletmeler milyonlarca
çal›flan için ücretleri eksik beyan ediyorlar. Ancak bunun ne kadar oldu¤unu
bilemiyoruz.
‹dari (cezai) önlemlerin öncelikle bu tür uygulamalara mensup firmalara
yönelmesi istihdam aç›s›ndan tercih edilmelidir. Yine de yüksek iflgücü maliyetlerinin eksik beyan uygulamalar›n› teflvik etti¤i unutulmamal›d›r. ‹flgücü maliyetlerinde yap›lacak dikkate de¤er bir indirimin k›smen kay›t d›fl›l›¤› daraltarak, eksik
beyan› da büyük ölçüde gerileterek vergi ve sosyal güvenlik kurulufllar›n›n gelir
kay›plar›n› önemli ölçüde telafi etmesi olanakl›d›r. ‹flgücü talebi bölümünde
de¤inilece¤i gibi, iflgücü maliyetlerinde yap›lacak indirimlerin istihdam› art›r›c›
etkisi de dikkate al›nd›¤›nda, kamuda gelir kayb› endiflesinin yersiz oldu¤u iddia
edilebilir.
Özetle tekrarlamak gerekirse, kay›t d›fl›l›kla mücadele iflgücü maliyetleri
düflürülmeksizin yap›ld›¤› takdirde, özellikle informal sektörde istihdam kay›plar›na
yol açarak iflsizli¤i art›r›c› etki yapmas› kaç›n›lmazd›r. “Kafl yapal›m derken göz
ç›kartma” ihtimali yüksektir. Bu bak›mdan kay›t d›fl›l›kla mücadele mutlaka iflgücü
maliyetlerinde yap›lacak indirimle eflgüdümlü olarak tasarlanmald›r. Ayr›ca iflsizli¤i
azaltmak esas hedef olmakla birlikte, sosyal güvencelere sahip istihdam›n da önemli bir toplumsal hedef oldu¤u unutulmamal›d›r.
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6.2. ‹flgücü Maliyetinin ‹stihdama Negatif Etkisi
‹flgücü talebinin iki temel belirleyicisi iflgücü maliyeti ve büyüme oran›d›r. ‹flgücü
talebi büyüme oran› artt›kça yükselir, iflgücü maliyeti artt›kça azal›r. Türkiye halen
Avrupa Birli¤i ülkeleri aras›nda göreli olarak en yüksek iflgücü maliyetine sahip ülkelerden biridir. Bu noktaya vergi sisteminin zaman içinde bozulmas›yla, sorumsuz
emeklilik düzenleriyle ve SSK fonlar›n›n devlet taraf›ndan kullan›lmas› ve dolay›s›yla bir
fon yönetimi anlay›fl›yla ele al›nmamas› yüzünden geldik. Bu gerçekler iyi biliniyor ve
genel kabul görüyor. Halen bilinmeyen ve oldukça tart›flmal› olan, iflgücü maliyeti ile
istihdam aras›ndaki iliflkinin yo¤unlu¤udur. Bu iliflkinin ters yönlü oldu¤u uzmanlar›n
ço¤unlu¤u taraf›ndan kabul edilmektedir. Ancak marjinal bir etkiye mi yoksa dikkate
de¤er bir etkiye mi sahip oldu¤u konusunda bir görüfl birli¤i yoktur. Yeterli say›da
araflt›rma olmad›¤›ndan konunun oldukça mu¤lak kald›¤›n› söylemek daha do¤ru olur.
Bu araflt›rman›n en önemli amaçlar›ndan biri de iflsizlikle mücadelede hayati öneme
sahip bu konunun Türkiye ba¤lam›nda derinlemesine araflt›r›lmas›d›r. Var›lan sonuç,
yüksek iflgücü maliyetinin düflürülmesinin istihdama yapaca¤› olumlu katk›n›n dikkate
de¤er oldu¤u fleklindedir.
‹flgücü maliyetini dört temel unsura ayr›flt›rabiliriz: Net ücret ya da daha genel
olarak çal›flan›n evine götürdü¤ü gelir, gelir vergisi, çal›flan›n SSK ve benzeri prim
ödemeleri, iflverenin ayn› türden prim ödemeleri ile birlikte k›dem tazminat›
ödemeleri. Bu ayr›flt›rmay› D‹E’nin imalat sanayii istatistikleri ile tam olarak yapmak
olanaks›zd›r. Ayr›flt›rma ancak çal›flanlar›n ödedi¤i primler dahil brüt ücret ile
iflverenin pay›na düflen ödemeler aras›nda yap›labilmektedir. Bundan ötürü özellikle gelir vergisi oran›n›n düflürülerek istihdam üzerinde nas›l bir etki yarataca¤›
incelenememifltir. Brüt ücret/istihdam vergileri fleklindeki ayr›m temelinde bile
istihdam üzerindeki ücret d›fl› ödemelerin, di¤er ifadeyle “istihdam vergilerinin”
önemli bir yük oluflturdu¤u gözlemlenmektedir. ‹malat sanayiinde iflveren pay›na
düflen ödemeler ortalama olarak toplam iflgücü ödemelerinin % 20’si dolay›ndad›r.
Ancak biraz daha detayl› olarak incelenecek olursa baz› flirketlerde bu ödemelerin
toplam iflgücü ödemeleri içindeki pay›n›n % 30’lar›n üzerinde oldu¤u hatta baz›
y›llarda kimi flirketler için % 40 civar›na kadar ç›kt›¤› gözlenmektedir.
Yukar›daki oranlar›n üzerine bir de iflçinin pay›na düflen, gelir vergisi ve di¤er
kesintiler de eklendi¤inde tüm istihdam vergileri olarak adland›r›labilecek kesintilerin % 40 ile % 60 aras›nda de¤iflti¤i söylenebilir. Bunun istihdam üzerinde olum200
suz etkisi oldu¤u aç›kt›r. Bu maliyetin istihdam üzerinde sektörlere göre de¤iflen
oranlarda etkide bulundu¤undan söz edilebilir. Emek yo¤un sektörlerde, di¤er bir
deyiflle iflgücü maliyetinin toplam maliyet içindeki pay›n›n yüksek oldu¤u bilinen
sektörlerde istihdam üzerinde daha kuvvetli bir etkide bulunmaktad›r. Bu durumun
özellikle hizmet gibi emek yo¤un sektörde istihdam edilebilirlik üzerinde ihmal
edilemeyecek bir etkisi, dolay›s›yla toplam istihdam üzerinde hissedilir bir etkisi
oldu¤u aç›kt›r.
Ekonometrik çal›flma imalat sanayiinde istihdam vergilerinin oluflturdu¤u
maliyetin istihdam esnekli¤ini 0.2 olarak tahmin etti. Bunun anlam› bu maliyette
yap›lacak 10 puanl›k bir indirimin istihdamda uzun dönemde 2 puanl›k art›fla yol
açaca¤›d›r. Bu etki düflük görülebilir. Ancak iflsizlikle mücadelenin temel stratejisinin istihdam dostu büyüme gerçeklefltirmek oldu¤u unutulmamal›d›r. Tar›m d›fl›
iflgücü arz tahminleri önümüzdeki dönemde 500-600 bin net iflgücünün her y›l
iflgücü piyasas›na girece¤ini göstermektedir. En az›ndan bu miktarda net istihdam
yaratabilmek için sadece yüksek büyüme yeterli olamamaktad›r. 2001 krizinden bu
yana geliflmelerin de gösterdi¤i gibi, Türkiye makroekonomik istikrar›n› sa¤lad›¤›
takdirde y›ll›k büyüme h›z›n› ortalama % 6 düzeyinde sürdürebilir. Bu büyümenin
500-600 bin net ifl yaratmas› için istihdam› ortalama % 3 art›rmas› gerekmektedir.
Büyümenin son iki y›ll›k performans› bu düzeyin oldukça alt›nda kalm›flt›r. Bu
nedenledir ki büyümenin istihdam yaratma kapasitesini bir puan dahi art›rmak,
büyümeyle iflsizli¤i azaltmakla, büyümeye ra¤men iflsizli¤in artmas› ve/ya da istihdam oran›n›n düflmesi aras›ndaki ince çizgiyi oluflturmaktad›r.
‹stihdam vergileri ile isithdam aras›ndaki iliflkiye dair söylenecekler bunlarla
s›n›rl› de¤ildir. Bir kez daha hat›rlatmak gerekirse, 0.2 uzun dönem esneklik katsay›s›, imalat sanayii için tahmin edilmifltir. Raporda da vurguland›¤› gibi, hizmetler
sektöründe iflgücü yo¤unlu¤u yüksek oldu¤undan, bu sektörde yer alan firmalar›n
toplam maliyetleri içinde iflgücü maliyetinin pay› yüksektir. Bu nedenle, flimdilik
ölçülemese de, istihdam vergileri yükünün hafifletilmesinin istihdam üzerinde
imalat sanayiine k›yasla daha büyük etki yapmas› do¤ald›r. Bu raporda ele
al›nmayan di¤er bir boyut da, istihdam vergileri olarak adland›rd›¤›m›z ödemelerin
içinde önemli bir paya sahip olan k›dem tazminat› yükünü do¤rudan de¤il, dolayl›
olarak hafifletecek düzenleme konusudur. Bu alanda aktüeryal dengelere sahip bir
k›dem tazminat› fonunun oluflturulmas› tart›fl›lmal›d›r.
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Vurgulanmas› gereken di¤er bir nokta da, iflgücü maliyeti ile istihdam aras›ndaki
iliflkinin, vas›fl› iflgücü ile vas›fs›z iflgücü aras›nda ayn› yönde olmad›¤›d›r. Vas›fl›vas›fs›z ay›r›m›n› yaparak iflgücü maliyeti - iflgücü talebi iliflkisini araflt›ran çal›flmalar,
vas›fl› iflgücünün maliyeti ile talebi aras›nda ters yönlü bir iliflki saptam›yor.2 Aksine bu
iki de¤iflkenin birlikte hareket etti¤i görülüyor. ‹lk yaklafl›mda bu beklenmedik sonucun nedeni, vas›fl› iflgücünün asl›nda sermaye stoku niteli¤inde olmas›d›r. Di¤er bir
ifadeyle sermaye stoku ile vas›fl› iflgücü aras›nda tamamlay›c› bir iliflki söz konusudur.
