Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from

Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from

Articles
Turkish-Israeli Relations after
Davos: A View from Turkey
GÖKHAN BACIK*
ABSTRACT
Despite the negative atmosphere it
created for both sides, the Davos case
should be seen as an opportunity
to revisit the various aspects of
Turkish-Israeli relations. TurkishIsraeli rapprochement is important
for the regional order. However,
both sides should realize that like all
bilateral relations the Turkish-Israeli
one is subject to social, political and
psychological parameters. There is
no ideal, correct model that is free
of social effects. The fluctuations
of a bilateral contact cannot be
understood through simplistic
analyses that prioritize personalities
or other trivial issues. Every single
event, including that at Davos, should
be seen as one function of complex
social phenomena. Even the most
unexpected events in politics are
the products of several major social
machineries. This article will offer an
alternative analysis of the TurkishIsraeli relationship in the light of a
number of social structures.
M
any aver that the 2009 World
Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos opened a new era in TurkishIsraeli relations. Before expanding on this,
it should be made clear that the Davos event
meant different things to the Turkish and Israeli public: For the Turks, who believe they
have historical and emotional links with the
Muslims of Palestine, the bombing of Gaza was
a near-traumatic experience. The Gaza factor
eroded even the most severe divisions in Turkish politics, bringing together the normally
antagonistic parties (conservative, secular, nationalist) in a vehement condemnation of Israel well before the Davos event. As far as the
Turks were concerned, therefore, the Turkish
prime minister’s describing Israel’s assault on
Gaza as a set of “barbarian” acts was no more
than the rhetorical summary of the mood in
Turkey. That is why even Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political opponents pub* Associate Professor, International Relations Department, Fatih
University & Dean of the Graduate School of Social Sciences,
[email protected]
Insight Turkey Vol. 11 / No. 2 / 2009
pp. 31-41
31
GÖKHAN BACIK
Most Israeli scholars’ analysis of
Turkish-Israeli relations ignores
their own side and focuses on
the Turkish side All problems
and crises in the two countries’
relations are explained in terms
of developments on the
Turkish side
licly declared their support for what he
had done. This is most unusual in Turkish politics. Not unexpectedly, however,
the Israelis deemed Prime Minister
Erdoğan’s declaration unacceptable: He
had accused Israel of committing barbaric crimes, and had ignored her security concerns. More, what Erdoğan said
was nothing like just another condemnation emanating from an Arab state. This
was Turkey speaking, a state that had
long treated Israel quite differently. That doubled the psychological effect on the
Israeli public.
The analytical tools of political science offer no apt instrument for analyzing
this event at Davos. Whatever it was (accident, lapsus lingua, heroism, justice,
immoderation…) is less important than how it was understood: The Turks, along
with other Muslims across the globe, considered it morally correct, and exactly
what Israel deserved. The Israelis and their allies across the globe viewed it as unacceptable. The upshot was that, even if it was an event contextualized in a highly
moral framework, the Davos incident per se ceased to be a topic in the discourse
about international relations. In other words it is no longer logical to quarrel on
the meaning of the event, as it refers to two contending set of meanings for both
sides. Yet the Davos case should be seen as an opportunity to revisit the various aspects of Turkish-Israeli relations. An analysis of the complex structures that produced the current situation is needed. Once analyzed, it will become obvious that
many people have characterized the Turkish-Israeli relationship without giving
proper attention to the complex structures that forged it. Ignoring the causal links,
commentators have uprooted this relationship from its social environment, and
inevitably put themselves on course for a highly speculative analytical outcome.
This article will offer an alternative analysis of the Turkish-Israeli relationship
in the light of a number of social structures. Which question should drive the
methodological pursuit is easily determined: Why is the Turkish-Israeli alliance
fragile?
A Discursive Alliance
Despite the all-pervading rhetoric, analysis will make apparent that the Turkish-Israeli relationship was bred in a discursive milieu that lacked the necessary
32
Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey
material infrastructure. Today, the volThe inadequate trade volume
ume of trade between Turkey and Iraq is
between Turkey and Israel
around $8 billion,1 and around $10 bilhas left the Israeli option in
lion2 between Turkey and Iran. Not satisTurkish foreign policy in the
fied with the current performance, Turkey is now aiming to increase her trade
sterile domain of bureaucratic
with both Iraq and Iran. One projected
initiative
target is a $20 billion trade volume with
Iraq. Meanwhile, Turkey’s economic relationship with Russia has ballooned to a
market volume of $33 billion.3 Similarly impressive data can be displayed about
economic relations with Poland, the Czech Republic and Georgia. In comparison,
Turkey’s economic relationship with Israel has produced a trade volume of a mere
$3.5 billion,4 which is far from satisfactory. On a descending list of Turkey’s yearly
export-destination states, Israel is lower even than Libya, Algeria and the United
Arab Emirates.5
Such a weak economic tie does indeed fall well short of one that can sustain
an enduring political rationale. In other words, in economic terms at least, the
history of bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel shows no significant level
of interdependence. Therefore, the nature of the bilateral contact between the
two states has a very fragile foundation. The volume of trade between the two
states is not satisfactory developed in terms of the growing economic trends in
the region. Equally important is the components of trade with Israel. Dominated
by the military field, the Israeli option has failed to create a social basis on the
Turkish side.