Oysa vas›fs›z iflgücü sermaye ile, dahas› vas›fl› iflgücü ile, ikame edilebiliyor. D‹E verilerinde çal›flanlar› vas›fl› ve vas›fs›z fleklinde ayr›flt›rmak olanaks›z oldu¤undan Türkiye
için özel çal›flma yap›lamad›. Bununla birlikte, bulgular›n Türkiye ekonomisi için de
geçerli olmamas› için bir neden yoktur. Bu durumda, istihdam maliyetinde elde edilecek düflüfllerin, düz lise mezunlar› dahil iflsiz say›s› içinde büyük ço¤unlu¤a sahip
vas›fs›zlar›n istihdam›n› 0.2’lik etkiden daha faza etkileyece¤ini söyleyebiliriz. Fransa
için yap›lan çal›flmalar vas›fs›z iflgücü talebinin maliyetine esnekli¤inin 0.6 civar›nda
oldu¤unu gösteriyor.
Araflt›rman›n önemli bir bulgusu da istihdam›n ücrete olan esnekli¤inin uzun
dönemde pozitif olmas›d›r. Bunun anlam› fludur: Ücretlerin düflmesi k›sa dönemde
iflgücü maliyetini düflürerek istihdam› bir miktar art›rabilir. Asl›nda bu tür kararlarda
halen ücretin düflmesi de¤il gelecekte de düflük kalmas›n›n beklenmesi önemlidir. Yine
de ücret düflüflü az da olsa istihdam aç›s›ndan yararl› olsa da, uzun dönemde zararl›d›r.
Bu bulgunun ard›nda Keynesçi yaklafl›m› görmek olanakl›d›r: Ücretlerin maliyet oldu¤u
kadar gelir, dolay›s›yla talep unsuru oldu¤u unutulmamal›d›r.
‹flgücü maliyeti – istihdam aras›ndaki iliflki konusunda son olarak gelir vergisi
unsurunu biraz açal›m. Çal›flanlar›n yükümlülü¤ünde olan gelir vergisinin iflgücü
talebi ile iliflkisinin olmad›¤› iddia edilebilir. Bu iddia gelir vergisini çal›flanlar›n da
beyanname usulü ile ödedikleri geliflmifl ekonomilerde geçerlidir. Bu nedenle
ekonomi yaz›n›nda gelir vergisi iflgücü talebi ile de¤il iflgücü arz› ile iliflkilendirilir.
Bununla birlikte Türkiye’de gelir vergisi kaynaktan ödendi¤inden, ücret pazarl›¤›nda
net ücret önemlidir. Bu bak›mdan gelir vergisinde meydana gelebilecek bir azal›fl,
yans›ma yoluyla, ayn› oranda olmasa bile, brüt ücreti azalt›c› etki yapabilir. Bu
nedenle, her ne kadar flimdilik bu iliflkiyi araflt›ran çal›flmalar olmasa da, gelir vergisi
yükünün hafiflemesinin istihdam› art›r›c› etki yapaca¤›n› söyleyebiliriz.
2
Pisani Ferry, Jean, “Plein Empoi”, Conseil d’Analyse Economique raporu, La Documentation Française, 2000.
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Gerek istihdam vergilerinin gerekse gelir vergisinin yükünü hafifleterek büyümenin istihdam yaratma kapasitesini art›rmak kesinlikle olanakl›d›r. Daha ileri
giderek, bu stratejinin iflsizlikle mücadelede ihmal edilemeyecek kadar önemli bir
unsur oldu¤unu iddia edebiliriz. Ancak bu stratejinin uygulanmas›, söylenmesi
kadar basit de¤ildir. Makroekonomik istikrar›n henüz tesis edilemedi¤i, bu nedenle yüksek faiz d›fl› fazla zorunlulu¤unun devam etti¤i, SSK’n›n aç›klar›n›n giderek
büyüdü¤ü bir ortamda prim ve gelir vergisi oranlar› düflürülebilir mi? Bu ancak
kamu gelirlerinde bir azalma yarat›lmaks›z›n yap›lmak zorundad›r. ‹lk yaklafl›mda
indirimlerin sa¤layaca¤› istihdam art›fllar›n›n yarataca¤› ek gelirin, oranlar›n
düflürülmesinden kaynaklanacak gelir kay›plar›n› karfl›layaca¤› iddia edilebilir. Bu
sav›n geçerli olabilmesi için esnekli¤in yüksek olmas› gerekir. Oysa, tahmine
hizmet sektörü dahil edilse bile, hesaplanan esnekli¤in bu düzeye ç›kamayaca¤›
aflikard›r. Üstelik gelir kayb›n›n hemen, istihdam art›fl›n›n ise zaman içinde gerçekleflece¤i unutulmamal›d›r. Sonuç olarak istihdam art›fl›n›n yarataca¤› ek gelir faydal›
ama yetersiz olacakt›r.3 Genelde bu hesaba iflsizlik tazminat› ödemelerinde meydana gelecek azalma da dahil edilir. Ama bizde bu ödemeler halen çok düflük
kald›klar›ndan ihmal edilebilirler.
‹flgücü maliyetlerinin düflürülmesi mutlaka kay›t d›fl›l›kla mücadele ile birlikte
ele al›nmal›d›r. Yukar›da bu stratejinin güçlüklerine ve s›n›rlar›na de¤inildi. Kay›t
d›fl›l›¤› azaltmaya çal›fl›rken hedefler iyi belirlenmeli, “kafl yapal›m derken göz ç›kartacak” giriflimlerden kaç›n›lmald›r. Sonuçta kay›t d›fl›l›kla mücadelede ilerleme
sa¤lansa bile, kazan›mlar büyük olas›l›kla gelir kay›plar›n›n telafisinde yeterli olamayacaklard›r. Ek bir strateji de sosyal güvenlik reformudur. Bu reform gündemdedir ve iflgücü maliyetini hafifletme politikas›yla birlikte ele al›nmal›d›r.
Maliyeti düflük ama iflsizli¤e etkisi yüksek bir tasar›m da, ilk kez ifle girecek
15-24 yafl grubuna yönelik olarak düflünülebilir. Bu grubun iflsizler ordusu içinde
yüksek paya sahip oldu¤u bilinmektedir. Bu özellik bir bak›ma iflsizli¤in düflük
oldu¤u ekonomilerde de gözlemlenir. Ancak ilk ifli bulma süresinin Türkiye’de
göreli olarak uzun olmas›, esasen afla¤›da de¤inece¤imiz vas›f uyumusuzlu¤u ya da
e¤itim yetersizli¤i nedeniyle iflgücünün istihdam edilebilirli¤i ile ilgili olsa da, bu
3
OECD’nin son raporunda (Turkey 2004) primler yar› yar›ya düflürüldü¤ü takdirde kamu geliri a盤›n›n GSY‹H’nin
% 2’sini bulaca¤› tahmin edilmifltir. Bu hesaba indirimin yarataca¤› istihdam art›fl›n›n sa¤layaca¤› gelir art›fl› dahil de¤ildir.
Ancak sonuçta mali dengenin önemini korudu¤u koflullarda 1 puanl›k bir aç›k bile büyük sorundur. OECD, meydana
gelecek a盤›n “di¤er vergilerle” karfl›lanmas›n› önermektedir.
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gruptan yap›lacak ifle almalarda istihdam vergilerinden süreli muafiyet, kay›tl›
kesimdeki iflverenin deneme maliyetini azaltaca¤›ndan istihdam› az da olsa olumlu
etkileyebilir.
Yine de iflgücü maliyetlerini hafifleterek istihdam› art›rma, iflsizli¤i azaltma
politikas›n›n bir miktar kamusal gelir kayb›na neden olmas› kaç›n›lmaz gibi durmaktad›r. Kayb›n tümüyle telafisi ancak baflka harcama kalemlerinden yap›lacak
tasarruflar ile mümkün olabilir. Hangi kalemlerden ne ölçüde tasarruf yap›labilece¤i
ise ayr› bir konudur.
6.3. Ücretlerin Belirlenme Süreçleri
‹malat sanayi verilerini kullanarak yap›lan analizler Türkiye’de ücret belirlenme süreçlerinin belirli bir esnekli¤i içerdi¤ini göstermektedir. Ücretler iflsizlikteki
de¤iflimlere duyarl›lar. Di¤er bir ifadeyle, artan iflsizlik ücretler üzerinde dikkate
de¤er bir bask› oluflmaktad›r. ‹flsizlik azald›¤›nda ise aksi yönde bir bask› ortaya
ç›kmaktad›r. Bu bak›mdan iflgücü piyasam›z›n ücret belirlenme süreci aç›s›ndan nispeten esnek oldu¤u söylenebilir.
‹kinci bölümde ekonometrik analiz iflgücü talebi ile ücret aras›ndaki uzun
dönemli iliflkinin pozitif oldu¤unu ortaya koymufltu. ‹stihdam›n brüt ücrete uzun
dönemde duyarl›l›¤› az da olsa pozitiftir. Bu sonuç, ücretin maliyetin yan›s›ra gelir
oldu¤unu ve uzun dönemde büyümeyi, dolay›s›yla istihdam› destekledi¤ini gösterir. Bir kez daha burada iflgücü piyasas›nda istihdam› k›s›tlayan unsurun, kesinlikle ücret olmad›¤›n› ama ücret üzerinden al›nan vergilerin önemli ölçüde
k›s›tlay›c› etki yapt›¤›n› hat›rlatmak gerekir.
‹flkolu de¤iflkenleri ve iflyeri büyüklü¤ü de¤iflkeni ile ilgili bulgular, ücretlerin
belirlenmesinde yap›lan iflin niteli¤i, gerektirdi¤i e¤itim, üretimin teknolojik organizasyonu gibi yap›sal unsurlar›n da rol oynad›¤›n› do¤rular niteliktedir. ‹flyerinin
büyüklü¤üne paralel olarak ücretler de yükselmektedir. 500 çal›flanl› büyük bir
iflyeri ile 10 çal›flanl› küçük bir iflyeri aras›nda, analizde yer alan di¤er unsurlar
sabitlendi¤i halde, % 30’a varan bir ücret farkl›l›¤› olabilece¤i gözlemlenmektedir.
Ama istihdam aç›s›ndan önemli olan, genel olarak ücret düzeyini belirleyen pazarl›k
sürecinin nas›l gerçekleflti¤idir.
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‹flkolundaki sendikalaflma oran› ve toplu ifl sözleflmesine tabi çal›flan oran›
de¤iflkenleri ile ilgili farkl› bulgular söz konusudur. Sonuçlar sendikalaflman›n ücretler
üzerinde beklenildi¤i gibi yükseltici bir etki yapt›¤›n› gösterirken, toplu pazarl›k kapsam›n›n genifllemesinin beklentilerin tersine ücretleri düflürücü bir etki yapt›¤›na iflaret
etmektedir. Toplu pazarl›k kurumunun ekonomik geniflleme dönemlerinde çal›flanlar›n
artan kârl›l›ktan daha yüksek paylar almalar›n› sa¤lad›¤›n›; buna karfl›l›k ekonomik
daralma dönemlerinde ücret art›fllar›n› dizginleyici bir rol oynad›¤›n› tahmin ediyoruz.
Özellikle
krizlerde
istihdam›
koruma
karfl›l›¤›nda
ücretlerden
taviz
verilmesi s›k rastlanan bir sendikal davran›fl olmaya bafllad›. Buna karfl›l›k, toplu
pazarl›k uygulamas›n›n nispeten k›s›tl› oldu¤u kimi sektörlerde ücret
koordinasyonunun sa¤lanamad›¤› görülmektedir. Daralmaya ra¤men, ücretler artabilmektedir. Bu durumun istihdam üzerinde olumusuz etki yapmas› do¤ald›r.
Dolay›s›yla klasik liberal bir yaklafl›mla sendikan›n mutlaka iflgücü maliyetlerini art›ran,
dolay›s›yla istihdam üzerinde olumsuz etki yapan bir etmen olarak görülmesi yanl›flt›r.
Toplu pazarl›k düzeni istihdam süreklili¤ini sa¤layan bir unsur olarak
karfl›m›za ç›kmaktad›r. Toplu pazarl›¤›n yayg›n oldu¤u sektörlerde ücretlerin
iflsizli¤e olan duyarl›l›¤› azal›r. Öte yandan toplu pazarl›k kapsam›n›n genifllemesi
ücretin katma de¤ere olan esnekli¤ini art›rmaktad›r. Kriz dönemlerinde toplu
pazarl›k sistemi içerisindeki iflveren çal›flanlarla toplu olarak masaya oturma imkan›
bulmakta ve olumsuz piyasa koflullar›n›n ücretlerdeki art›fllarla bir araya geldi¤inde
istihdam üzerinde yaratabilece¤i olumsuz etkiler birlikte de¤erlendirilmektedir.
Ekonomik geniflleme dönemlerinde ise, toplu pazarl›k sistemi çal›flanlar›n örgütlü
olarak pazarl›k gücünü k›smen art›rabilmekte ve artan kârl›l›ktan daha büyük bir
pay alabilmelerinin önünü açmaktad›r. Bu bulgular›n ›fl›¤›nda, toplu ifl
sözleflmelerinin sadece kazanma ve kaybetmenin üzerine kuruldu¤u de¤il, her iki
taraf›n da uzlaflaca¤› ya da kazanaca¤› bütünlefltirici bir kurum oldu¤u ileri
sürülebilir. Sendikalaflmadan sak›nmak yerine, sendikalarla daha verimli bir iliflki
içersinde olmak, iflyerinde verimlili¤i art›ran bir etken olarak da görülebilir.
Toplu sözleflme sisteminin burada iflaret edilen yararlar›n›n yan›s›ra esas olarak
“içeridekileri” korudu¤u (istihdam edilenler), “d›flar›dakilerin” (iflsizler) ise aleyhine
sonuçlar verdi¤i de unutulmamal›d›r. Toplu pazarl›k sisteminde toplumsal aç›dan
temel sorun iflsizlerin cari ücretle, hatta alt›nda çal›flmaya haz›r olduklar› halde istihdam›n k›s›tlanabilmesidir. Bu sorunla bafledebilmenin tek yolu ücret pazarl›¤›n›
mümkünse ülke geneline tafl›makt›r.
205
Ücretlerin katma de¤erdeki ve ürün talebindeki konjonktürel de¤iflmelere
karfl› k›sa dönem esnekli¤inin, ücretlerin belirlenme düzeyi ile de yak›ndan iliflkisi
oldu¤u biliniyor. Ücret belirleme süreçlerindeki merkeziyet ve koordinasyon
mekanizmalar› ile ilgili olarak uluslararas› çerçevede yap›lan de¤erlendirmeler,
Avrupa Birli¤i ülkelerinin önemli bir k›sm›nda ulusal düzeyde ücret pazarl›klar›n›n
yap›ld›¤›n› ve toplu pazarl›k uygulamalar›n›n iflçi-iflveren-hükümet aras›ndaki
uzlaflt›rma ifllevinin vurguland›¤›n› göstermektedir. Ekonomik araflt›rmalar alternatif
ücret belirlenme süreçleri aras›nda en uygunsuz, di¤er bir ifadeyle en fazla kat›l›k
yaratan sürecin, rekabetçi ademi merkeziyetçi süreç ile ulusal merkeziyetçi süreç
aras›nda kalan, sektörler hatta firmalar düzeyinde ayr› ayr› toplu sözleflme süreci
oldu¤unu göstermektedir. Bunun nedeni olumsuz konjontürden az ya da hiç
etkilenmeyen ya da yüksek konjonktür olsa dahi çeflitli nedenlerle, örne¤in
teknolojik yenilik, tekel gücü gibi, yüksek ücret art›fllar› verebilen firmalar›n k›yas
yoluyla di¤er firma ya da sektörleri etkilemeleridir. Bu tür süreçlerde sendikalar
aras› rekabet de etkili olur. Buna karfl›l›k, tek iflçi sendikas› konfederasyonunun ve
tek iflveren konfederasyonunun bulundu¤u ekonomilerde (Almanya, Skandinav
ülkeleri) merkezi ücret pazarl›¤› bir bak›ma kendili¤inden olmaktad›r. Yine de birden fazla konfederasyonun oldu¤u durumlarda Hükümet’in hakemli¤inde taraflar
ulusal düzeyde Ekonomik ve Sosyal Konsey türünden kurumlarda bir araya
gelebilmektedirler. Sendikal rekabetin dizginlenebildi¤i, uzlaflma kültürünün de
geliflti¤i koflullarda bu düzende de etkili bir koordinasyon sa¤lanabilmektedir.
Uluslararas› karfl›laflt›rmalarda Türkiye’de iflgücü piyasas›nda etkin olan ücret
belirleme sisteminin, genelde merkezi ve koordineli bir sisteme sahip olan Avrupa
Birli¤i ülkelerinden çok, iflgücü piyasas›nda rekabet koflullar›na sad›k ve en az
merkezi / koordineli ücret belirleme sistemlerine sahip olan ABD, Kanada ve
‹ngiltere ile benzeflti¤i; ancak Avrupa Birli¤i’ne yeni üye ülkelerin baz›lar›ndan da
çok farkl›l›k göstermedi¤i görülmektedir. Türkiye’de geçerli olan sistem son tahlilde
en sak›ncal› sistem olarak görülen “iki arada bir derede” sistemine yak›nd›r.
Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birli¤i perspektifi Amerikan sisteminin örnek al›nmas›n› gündemden ç›kard›¤›na göre mevcut sistemin Amerikan vari bir esneklefltirmeye
yöneltilemeyece¤i aç›kt›r. Türkiye’de hedef merkezi koordinasyon sistemi olmal›d›r.
Bulgular, Avrupa Birli¤i’ne üyelik perspektifi do¤rultusunda toplu pazarl›k uygulamas›n›n yayg›nlaflmas›n›n ve merkezileflmesinin istihdam›n istikrarl›l›¤›na ve
makroekonomik performansa olumlu katk› yapaca¤›n› göstermektedir. Ekonomik
ve Sosyal Konsey’in düzenli çal›flt›r›lmas› ve Türkiye’ye uygun bir modelin geliflti206
rilmesi önem kazanmaktad›r. En istenmeyen durum iki arada bir derede kalmaya
devam etmek olacakt›r. Bu durumda iflgücü piyasas› ücret belirlenmesi aç›s›ndan
ne ademi merkezi koordinasyonun (rekabetçi piyasa koordinasyonu) ne de
merkezi koordinasyonun sa¤lad›¤› esnekli¤e sahip olabilmektedir.
6.4. ‹fl Arama ve Uyumsuz Eflleflme
Yap›sal iflsizli¤in bafll›ca göstergelerinden biri olan uzun dönemli iflsizlik (bir
y›l ve daha fazla süredir iflsiz olanlar) Avrupa Birli¤i’ne k›yasla Türkiye’de oldukça
düflüktür. Kriz öncesinde uzun dönemli iflsizlerin toplam iflsizlere oran› % 20
civar›ndayken kriz ertesinde % 29’a yükselmifl, daha sonra da % 25’e gerilemifltir.
Bu göstergenin Avrupa Birli¤i ortalamas› % 60 civar›ndad›r. Bulgular Türkiye’de
ortalama iflsizlik süresinin genel olarak düflük kald›¤›n› göstermektedir.