As a second and related fact, the lack of a satisfactory economic rationale keeps
the Israeli option on a bureaucratic plane. That is, the Israeli connection has no
sociological rationale in Turkish politics. Interestingly, in contrast, several social
groups have emerged in Turkey to champion trade with Syria, Iraq, Georgia and
even Armenia. For example, local businessmen in Turkey’s southeast have formed
what almost amounts to a lobby, for they are increasingly successful at keeping
the political elite on a pro-Syrian line: The “Syrian option” has become a golden
opportunity for the residents of many Turkish cities in the region, such as Antep
and Kilis.6 Part of this scene is the unique case of a foreign state -- Syria -- opening a consulate in an Anatolian city, Antep. To show the extent to which economic
factors can attract social interest is the fact that the Syrian Consulate building in
Antep was voluntarily furnished by local businessmen.7 Naturally, those groups
emerged as new actors with the capacity of influencing decision making elites
in Turkish foreign policy. In sharp contrast, Israel has totally failed to create a
33
GÖKHAN BACIK
comparable mood of social receptiveness. The inadequate trade volume between
Turkey and Israel has left the Israeli option in Turkish foreign policy in the sterile
domain of bureaucratic initiative.
In the last two decades in particular, Turkish foreign policy has been de-securitized. In the late President Turgut Özal’s hands, foreign policy was radically
reoriented.8 An economic rationale emerged to replace the previous “security
first” orientation. The Turkish foreign policy actors were transformed from security-seeking agents into market-seeking agents. Consequently, the priority list
of foreign policy drivers changed. It is therefore normal in this context that the
relationship with Israel is fragile. Simply, Israel is not among the top ten states in
Turkey’s economic ambit.
In this vein, the link between de-securitization and democratization should
be noted. No other state can compete with Turkey in proving the positive link
between de-securitization and democratization. De-securitization rearranges the
division of labor among civil and military elites, yet it automatically strengthens
democracy in developing societies. De-securitization reduces the military component of foreign policy. More importantly, de-securitization means new room
for public influence. Proving the theory, the democratization process of Turkey in
the past ten years opened the way for dramatic changes in foreign policy. Foreign
policy has become a more societal process replacing the former elitist structure.
The rise of the public introduced two major new components: values and interests. In other words, society came out as the new actor in the definition of values
and interests to be protected and sought in foreign policy. Compared with the
former, interest is predominantly defined in economic terms in the new calculus
of Turkish foreign policy. Thus, legitimacy tests in Turkish foreign policy should
take the societal reaction into account.
The transformation of Turkish foreign policy signals a strong message for Israel. For long-term stable relations, Israel should be included into the new calculus of Turkish foreign policy. The rise of societal values side of de-securitization
may create new problems. However, as stated above, de-securitization also means
the inclusion of economic calculations which may even create socially legitimate
corridors for Israel.
Stereotyping Turkish Politics
Among not only Jewish but also Western scholars there exists a simplistic reductionist model to explain the shifts in Turkish foreign policy. This model holds
34
Photo by World Economic Forum
Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey
Whatever happened in Davos is less important than how it was understood: The Turks, along with
other Muslims across the globe, considered it morally correct, and exactly what Israel deserved.
that in Turkey there are two polar opposites: the seculars and the Islamists, and
that the nuances of foreign policy are accounted for in terms of which of the two
is in the dominant position. This structural model also houses several “transcendental” presumptions as well; one being that the Islamic/conservative groups are
the natural anti-Israelites, and the secular groups the natural pro-Israelites.
Like all inadequate structural frameworks, this model is based on misleading
stereotypes. To begin with, it depicts Turkish politics as a shallow game in which
several simple parameters shape the whole process. It totally ignores the machinery of the actual consequential social phenomena. The simple dichotomy of “Islam vs. secular” or “liberal vs. Kemalist” lacks the capacity to present analytical
explanations that shed light on the logic of the Turkish social phenomena. Naturally, in Turkey as elsewhere, political actors and procedures are directed by the
sophisticated influences of contending social networks. The Kemalist vs. Islamist
binary model, now almost canonical in contemporary Western studies of Turkey,
should be carefully reviewed, for it is grossly misleading.
Major developments in Turkey contradict what the Islamist vs. secular model tells us. For example, it was the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)
35
GÖKHAN BACIK
that supported the invitation of Jewish capital into Turkey. Ironically, this AKP
initiative was blocked by secular circles. In 2007, Sami Ofer, a Jewish businessman, sought to buy a 14.76 percent stake in the Turkish Petroleum Refineries
Corporation (TÜPRAŞ). However, the Turkish Council of State cancelled the
plans to privatize TÜPRAŞ. During the pertinent parliamentary debates, it was
the centrist Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputies who harshly criticized the
AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan.9 Meanwhile, Ofer’s other major privatization
project was also rejected by the Council of State, on the CHP’s instigation.10 The
CHP actually made out its case in a hostile interpellation that chastised the AKP
government. What Prime Minister Erdoğan said in response is of importance for
the identification of a major flaw in the Islamism vs. secularism model:
“When Jewish capital comes, you are against it. When Arab capital comes, you are
against it. You are also against Western capital. So, who is your friend? They [those
who are critical of foreign capital] can not stop us! I am marketing my country.”11
However, the criticism did not stop, nor did the prime minister abandon his
course. Even during the 2009 local election campaign, Erdoğan defended his party’s will to open the Turkish market to Jewish capital. The legendary leader of the
Turkish Islamist movement, Necmetttin Erbakan, a former prime minister, accused the AKP of “serving the Zionist cause”. According to Erbakan, Zionism is
behind the AKP, and is using it to realize its aims in the Middle East.12
The secular groups’ voices were no different. In the famous Republic Rallies,
organized to protest the AKP government, the streets abounded with banners
bearing texts that accused the AKP of “cooperating with Israel” and “selling Turkish soil to the Zionists”. Several bestselling books castigating the leaders of the
AKP, particularly Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül, and dubbing them “the
children of Moses”, have insinuated the AKP’s services to Zionism.13 The book
titled “The Children of Moses” was welcomed by secular commentators who write
for leading mainstream newspapers such as Hürriyet. (Hürriyet is a leading secular newspaper with a circulation of 500,000.) Emin Çölaşan, at that time a Hürriyet journalist, passionately commended the book to his readers. According to
Çölaşan, the book unmasks “Moses and his contemporary contacts”.14 By “contacts” he meant the AKP elite. It is worth noting that such conspiracy theories are
difficult to find even in the most radical of Islamist newspapers in Turkey.
Finally, to give a very recent example of the wrong-mindedness of the secularist vs. Islamists model: Deniz Baykal, the leader of the ultra-secular CHP, attacked
Prime Minister Erdoğan in the same vein, proving the fallacy of the Islamism vs.
36
Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey
secularism binary. Baykal, after noting that the Erdoğan government is responsible for promoting the acceleration of relations with Israel in an unusually urgent
way, said:
“The pilots who drop bombs over the kids in Gaza are trained in Turkey. We all
feel the pain! This has been happening with the approval of the Erdoğan government. It is the Erdoğan government that signed the agreement with Israel on the
modernization of the army.”15
This attack on Erdoğan came in tandem with rather more than moderate level
of condemnation of Israel. But then the secular actors in Turkish politics can afford to be immoderate in their critical references to Israel, for they enjoy an informal guarantee of immunity from adverse Israeli, and other Western, reaction.
Curious though this might be, if a Turkish political actor has a secular identity
then, no matter what he says about Israel, he is never accused of being anti-Israel.
Attachment to the illusory Islamism vs. secularism binary puts the Turkish secular elite beyond the possibility of foreign, particularly Jewish, criticism. This is a
clear instance of a model that is defective a priori giving life to a perverse political
rationale.
Genealogical Problems
As Paul Pierson succinctly puts it, “beginnings are extremely important”.16 Especially in the social process, the nature of a beginning can set in motion various
unintended consequences that affect the whole process in the long run. In retrospect, the relationship with Israel was an item in the domestic competition between the elected government and the army in 1997. As the present writer noted
in 2001, “The zenith of the Turkish-Israeli relations coincided with the so-called
28 February process, which was obviously a pseudo-civil era in terms of civil
government”.17 Israel figured as a symbolic value in the ongoing Turkish domestic political debate. In the eyes of ordinary Turkish citizens, alliance with Israel
was a purely military rather than a civil proposition, used by the military against
the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (RP).18 In the words of Lütfullah Karaman, a Turkish expert on Palestine, “Rapprochement with Israel is the preference of official
Turkey.”19 This association in the public mind of the army and the relationship
with Israel damaged the social legitimacy of the bilateral relationship from the
very first stage of its pursuit.