Bu aç›dan Türk iflgücü piyasas› hayli esnektir. Bu esnekli¤in bafll›ca nedeni de
iflsizlik tazminat›n›n ancak k›sa süre önce uygulanmaya bafllamas›d›r. ‹flsizlik tazminat›n›n kapsam› ve seçilebilirlik koflullar› afl›r› dar tutulmufl oldu¤undan halen yararlanan say›s› yüz bini bulmam›flt›r. Üstelik süre ve tazminat miktar› da çok düflüktür.
‹flsizlik Sigortas› Fonu’nda 12 katrilyon TL’ye yak›n para birikmifl olup, birikmeye
devam etmektedir. Bu oldukça garip bir durumdur. Eflitsizlik ve yoksullukla
mücadele gibi di¤er sosyal kayg›lar bir yana, iflsizlik tazminat›n›n kapsam›n›n bir
miktar geniflletilerek daha çok iflsizin yararlanmas›n›n sa¤lanmas›, ifl arama
etkinli¤ini düflürmeyece¤i gibi, iflsizlerin ‹flkur ve yeni faaliyete geçen özel çal›flma
bürolar›n›n faaliyet alan›n› geniflletecek ve ifl araman›n etkinli¤ini art›racakt›r. ‹flsizlik tazminat› aç›s›ndan Avrupa Birli¤i ile aram›zda adeta uçurum vard›r. Bu
bak›mdan iflsizlik tazminat› kapsam›n›n ve seçilebilirlik koflullar›n›n bir miktar
genifllemesi, yararlanma süresinin bir kaç ay uzat›lmas›, iflgücü piyasas›nda kat›l›¤›n
bafll›ca etmenleri aras›nda gösterilen afl›r› toleransl› iflsizlik tazminat› sistemlerine
Türkiye’yi yaklaflt›rmaz. ‹flsizlerin daha fazla bölümünün ‹flkur’da kay›t alt›na
al›nmas›, ‹flkur’un ifl bulmada ve iflsizlere e¤itim yoluyla aranan vas›flar›
kazand›rmada etkinleflmesi ile birleflti¤inde, iflsizlerle iflçi arayan firmalar›n bir araya
getirilmesini daha etkin k›lar.
Araflt›rma ifl arama tekniklerinin çok ilkel kald›¤›n› ortaya koymaktad›r. ‹flsizlerin ezici ço¤unlu¤u ifl aramada sadece iki kanal› kullan›yorlar: “Bizzat kendi” ve
“Efl-dost”. Bu yöntemleri ifl arama kanal› olarak tan›mlamak dahi zordur. Bu ilkel207
lik ifl araman›n etkinli¤ini düflürmekte, di¤er bir ifadeyle ifl bulma süresini art›rmakta, uyumsuz eflleflmeyi teflvik etmektedir. ‹flkur arac›l›¤›n›n oran› % 3’ün, özel istihdam ofislerinin oran› da % 1’in alt›ndad›r. ‹flkur’un ve benzer kurulufllar›n çok daha
ifllevsel hale getirilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu ba¤lamda iflsizleri ‹flkur ve özel istihdam
ofislerini kullanmaya teflvik edici özel düzenlemeler düflünülmelidir.
Türkiye’de iflsiz say›s›n› art›ran önemli yap›sal bir etken de, özellikle e¤itimli
gençler aras›nda (15-24 yafl) iflsizlik oran›n›n çok yüksek olmas›d›r. Yak›ndan incelendi¤inde, gençlerin, e¤itimliler dahil, ilk ifllerini bulmakta oldukça zorland›klar›
görülmektedir. 2003 y›l›nda teorik olarak beklenen ortalama iflsizlik süresi 5,6 ay
olarak hesaplan›rken, üniversite ve yüksek okul mezunlar› aras›nda 8,1 ay olmas›
dikkat çekicidir. Bu fark dolayl› olarak üniversite mezunlar›n›n e¤itim gördükleri
alanlarda ifl bulmakta güçlük çektiklerini göstermektedir. Bu güçlük, vas›f
uyumsuzlu¤unun “vas›fl›” iflgücünde yüksek oldu¤unun göstergesidir. Sorun
kuflkusuz üniversite kontenjanlar›n›n ve e¤itimlerin içeri¤inin talebe yaklaflt›r›lmas›
ile afl›labilir. Hükümet, ifl dünyas›-firmalar ve üniversite iflbirli¤i ile orta-uzun vadeli
e¤itim planlamas›n›n yap›lmas› flartt›r. Bildi¤imiz kadar›yla halen bu yönde dikkate
de¤er bir çal›flma bulunmamaktad›r. Konuyla ilgili kapsaml› araflt›rmalar›n ivedilikle yap›lmas› ve üçlü iflbirli¤ini yaflama geçirecek kurumsal düzenlemelerin tasarlanmas› çok yararl› olacakt›r.
Genel olarak e¤itime daha fazla kaynak ayr›lmas› ve artmakta olan iflgücünün
istihdam edilebilirli¤inin gelifltirilmesi, iflsizlikle mücadelede temel bir yöntem olacakt›r. “Aranan meslek grubuna göre iflsizlik” oranlar›na bak›ld›¤›nda, “‹dari personel ve benzeri” kategorisinde iflsizlik oran›n›n % 20’yi aflarak ortalaman›n bir hayli
üzerinde oldu¤u görülmektedir. Çok say›da iflsiz asl›nda memur ve benzeri bir ifl
aramakta ama bulamamaktad›r. Bu olgu vas›fs›zl›¤›n dolayl› olarak d›fla vurumudur.
Uzun dönemde Avrupa Birli¤i’nin iflgücü a盤›n› Türkiye’den karfl›lamas› ancak yeni
kuflaklar› mesleki a¤›rl›kl› ve daha vas›fl› e¤itmek ile mümkün olacakt›r. Bu
bak›mdan e¤itime ayr›lan kayna¤›n ulusal bir tart›flma konusu yap›lmas› ve e¤itime
ayr›lan kayna¤›n esasl› bir flekilde art›r›labilmesi için hangi alanlardan kaynak aktarmas› yap›laca¤›n›n ivedilikle araflt›r›lmas› ulusal öncelik olarak de¤erlendirilmelidir.
E¤itim planlamas›n›n yan›s›ra daha k›sa ve orta vadeli önlem olarak lise ve
üniversite mezunu gençlerin ilk ifllerini bulmada yard›mc› olacak düzenlemelerin
gelifltirilmesi, iflsizli¤i düflürücü etkin bir yöntem olur. Yukar›da de¤indi¤imiz istih208
dam vergi yükünün hafifletilmesini amaçlayan düzenlemeler öncelikle ilk kez ifl
arayan yüksek okul ve üniversite mezunlar› için uygulanabilir. Böyle bir uygulama
etkisini hemen gösterece¤inden ve kamuya yükü de s›n›rl› olaca¤›ndan öncelikle
düflünülmelidir. Bu türden istihdam desteklerinin ikame etkisi nedeniyle etkili olamad›¤› elefltirileri göz ard› edilemez. Ancak yüksek okul ve üniversite mezunu
kategorisinde firmalar›n deneyimli çal›flanlar›n› iflten ç›kararak hiç ifl deneyimi
olmayan gençleri ç›kard›klar›n›n yerine ifle almas› beklenemez. Ayr›ca “ifl güvencesi” ve “k›dem tazminat›” kurumlar› ikame etkisini s›n›rlayacakt›r.
6.5. Ek Aç›l›m: ‹stihdam Dostu Büyüme
‹stihdam dostu büyümeyi baflarman›n yolu yukar›da de¤indi¤imiz yap›sal
sorunlar ve çözüm önerileri ile s›n›rl› de¤ildir. Makroekonomik düzeyde “büyümenin istihdam içeri¤i” ekonomik yaz›n›n önemli bir konusudur. ‹lk yaklafl›mda
büyümenin istihdam yaratma kapasitesini iflgücü verimlili¤inin tersi olarak
düflenebiliriz. Belirli bir büyüme oran›nda verimlilik art›fl› ne kadar yüksek olursa,
istihdam art›fl› da o kadar düflük olur. Ancak bu iliflkiye bakarak verimlilik
art›fllar›n›n kötü bir fley oldu¤u sonucuna var›lamaz. Verimlilik art›fllar›n›n uzun
dönemde istihdam›n lehine oldu¤u aç›kt›r. Toplumda refah art›fl›n›n motoru
verimlilik art›fllar›d›r. Uzun dönemde reel ücretler verimlilik art›fllar›n› izlerler. Zaten
aksi takdirde iç talep artamaz ve büyüme durur.
Reel ücret art›fllar› uzun dönemde talebin yap›s›n› de¤ifltirir. Toplam tüketim
artarken hizmet tüketimi daha h›zl› artar. Bilindi¤i gibi verimlilik art›fllar› sanayide
yüksek, hizmet sektörlerinde düflüktür. Dolay›s›yla hizmet sektörünün ekonomide
pay› artt›kça büyümenin de istihdam yaratma kapastesi artar. Uzun dönemde istihdam›n lokomotifi hizmet sektörüdür. Geliflmifl ülkelerde büyümenin istihdam yaratma efli¤i sanayileflme aflamas›nda bulunan ülkelere k›yasla oldukça düflüktür.