However, the soldiers were eventually left out of the evolving Israel issue. In
the ensuing stage of the development of the bilateral relationship, even the most
37
GÖKHAN BACIK
secular actors took to voicing criticism of Israel: Former President Ahmet Necdet
Sezer’s remark, responding to the tension after then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon visited the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, is an important illustration of
this:
“…the Islamic world was deeply upset by the violent deeds against our Palestinian
brothers after Friday’s prayers on Oct. 28 in Jerusalem, which Islam deems to be
among the most sacred of lands, following certain irresponsible provocations. Resorting to violence, no matter for what purpose, and using weapons in sacred lands
is totally unacceptable. Clashes spread rapidly after the upsetting event, and very
unfortunately, use of weapons by Israeli soldiers caused several deaths. I mourn
those who lost their lives after these terrible occurrences.”20
Public pressure was the background and instigator of this and similar declarations. Remembering the symbolic universe in which the Turkish public analyzes
the Palestinian problem, it is obvious that the Turkish political elite, be they secular or nationalist, does not have many alternatives. Often the Palestinian issue engages the public almost as a national cause.
The role of the Turkish military elite in the early period of Turkish-Israeli relations during the late 1990s is important. Conservative citizens saw it played out
as a power that reduced the authority of the government. They wanted a different
and more civil presentation of the Israeli option to the Turkish public. Meanwhile,
they wanted the Israeli side to cease to equate all critical developments in Turkish
public life with the country’s Islamization. Such reductionist arguments provoked
public resentment, and again re-contextualized the Israeli option, setting it into
the context of the civil-military tension in Turkey.
Israeli Domestic Politics: A Source of Instability
Most Israeli scholars’ analysis of Turkish-Israeli relations ignores their own
side and focuses on the Turkish side. In those analyses, Israel is a fixed independent variable. All problems and crises in the two countries’ relations are explained
in terms of developments on the Turkish side. This is a defensive mechanism on
the part of Israeli scholars for, as in all bilateral relations, the fluctuations of Israeli
domestic politics are equally important. Those, too, have a direct effect on the
nature of the bilateral relationship.
Israeli politics has been reduced to a process that is an almost-continuous
electoral game. Elections are inconclusive. Endless elections keep political actors
in abnormal posturing modes as they vie with one another to voice ever more
38
Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey
intemperate views. Naturally, in the age In the eyes of ordinary Turkish
of globalization, their views travel rap- citizens, alliance with Israel was
idly from one state to another. The ina purely military rather than a
creasingly unstable condition of Israeli
civil proposition
politics gives rise to serious concern in
Turkey. Thanks to the endless political
instability, the normal and abnormal have become fused in Israel. Taha Akyol, a
Milliyet journalist, outlines his analysis of the Turkish perspective on the Israeli
situation thus:
“Israel is an example of an unstable democracy. The political parties, several of
which are yet to be institutionalized, are not strong. There is no stable electoral
support. Big parties crumble into small ones, and a small party can rise to being
the leading one. In such an unstable democracy, moderate policies have no chance
of gaining societal support. The weakness of political parties contributes to Israeli
militarism, which radicalizes the masses. Did not the Kadima activate the Gaza
massacre to garner votes?”21
(One should note here that Milliyet is a leading left-leaning newspaper in Turkey.) Akyol’s point is important, for many people share similar views. For instance,
asked about the recent elections in Israel, Prime Minister Erdoğan noted his concern that the Israelis had supported right-wing parties. According to Erdoğan, the
election result represented a “dark picture for the future”.22
The rise of right-wing parties in Israel is a key factor.23 As Mel Frykberg puts
it, extremism now dominates Israeli polls and politics.24 The rise of ultra-right
parties in fact isolates Israel.25 These parties’ spokespersons’ ideas and theses, particularly their manipulations of the Palestinian issue, quickly affect public opinion
in Turkey and inflate the level of public resentment. The rise of ultra-right, if not
fascist, actors such as Avigdor Lieberman and his Yisrael Beiteinu, has been noted
by the political elite of a number of states. Borrowing Roee Nahmias’ phrase, the
much-employed loaded question, particularly in Arab and other Muslim states, is,
“Which extremists will Israel elect?”26
Naturally, what is said in Israel registers with the public of other states, including that of Turkey. An illustrative case after the Davos event was that of the
several Jewish newspapers that invited Israeli citizens to boycott Turkish goods.27
Similarly, crudely derogatory depictions of the Muslim Prophet on Israeli television’s Channel 10 quickly incensed the Turkish public. The secretary general of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a Turk himself, delivered a
39
GÖKHAN BACIK
protest to that channel that made known the exception taken to this grave offence
to Muslims and their faith.28
Conclusion
So far various critical aspects of the bilateral relations between Turkey and
Israel have been summarized. At this stage, a number of practical strategies can
be listed that may play a critical role in overcoming the problems. First of all,
Turkish-Israeli relations are very shallow. Complex plans are needed, such as increasing exchange programs for universities, cultural programs and tourism. For
instance, the level of cooperation between Turkish and Israeli universities is poor.