Yap›sal önlemlerle yeterince desteklenmeyen geliflmifl ekonomilerde bu eflik % 2
civar›nda olmakta, büyümeyi tam anlam›yla istihdam dostu k›lan ekonomilerde de
% 1’e kadar düflebilmektedir. Di¤er bir ifade ile geliflmifl ekonomilerde büyüme
yap›sal özelliklere göre % 1’den ya da 2’den itibaren net istihdam yaratmaya
baflamaktad›r (Pisani-Ferry, 2000). Bu eflik oranlar sanayileflmekte olan ülkelerde en
az % 3 civar›nda seyretmektedir. K›sa dönemlerde verimlilik art›fllar›na ba¤l› olarak
bu oranlar›n çok üzerine ç›kabilmektedir; halen Türkiye’de oldu¤u gibi. 2003
y›l›nda % 5.8 oran›nda büyüme istihdamda % 1 civar›nda bir art›fl sa¤larken,
209
2004’ün ilk çeyre¤inde de % 12’nin üzerinde bir büyüme ancak % 3 civar›nda bir
istihdam art›fl› sa¤layabildi. 2000 öncesinde Türkiye için bu eflik % 2.8 olarak
hesaplan›yordu (Gürsel & Ulusoy). Verimlilik patlamas› geçtikten sonra efli¤in bu
düzeye inmeyece¤i beklense de, hiç olmazsa % 3’e düflmesi için çaba sarfedilmelidir. Bu çaba yukar›da de¤indi¤imiz yap›sal önlemlerle oldu¤u kadar, büyümenin
sektörel kaynaklar› ve istihdam içeri¤iyle de ilgilidir.
Hizmet sektörünü, kamu ve özel olarak iki ayakl› düflünmek do¤ru olur.
Kamuda refah devletinin inflaas›, e¤itimde, sa¤l›kta, genel olarak kamu hizmetlerinin üretiminde vas›fl› iflgücü istihdam›n›n artmas›n› gerektirir. Türkiye’de kamuda istihdam fazlas›n›n oldu¤u düflünülür. K‹T’ler ve devlet kurumlar›nda vas›fs›z iflçi
ve düz memur say›lar› dikkate al›nd›¤›nda bu teflhis do¤rudur. Ama buna karfl›l›k
vas›fl› kamu istihdam› son derece yetersizdir. Nüfus itibariyle Türkiye ile
karfl›laflt›r›labilir geliflmifl üç Avrupa ülkesi, Fransa, ‹nglitere ve Almanya’da
memurlar›n nüfusa oran› s›ras›yla % 7.4, 6.7 ve 5.8 iken bu oran Türkiye için % 3.5
kadard›r (“Türkiye’de ‹flgücü Piyasas› ve ‹flsizlik”, TÜS‹AD Araflt›rma Raporu, 2002,
s.143). Ekonomik istikrar gere¤i son y›llarda kamuda istihdam azalmaktad›r. Mali
disiplinin koflulu olarak vas›fs›z istihdam düflerken, vas›l› istihdam yeterince
art›r›lamamaktad›r. Bu geçifl döneminin bir kaç y›l içinde son bulmas› beklenir.
Kamu borcu göreli olarak % 60’›n alt›na, nominal faizler % 10, paçal reel faiz de
% 6 civar›na düfltü¤ünde, k›sacas› fiyat istikrar› sa¤land›¤›nda, kamu istihdam› da
yeniden artmaya bafllayacakt›r. Bu vesileyle bir kez daha ekonomik istikrar›n önemini ve aciliyetini vurgulamak do¤ru olur.
Hizmet istihdam›n›n ikinci aya¤› özel e¤lence ve kültür harcamalar›d›r. Tatiller,
sinema, lokanta, her türlü kültür tüketimi bu kapsamda düflünülmelidir. Bu
hizmetlere talebin artmas› ortalama gelirin artmas›na, ayn› zamanda da çok eflitsiz
da¤›lmamas›na ba¤l›d›r. 2001 krizinin yaralar›n›n sar›ld›¤› 2002 y›l›n› saymazsak,
son bir buçuk y›ld›r (2003 ve 2004’ün ilk alt› ay›) Türkiye ekonomisi çok h›zl›
büyümektedir. Ancak iflsizli¤in bask›s› nedeniyle bu büyüme reel ücretlere henüz
yans›yabilmifl de¤ildir. Keza mali k›s›t da memurlar›n reel gelir kay›plar›n› telafi
etmeyi engellemektedir. Gelir eflitsizli¤i konusunda ise Türkiye zaten kötü bir performansa sahiptir. 1994 y›l›nda eflde¤erlilik ölçe¤i ile hesaplanm›fl bireysel gelir
da¤›l›m›n›n Gini katsay›s› 0.45’di. 2003 y›l›nda ayn› yöntemle D‹E Gini katsay›s›n›
0.43 olarak tahmin etti. Bu katsay› Avrupa Birli¤i’nde en kötü performansa sahip
Portekiz için 0.35’dir. 1994’ten bu yana eflitsizli¤in en iyi ihtimalle sadece biraz
210
azald›¤›n› düflünebiliriz. Eflitsizlik düzeyi yavafl yavafl afla¤›ya çekilemezse, özel
hizmetlere olan talep de bir noktada t›kanacak ya da yeterince h›zl› artmayacakt›r.
Görüldü¤ü gibi makroekonomik düzeyde büyümenin istihdam yaratma kapasitesini art›rmak ekonomik istikrara ve sosyal politikalara da yak›ndan ba¤l›d›r.
Sosyal politikalar iflsizlikle mücadeleye özgü iktisat politikalar›na konu olmasalar
da, bu politikalar›n dolayl› etkileri göz ard› edilmemelidir.
Sonuç olarak iflgücü piyasam›z, iflsizlik tazminat›n›n çok s›n›rl› kalmas›, yüksek ücret farkl›l›klar› ve ücretlerin herhangi bir endekse tabi olmamalar›, k›smi
sendikal örgütlenme, yayg›n kay›t d›fl›l›k gibi özellikleriyle bir hayli esnek olsa da,
k›dem tazminat› yükü dahil a¤›r istihdam vergileri, yar› merkezi ya da yar› ademi
merkezi toplu pazarl›k düzeni, vas›f uyumsuzlu¤u, ifl arama-bulma sisteminin
gerili¤i gibi özellikleriyle bir hayli kat›l›klar içermektedir. Ekonomik ve siyasal
istikrar ortam›nda Türkiye ekonomisinin ortalama % 6 civar›nda sürdürülebilir
büyüme kapasitesine sahip oldu¤u konusunda genel bir mutakabat vard›r. Yüksek
iflsizli¤i gelecek 10 y›lda % 10’un alt›na düflürebilmek için bu büyüme temposunun
tar›m d›fl›nda en az % 3 oran›nda istidam art›fl› sa¤lamas› gereklidir. Bu art›fl›
sa¤laman›n yolu da, mevcut kat›l›klar› olabildi¤ince azaltmaya yönelik kurumsal
reformlar ile popülizmden uzak ak›lc› sosyal politikalar› devreye sokmaktan
geçmektedir.
211
CHAPTER 4. EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT—
THE LABOR MARKET REFORM AGENDA
4.1.
TURKEY’S EMPLOYMENT PERFORMANCE IN A EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT
4.1
Employment generation has been weak. As analyzed in chapter 1, despite a
boost during the 1980s, output growth has not been fast enough to create enough jobs for
Turkey’s rapidly growing population. Moreover, Turkey has not translated output growth
into job creation as well as most other countries. The employment elasticity of growth
was a mere 0.27 during 1972-2000, at the low end of comparator countries. This partly
reflects the structural change out
of agriculture. However, in Figure: 4.1 Elasticity of Employment to Output Growth
Elasticity of employment to output growth
industry also the employment
(1980-2003; based on averages of annual growth rates)
intensity of growth in Turkey has
been low relative to other
Industry Services
middle-income countries that
have similar production and cost
structures, such as Brazil and
Mexico, though it compares
favorably
with
Southern
European countries (Figure 4.1).
Most importantly, growth in
services (which account for 48
percent of employment in
Turkey) has been almost half less
intensive in jobs than in both Southern European countries and other middle-income
countries.
2.0
4.2
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
Ireland
Turkey
Korea, Rep.
Mexico
Greece
Spain
Portugal
Argentina
Brazil
-1.0
4.2
Low employment generation, combined with a rapidly rising population
between 1980 and 2004, has led to significant declines in the employment ratio. Owing
to weak job creation, the employment rate in 2004, at 46 percent, was far from the Lisbon
target for 2010 of 70 percent. The two special Lisbon targets for women and older
workers represent the most dominant reasons why Turkey lags so far behind the 70
percent overall standard (Table 4.1). Without major improvements in the participation
and employment rates of these groups, this target will remain far above Turkey’s actual
41
performance. The unemployment rate was 10.6 percent in 2004 and this does not capture
the substantial underemployment in the large informal sector. 44
Table 4.1: Employment rates in 2004 relative to the Lisbon targets, Turkey, EU members,
and Bulgaria and Romania
Employment rate
2004
Turkey
EU-15
EU-10
Bulgaria
Romania
Source: SIS HLFS, Eurostat.
Overall employment
(15-64 years)
2010
70%
2005
67%
46.1
64.8
60.5
54.2
57.7
Female employment
(15-64 years)
2010
67%
2005
57%
24.3
57.0
53.3
50.6
52.1
Older workers
(55-64 years)
2010
55%
33.1
41.9
32.3
32.5
36.9
4.3
Labor force participation in Turkey has been declining over time and it is
extremely low by international standards, especially for women. While the low
participation rates may reduce immediate pressures on job creation (and, thus,
unemployment), they are an important factor in explaining Turkey’s poor employment
record and they represent a major loss in terms of achieving the country’s full productive
potential.
4.4
Roughly half of total employment is informal and this share is not declining
significantly. The informal economy must be acknowledged as an important generator of
jobs and as a type of safety net. However, it is characterized by low productivity, poor
wages, and workers in the sector have no access to formal sources of social protection.
4.5
Turkey’s demographic trends create both opportunities and challenges. Turkey
already has a larger working-age population than any current member of the EU and
demographic trends will ensure that this segment continues to grow rapidly throughout
the accession period. This situation offers Turkey the possibility of benefiting from a
population structure that is weighted towards potentially productive age groups.
However, this productive potential will only be realized if the economy can generate
adequate employment opportunities. Even at the currently low labor force participation
rate of about 40 percent for the 15-24 year age group (where the new entrants will largely
come from), about 335,000 new jobs would need to be created annually just to address
this new labor supply.
44
This is the OECD-standardized unemployment rate, which covers the working age population (15-64
years of age). SIS typically reports employment data for those 15 years and older which results in slightly
different numbers. For example, the SIS unemployment rate for 2004 was 10.3%. In this report, we use the
15-64 year definition where possible in order to provide international comparability.
42
4.6
Turkey is very competitive in terms of its labor costs, which, with the right
policies and institutions in place, should underpin faster employment creation. Unit
labor costs both for industry and for the total economy are similar now to what they were
in 1990 and are well below those in the EU-15, the EU-10, and Bulgaria and Romania.
4.2.
EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND EU ACCESSION
4.7
Labor market performance is a concern as Turkey prepares for EU Accession.
Demographic trends, the ongoing shift out of agriculture, and the expectations of an
increasingly well-educated youth cohort will ensure that job creation will persist as a
major domestic pressure through the accession period. As analyzed in chapter 1, stronger
employment creation is a key precondition for faster growth and accelerated convergence
to the EU average per capita income. Moreover, while in an optimistic scenario of strong
job creation, Turkey’s rapidly growing working-age population could provide a useful
(and selective) source of labor for an aging Europe, the context would be quite different if
job creation is slow and unable to accommodate the supply of new entrants into the
Turkish labor market. In a context of free labor mobility, existing member countries will
be more at ease with Turkey’s application if it is creating jobs for its citizens and does not
have a large pool of unemployed workers. Existing EU members would undoubtedly be
very concerned about large labor flows out of Turkey seeking work in Europe because of
scarce opportunities at home.
4.8
Turkey’s economic convergence to EU living standards will depend on job
creation that is based on increases in productivity through better allocation of
resources, technological change, and a more skilled workforce. The challenge for
decision-makers will be to further establish and implement a policy framework that
supports this development path in the context of economic liberalization. Certainly,
because fast job creation has to be underpinned by faster growth and stepped up
investment, some essential elements in such a framework rest outside the labor market—
for example, the macroeconomic environment and a pro-growth investment climate.
However, a number of critical factors fall within the labor market, including regulation,
labor institutions, active and passive programs, labor costs, and workforce development.
4.9
The European Employment Strategy is intended to support member countries to
create the conditions for full employment, higher quality and productivity at work, and
social cohesion and inclusion. Accession candidates are expected to work with the EU
to develop and implement a national action plan that will reach these objectives. As well,
candidates are required to comply with the directives that are part of the Acquis. In its
2005 report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, the European Commission has
identified areas where further reforms are required to implement the European
Employment Strategy guidelines. These include worker representation and collective
bargaining, social dialogue, elimination of child labor, and equal treatment (especially
gender). The Commission has also emphasized that Turkey faces a major challenge to
fully implement and enforce its labor laws on the ground.
43
4.10 With the 2003 Labor Code, Turkey has more closely aligned its laws to EU
employment directives. However, further reforms will be needed to fully conform to
directives regarding organization of working time, some aspects of fixed-term work,
employees’ rights in the event of transfers, information for employees, and consultation
and employee representation (Taymaz and Ozler 2005).
4.3.
LABOR MARKET POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS
4.11 The “tax wedge” on labor income is high. Relatively high payroll taxes are
levied on employees (20.5 percent) and employers (20.5-26 percent) to finance social
security. An international comparison of payroll tax rates concluded that Turkey’s
combined rates were significantly higher than the average rate (25 percent) for middleincome countries. When Turkey’s taxes on labor – income and payroll 45 -- are compared
with European and other OECD countries, the relative burden depends on the family
status and earning level of the worker. This is because, unlike most of these countries,
Turkey does not levy lower income tax rates on families with children and on low
earners. As a result, Turkey’s personal-and-payroll tax burden on workers with children
is the highest of all EU countries. Low-wage workers, in general, face a relatively high
tax wedge regardless of their family situation.46 Married women and youth -- groups with
low employment rates – are overrepresented in these categories of labor with particularly
high tax burdens. Even when these calculations take into account Turkey’s consumption
credits that somewhat ease the tax burden on workers, the tax wedge remains high. 47
4.12 Unfortunately, solid evidence does not exist to determine how much these taxes
are constraining employment. This impact will depend on (i) the incidence of the tax –
i.e., who actually pays the taxes – and, thus, its effect on total labor costs; and (ii) labor
elasticities – i.e., what happens to employment as labor costs change. Based on limited
evidence that does exist on these effects in middle-income countries, a 10 percent
decrease in payroll taxes (i.e., 3-4 percentage points) would result in a one-time
employment increase somewhere between 1-4 percent (roughly 200,000 to 800,000 jobs).
45
Payroll taxes dominate in Turkey, accounting for about 70% of the total.
The OECD and Eurostat have calculated the tax wedge for single workers earning 67% of the average
production worker at 41.8% in Turkey, compared to 36.4% among EU members. The “tax wedge” is
defined as income taxes and combined (employer-employee) social security contributions as a percentage
of total labor compensation.
47
The effect of including the consumption tax credits differs depending on the earnings level and the
family situation of the worker. Calculations made by the IMF and the World Bank indicate that including
these credits into the calculations reduces the tax wedge by roughly 3-6 percentage points for different
types of workers. Even with this adjustment, Turkey’s tax wedge remains above EU averages for many
categories of labor and among the highest for the types highlighted in the text.
46
44
However, this range is suggestive only and empirical analysis is needed to estimate
Turkey’s actual labor tax incidence and labor elasticities. 48
4.13 Major reductions in payroll taxes should only follow ambitious social security
reform, to address the precarious fiscal position of the social security funds. Taxes for
unemployment insurance could be decreased without threatening the integrity of the UI
Fund (as discussed below) but, since this represents a minor part of overall social security
contributions, any employment gains would be relatively small. The strategy should be to
successfully implement social security reforms to put the system on a better financial
footing which would allow for deeper tax cuts in the future. In the meantime, institutional
reforms to improve tax collection and reduce non-compliance would be useful. Whatever
the aggregate employment impacts, reducing payroll taxes and strengthening tax
collection and inspection would bring more workers into the formal social protection
system.
n
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a
As
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An
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O
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ew
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.
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r
or
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ic
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in
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rk
e
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r.
4.14 Turkey also has restrictive labor market regulations, specifically regarding
hiring and firing, with potentially significant labor market impacts. Even with the
changes under the 2003 Labor Code, Turkey’s employment protection rules are very
restrictive by OECD and European
Figure 4.2 : Turkey's employment protection rating (OECD
index)
4
standards (Figure 4.2). In fact, they rank
with Portugal’s as the strictest in the 3.53
OECD. 49 Turkey’s high score is primarily 2.5
due to its rules concerning flexible work 1.52
contracting (temporary and fixed-term
1
0.5
employment) which are the most restrictive
0
in the OECD. It also reflects the severance
pay requirements that are much more
generous than is typically the case in other
middle-income countries, or in Europe and
the rest of the OECD. Turkey has short employment periods for severance eligibility and
the payment levels are very high, especially for long-service employees.
4.15 Strict employment protection rules can provide important job security for
workers but they can also have unintended consequences. Strict employment protection
raises the cost of labor and, thus, discourages job creation – specifically formal sector
jobs. Women and youth are disproportionately affected because they are
underrepresented among the “insiders” who benefit from the job security rules.
48
It should be noted that the World Bank has requested data from the Government to undertake an analysis
of the effects of payroll taxes on employment and informality.
49
This is based on the OECD’s index which is calculated according to dismissal regulations for permanent
or regular workers; regulations regarding flexible work forms; and regulations governing collective
dismissals. For details on the methodology and the results, see OECD (2004).
45
4.16 Compliance with labor market regulations, as with social security contributions,
is weak in Turkey, especially in the SME sector. But this does not mean that reforms
should not be implemented. The current policy framework still influences behavior -with unfavorable economic and employment impacts. Employers appear to use different
strategies to avoid the formal obligations associated with regular employees and to
compensate for the restrictions on flexible contracts. One strategy is simply to operate
informally. Another is to employ the existing workforce for long hours, rather than hiring
new workers. In fact, workers in Turkey report actual hours that are among the highest in
the world – far beyond European countries and even longer than in East Asian countries
that are known to have long work weeks. An analysis of a sample of large firms during
and after the most recent crisis found that formal sector employers maintain very stable
employment levels even in the face of very unstable business conditions – including a
reluctance to hire during the recovery.
4.17 The labor market policy framework is in the process of being modernized but it
still creates disincentives for job creation, especially in the formal sector, and provides
little protection to large segments of the workforce. Turkey entered the new century
with many labor market policies and institutions that were no longer appropriate for a
dynamic economic and social context. In the last few years, policy-makers have
introduced some important modernizing reforms. But further progress is still needed to
support job creation, enhance productivity growth, better protect workers, and broaden
inclusion in the labor market. 50 These reforms, coupled with continued economic growth,
should result in an increasingly favorable climate for job creation and real wage growth
as Turkey moves through the accession candidacy period.
4.4.
AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
4.18 Recent initiatives, including the 2003 Labor Code, have brought Turkey’s labor
market framework into closer alignment with EU requirements. While the labor market
reform agenda goes well beyond the Acquis, more changes will still be needed to fully
comply with the Acquis. These generally represent useful reforms for achieving a more
efficient and equitable labor market but some of the reforms will require careful design
and implementation in order not to work against the job creation objective. Moreover,
Turkey’s negotiations with the EU should recognize that some of these could require a
long transition period, either because they will be costly or because it will be difficult to
get agreement from the social partners.
4.19 There is also a broader labor market reform agenda to create the conditions for
full employment, higher quality and productivity, and social cohesion and inclusion.
These objectives, which drive the European Employment Strategy, represent critical
50
Detailed analysis on many of the reform proposals included in this chapter was carried out by the World
Bank in its recent study of the labor market in Turkey. See World Bank (2005).
46
challenges for Turkey’s continued development and for the process of convergence to EU
living standards. Pursuing these objectives will necessarily require a wide range of
reforms involving social security, labor legislation, employment programs, industrial
relations, and education and training.
4.20 The underlying policy principle for achieving the objectives articulated in the
European Employment Strategy should be to shift protection from jobs to workers.
This will involve making labor market regulation more flexible while strengthening the
support workers can receive through unemployment insurance, active labor market
programs, and skills development. This reorientation is necessary if Turkey’s labor
market is going to have the flexibility to benefit from the opportunities of ongoing
economic liberalization, to provide full access to a diverse population, and to offer
workers the tools to enhance their employability and to manage the inevitable
adjustments in a dynamic economy. The summary policy table at the beginning of the
study prioritizes the reform agenda needed to comply with the Acquis and to pursue the
targets set by the European Employment Strategy.
4.21 More flexible job security rules would encourage employment creation,
especially in the formal sector. The proposed reforms would bring Turkey more in line
with comparator countries in Europe in terms of severance pay requirements and flexible
contracting. Increasing flexibility in this way does not need to jeopardize the protection
of the basic rights of workers. International experience suggests that women and young
people would especially benefit in terms of increased access to formal employment.
4.22 As more basic job security rules are put in place, better protection for workers
needs to be provided through a stronger safety net with wider labor force coverage.
The key elements in this safety net would be an improved unemployment insurance
system and capacity to implement cost-effective active labor market programs. Finally, a
strong skills development system is essential for workers to be productive in a higher
value-added and more competitive economy.
4.23 The unemployment insurance system needs to be reformed to increase its
coverage. Currently, less than 5 percent of unemployed workers collect UI benefits.
While this partly reflects the fact that the UI Fund is relatively new, this does not fully
account for the slow build-up of beneficiaries. Less restrictive eligibility requirements
and higher benefit levels would expand the coverage of the system and improve the
support UI can offer to unemployed workers. The Bank supports the Government’s
intention to modify both eligibility and benefit rules. However, our recommendations
differ in detail from those currently under discussion in the Government.
4.24 The Government is in a position to consider liberalizing changes to the UI
system given the strong financial position of the UI Fund. Because of low liabilities
47
and very high rates of return, the Fund now has a surplus of over 15 billion YTL (over
$11 billion). Projections undertaken by the Bank show that the parametric reforms
proposed, as well as a cut in contributions from 4 percent to 2 percent, could be financed
without jeopardizing the sustainability of the UI Fund in any way. This finding does not
change even when a macroeconomic shock and low interest rates are entered into the
simulations. However, changes to the UI system should be designed in a broader
medium-term fiscal framework, with a view to preserving the Consolidated General
Government’s strong fiscal position.
4.25 Over the longer term, policy-makers may want to consider a more far-reaching
reform strategy that fundamentally changes the architecture of income support for
unemployed workers. This would involve integrating the existing severance and UI
systems into fully-funded individual accounts to provide income support to workers who
have lost their jobs. While many design issues would have to be worked out, such
accounts have the potential to efficiently protect workers while solving some of the
employment and compliance-related concerns that are currently difficult issues in
Turkey.
4.26 In either case, income protection needs to be complemented by cost-effective
active labor market programs for unemployed and otherwise vulnerable workers.
Currently, Turkey has very little capacity to support these workers through better labor
market information, job training, or job creation measures. However, the international
experience suggests that capacity should be built up cautiously, with realistic
expectations, and should be based on hard cost-benefit analysis. The evidence from other
countries shows that these programs are not a panacea for unemployment but welldesigned and implemented interventions can improve the functioning of the labor market
and assist workers to find jobs.
4.27 Ultimately, in an environment where knowledge is becoming increasingly
important, job creation and convergence to EU living standards will require education
and training reforms that lead to a more skilled workforce. Currently, Turkey lags
behind EU members on virtually all human capital indicators. Improvements need to be
made to address deficiencies in basic skills, to enhance the quality and relevance of
secondary and postsecondary education, and to increase training activity in industry. This
will require challenging and far-reaching reforms but, given Turkey’s youthful
demographic profile, preparation of the future labor force must be a priority.
48
CHAPTER 9.
ENHANCING POLICIES FOR
SOCIAL COHESION
9.1
Ensuring sustained and inclusive growth is an important challenge for Turkey
in view of the existing important social and regional gaps and the potential for the EU
accession process to create “winners”, but also some “losers”. Although reform is
underway to define a more systematic approach to start closing the existing gaps, an
integrated strategy will need to be formulated with a strong dimension on policies for
social cohesion. The capacity of the social security system to contribute/strengthen social
cohesion is impaired by several factors: it does not cover the entire population; it lacks
financial stability, with the largest share of funds going to pensions; the presence of a
large informal sector; and administrative and management problems which have adverse
effects on the effectiveness in the delivery of services. This chapter provides analytical
underpinnings in the key areas of social inclusion and health care, with emphasis on
policies to improve efficiency and ensure financial sustainability.
9.1.
SOCIAL INCLUSION
9.2
A wide range of policies and programs can have an important positive impact
upon social inclusion and cohesion. Notable amongst these are basic and secondary
education policies (discussed in the recent World Bank report on education) which extend
high quality education at an affordable price to the entire citizenry. Tertiary education is
more complex because of its higher unit costs, and more limited coverage. UHI, as
discussed already, if implemented correctly, will be a powerful tool of social cohesion.
However, a number of other measures are necessary. The key ones are highlighted
below.
9.3
Poverty monitoring: Maintain the excellent work on poverty monitoring under
the State Institute of Statistics (DIE) based upon annual household income and
consumption expenditure surveys (HICES). Strengthen the poverty mapping function.
9.4
Conditional cash transfer (CCT): Maintain and strengthen the CCT which is
targeted towards the poorest 6 percent of children (with the benefit paid to the mothers)
which helps families to maintain the poorest children in school and obtain adequate
preventive health services. This program is already reaching 2.0 million children and is
administered by the General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity (SYDGM)
87
through its 931 associated foundations throughout the country. The proxy means test for
this program was updated in 2005 according to the 2003 HICES. The proxy means test
for CCT will be systematically updated based upon the latest HICES, and in this manner
strengthened so that it can be used for the determination of eligibility for other
government programs (such as UHI premia paid for by the state) by adjusting the cut-off
point accordingly.
9.5
Social Services: A wide range of agencies including municipalities, the Social
Services & Child Protection Organization (SHCEK) and the SYDGM are providing
social services. Unfortunately there is no integrating framework, and both problems of
duplication and inadequate service provision apply, although the related agencies are
doing their best to coordinate. There is a need to develop an integrated social policy
under one lead ministry, improve the monitoring and evaluation of social services, and
then expand cost-effective services to underserved population groups, although it would
be very appropriate for the SYDGM to remain as an executive agency making payments
and providing services but not under the direct control of the policy-making ministry..
9.6
Youth policy: With. youth aged under 25 accounting for 50 percent of the total
population, youth are a particularly important population group to target as they represent
nothing less than the future social and human capital of the country. It is urgent to give
more attention to the issues of youth empowerment and inclusion, together with specific
programs .to overcome barriers to youth employment (youth unemployment is 2.5 times
the national average). Inter alia, this process would be enhanced through the
development of a national youth policy and providing significantly more resources to
youth programs.
9.7
Gender: Whilst Turkey has made good progress in addressing some gender
inequities, and both primary and secondary school enrollment rates are converging for the
two genders, there is still more to be done in terms of promoting and supporting female
employment, reducing the pay gap and in general integrating women as full equal
partners in society.
88
9.2.
MANAGING THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Health Expenditure Per
Capita
9.8
Health care expenditures and outcomes are unevenly distributed. Turkey
spends around 6.7 percent of its Gross National Income (GNI) on health, of which public
expenditures account for about 70 percent. 97 Per capita expenditure is relatively higher
than in countries with similar income
Fig. 9.1 Health Expenditure and GNI Per Capita Turkey and
Comparator Countries
levels (Figure 9.1), while the health
Public Expenditures
Total Expenditures
system fails to reach the poor and
Linear (Public Expenditures)
Linear (Total Expenditures)
vulnerable sections of society.
2000
Expenditures favor Turkey’s Central
TUR-Total
TUR-Public
and Mediterranean regions over
1500
other parts of the country and East
1000
and Southeast Turkey receiving less
500
than the proportionate share of
0
spending given their population. The
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
distribution of health benefits to
GNI Per Capita
different income quintiles shows a
significant bias towards the top two quintiles, who consume about 52 percent more health
care per capita relative to the bottom two quintiles.
9.9
There is ample room for improving health care outcomes and for efficiency
gains in public expenditure. Despite spending levels on the high end of comparators,
Turkey faces an unacceptably high burden of ill health and ranks far behind most middleincome countries in terms of the health status of its people. The reasons for such low
outcomes are many and varied. There are gaps in nutrition, housing, access to clean water
and satisfactory sanitation, and education, especially of girls and women – all of which
are widely recognized to be powerful determinants of good health – that adversely affect
health status. On the financing side, besides the fact that there are multiple problems with
mobilization of resources, the available resources are not allocated efficiently and
equitably. A significant proportion of the population has little or no financial protection,
and despite support from special funds and programs like the Social Assistance Fund and
97
Public expenditures on health consist of expenditures incurred by the Ministry of Health, General
Directorate of Coastal Health Services, Universities, Social Solidarity Fund, other Ministries and agencies,
local governments, state enterprises, civil servants, and social security institutions: Sosyal Sigortalar
Kurumu (SSK), Emekli Sandigi and Bagkur. Private expenditures on health consist of out-of-pocket
treatment and pharmaceutical expenditures incurred by individuals and households, and by companies and
individuals contributing to private insurance schemes. Social health insurance – offered by SSK, BagKur
and Emekli Sandigi – accounts for almost 66 percent of all public expenditures on health, equivalent to
about 12,875 trillion liras in 2004, with the balance (6,582 trillion liras in 2004) coming from the central
government budget. A little over 53 percent of all public expenditures on health take place on care provided
by hospitals, followed by 30 percent on the provision of pharmaceuticals and medical goods and 8.5
percent on outpatient care. Source: World Bank calculations, based on MOF/MOH/MOLSS data,
reorganized and presented in the NHA2000 format
89
the Green Card, in practice the disadvantaged groups are not targeted effectively. In
addition, there are multiple payers for same or similar services, and the institution of
revolving funds – which allow health providers to accept user charges and account for
them outside the budgetary flow of funds – introduces a variety of perverse incentives for
providers and further constrains access to health services for consumers. Public provision
of health is characterized by poor incentives for managers and providers alike, leaving
them open and vulnerable to alternative sources of income to augment their meager
salaries. Like financing, the delivery of health care is also fragmented, and there is little
continuity in the different levels of care. Clinical effectiveness of existing medical
interventions and treatment protocols is not always tested and attention to quality and
effectiveness of care is uneven. The private sector is growing, but its full potential is not
fully realized and their role and responsibilities not adequately defined.
9.10 Systemic and comprehensive reforms in the health sector are being undertaken.
Key elements of the proposed reforms that aim at improving equity and access to health
services are the introduction of universal health insurance and the creation of a health
insurance fund that would integrate all functions and premium collections related to
health in the existing insurance agencies such as SSK (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu),
BagKur and Emekli Sandigi. The health insurance fund would combine all financial
flows of fund in the health sector, including budgetary support to MOH (except for public
health care activities), financial outlays for the existing Green Card program, and health
expenditures of civil servants. Based on the principles of solidarity and risk pooling, all
citizens of the country are proposed to be covered under universal health insurance, with
the state making premium contributions on behalf of the indigent and others unable to do
so on their own behalf.
9.11 Providing adequate financial protection for health care to the entire population
is a key challenge. The present system of insurance leaves many without any coverage
and with inadequate coverage for many who are nominally covered. Additionally, there
are many who enjoy multiple sources of coverage, either by design or by circumstances.
There is also little doubt that the different health insurances being offered through SSK,
Bagkur and Emekli Sandigi, and the coverage provided to civil servants and welfare
programs like the Green Card should – in the interest of efficiency, risk-pooling and
consolidation of financing – be combined into one compulsory universal health insurance
system.
9.12 Unless it is accompanied by cost-reduction and efficiency enhancing measures,
the introduction of UHI could lead to higher levels of public expenditure on health in
the short run and jeopardize the fiscal sustainability of the system. Public expenditure
may increase not only because the state will have to bear the health insurance
expenditures of those hitherto uninsured, but also due to the induction impact on account
of changes in utilization of health services by the already insured as they adjust to new
boundaries of coverage, and the utilization patterns of the newly insured. In order for the
system to be fiscally sustainable, therefore, the introduction of universal health insurance
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needs to be accompanied by system-wide efficiency changes that will contain health costs
and compensate for the additional expenditures associated with extending financial
protection to all segments of the population. The proposed introduction of universal
health insurance has already triggered a number of reform measures in the health sector
in Turkey, and the emphasis at this point needs to be not only on sustaining this
momentum and extending it to other areas not included so far, but increasingly on
ensuring that the desired access and efficiency outcomes are achieved without any
increase in public expenditures on health. The more important of these focus areas are
elaborated below.
(a)
Consolidating hospitals and improving efficiency
9.13 While some gains in efficiency can be brought about simply by consolidating
and reducing the number of hospital beds in many provinces, further gains will come
about only by improving efficiency in the use of hospital resources and overall
management and accountability. A large number of hospitals continue to be
underutilized, and huge variations still exist in hospital occupancy rates among provinces.
Many MOH hospitals are too small in size to allow for efficient operation and provision
of care, and have significantly lower utilization rates compared to SSK and University
hospitals. In addition, hospital managers enjoy very limited administrative and financial
autonomy, and have very few incentives to adopt efficiency-enhancing measures. The
proposed introduction of universal health insurance provides a good opportunity to
further strengthen the gains from the merger of MOH and SSK hospitals under MOH
ownership and management. However, the separation of provision and financing provides
an opportunity to introduce innovative methods in management of health facilities, which
can be achieved by granting financial and administrative autonomy to public hospitals.
The introduction of hospital autonomy will require appropriate legislation that will allow
for public assets to be managed outside the direct purview of the government, and related
laws and regulation would need to be amended in order to facilitate the transformation of
MOH and SSK facilities to autonomous bodies.
(b)
Strengthening delivery of health services
9.14 The introduction of universal health insurance also provides an opportunity to
initiate measures to improve delivery of health services. This process has also started
with the piloting of the family medicine system, which is aimed at shifting the emphasis
from treatment of the sick to health promotion and prevention of illness. The family
medicine system will bring the physician and family members into closer and more
personal contact, enabling the physician to play an important role in the family’s health
and prevention of illness. Under the family medicine system, simple and routine
diagnostic services and consultations could be provided under a single-window and
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common illnesses could be treated across a broad spectrum of medicine domains,
including internal medicine, gynecology and pediatrics. Family medicine places special
emphasis on continuity of care and on quality of health services, and integrates
preventive health services with basic health services and provides the full package under
one window. The family medicine system has the potential for the strengthening of the
patient referral system as well.
(c)
Reforms in provider payment mechanisms
9.15 Changes in provider payment systems and incentives for physicians to provide
quality care at lowest costs are required. Some of these changes are already being
planned, and a system of paying family physicians on the basis of capitation is being
worked out. 98 Physicians participating in this scheme bear most risks of treating a patient,
and therefore are likely to be conservative in the amount of health care they provide.
Such a system would need to be extended to cover all outpatient care as family medicine
is scaled up from the Duzce pilot.
9.16 Prospective payment mechanisms introduced at the hospital level would provide
incentives to hospitals to contain costs. Prospective payment mechanisms rely on the
fact that services associated with a particular treatment are reasonably predictable and can
be bundled into a group to which a monetary value can be attached. The hospital then
gets reimbursed according to a pre-fixed rate per bundle. Such payment mechanisms do
not encourage excessive use, since the hospital can conceivably make a profit (or a
surplus) by being careful about inputs and hospital lengths of stay. One of the most
widely-known prospective payment systems is the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG),
developed to classify treatments according to the resource costs of its treatment. To be
certain, a DRG-based system by itself will not necessarily promote efficient use of
resources. Hospital care providers and managers need the flexibility and tools to actively
manage their resources and redirect their use, which will ensure that cost-savings in
treatment of one case are passed through the entire system.
(d)
Containing outpatient care provided by hospitals
9.17 A rules-based approach would be needed to contain costs. A large number of
outpatient services in Turkey are provided in hospitals, accounting for almost 43 percent
of total costs of outpatient services. Outpatient services provided in hospitals cost
significantly more than outpatient services provided in outpatient clinics, and it is
imperative that the introduction of universal health insurance and family medicine be
98
Physicians paid on the basis of a capitation fee per enrollee receive a fixed amount per enrollee
regardless of the type and extent of treatment sought.
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accompanied by a significant reduction in number of outpatient visits in hospitals that are
paid out of the health insurance fund. This can be managed by establishing clear and
transparent rules restricting reimbursement by the health fund of outpatient treatment
carried out in hospitals.
(e)
Managing pharmaceutical costs
9.18 Containing expenditures on drugs is a key challenge. Drugs are perhaps the
single largest cost driver in almost all healthcare systems, and have been the most
dynamically growing element in overall costs of healthcare services in recent years.
According to new data released by OECD, spending on pharmaceuticals across OECD
countries has increased by an average of 32 percent in real terms since 1998, reaching
more than US $450 billion in 2003. Growth in drug spending has outpaced total health
expenditure in most OECD countries, and Turkey is no exception. Expenditure on
pharmaceutical products constitutes a significant proportion of total expenditures on
health in Turkey, accounting for almost half of all SSK, Emekli Sandigi and Bagkur
spending on health. While pharmaceutical prices have increased broadly in line with
inflation, there has been a much larger change in consumption levels, including subtle
changes in consumption in favor of newer and more expensive drugs. 99
9.19 One of the reasons why Turkey spends a huge amount on drugs and
pharmaceutical products is that most of the insured population is insensitive to
pharmaceutical prices. Out-of-pocket payments for medicines constituting between 10
and 20 percent of total medicine bill of the insured. 100 In addition to price controls,
managing consumption of pharmaceuticals is critical in order to contain expenditures on
drugs. Many countries have successfully adopted demand-side measures of controlling
consumption, and cost-sharing has proved to be the most effective such measure. 101 The
consumption of pharmaceutical products among the insured is actually not low by
international standards, and there is a strong scope for cost containment if indiscriminate
consumption can be curbed.
99
Between the years 2000 and 2001, for example, the proportion of drugs consumed priced at half million
TL or less decreased slightly from 34 percent to 30 percent, while the proportion of drugs consumed priced
at 2 million TL or more increased from 34 percent to 47 percent.
100
Indeed, the high percentage of pharmaceutical expenditures in terms of overall health expenditures is as
much a reflection of low overall expenditures on health as it is of high expenditures on drugs.
101
In the Netherlands, for example, the introduction of co-payments on prescribed pharmaceuticals (a fixed
amount per prescription) led to substantial decrease in the total number of prescriptions. In Germany, drug
cost-containment measures take the form of cost-sharing, prescription limitations, reference prices and the
pharmaceutical spending cap that makes physicians’ associations liable for any overspending with no upper
limit. These measures led to substantive decreases in pharmaceutical expenditures for social health
insurance, mainly attributable to price reductions, changes in physicians’ prescribing behavior resulting in a
reduced number of prescriptions by 11.2 percent and increased prescriptions for generics. The French
government imposes a fine on pharmaceutical companies if pharmaceutical expenditures surpass budget
ceilings either due to price or quantity increases.
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9.20 Reforms should be phased in with appropriate sequencing. While all of the
above measures are critical to ensure improvements in access, equity and efficiency, it is
critical that utmost attention is paid to the sequencing of the above reforms so that the
process is seamless and does not lose effectiveness and credibility in the process of its
implementation.
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