Naturally, the poverty of academic contact is a major handicap in creating the
common discourse that is so important in the formation of societal legitimacy.
The current model reminds the Cold War diplomacy that took place between
leaders. Turkish-Israeli relations in this sense are still bureaucratic. Secondly, Israel should create a mechanism of communication with Turkey with regards to
her policies toward Palestine, and Gaza in particular. This suggestion does not
mean that Israel should offer an explanation to the Turkish side. What is needed is
a communication mechanism. At least such an attempt will enhance the Turkish
leaders’ position with their own public.
It is a fact that Turkish-Israeli rapprochement is critically important for the
order in the Middle East. But both sides should realize that, like all bilateral relations, the Turkish-Israeli one is subject to social, political and psychological parameters. There is no ideal, correct model that is free of social effects. The fluctuations of a bilateral contact cannot be understood through simplistic analyses that
prioritize personalities or other trivial issues. Every single event, including that
at Davos, should be seen as one function of complex social phenomena. Even
the most unexpected events in politics are the outcomes of several major social
machineries. It is to be reasonably expected of rational actors that they seek to
understand these machineries.
Endnotes
1. “Irak’la 8 milyar dolarlık ortaklık,” Radikal, Oct. 18, 2006.
2. Cengiz Çandar, “Tahran’da olup-biteni ve Türkiye’nin konumunu doğru anlamak,” Radikal,
March 13, 2009.
3. “2008’de Türkiye Rusya ilişkileri,” Milliyet, Dec. 19, 2008.
4. Nevin Donat, “İsrailli yatırımcı için Türkiye hala cazip,” Milliyet, Jan. 27, 2009.
5. Turkish Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade: İhracatta ilk 40, http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/EAD/IstatistikDb/eko06.xls
40
Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: A View from Turkey
6. “Tüzmen: Suriye sınırında 4 bölgede ticaret merkezi kurulacak,” Milliyet, Jan. 8, 2004.
7. Nazire Kalkan, “Antep-Halep hattı altın basacak,” Tempo, May 16, 2005.
8. Muhittin Ataman, “Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring, 2002),
pp. 120-153.
9. “TBMM’de Sami Ofer tartışması,” Radikal, Oct. 12, 2005.
10. “Galataport yeni imar planını bekleyecek,” Milliyet, Jan. 7, 2006.
11. http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=1105903
12. “Erbakan AKP ve CHP’ye Trabzon’dan yüklendi,” Zaman, July, 6 2007.
13. Ergun Poyraz, Musa’nın Çocukları: Tayyip ve Emine (Children of Moses: Tayyip and Emine)
(Istanbul: Togan Yayınları, 2007). The author was latter arrested and accused of assisting a possible
coup against the government.
14. Emin Çölaşan, “İlhan Taşçı’nın kitabı,” Hürriyet, July 8, 2008.
15. “Baykal: Filistinli çocukları vuran İsrailli pilotlar Konya’da eğitiliyor,” Radikal, Feb. 4, 2009.
16. Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, And Social Analysis (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 11.
17. Gökhan Bacık, “The Limits of an Alliance: Turkish-Israeli Relations Revisited,” Arab Studies
Quarterly Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2001), p. 52.
18. Bacık, “The Limits of an Alliance: Turkish-Israeli Relations Revisited,” p. 53.
19. Lütfullah Karaman, “Israil ile Yakınlaşma “Resmi Türkiye”nin Tercihi,” Islam, Vol. 14, No.
166 (June, 1997), p. 48.”
20. Presidency of the Republic of Turkey: 16. İSEDAK Toplantısı’nın açılısında yaptığı konuşma,
(Oct. 25, 2000). www.cankaya.gov.tr/KONUSMALAR/25.l 0.2000-127
21. Taha Akyol, “İsrail dersleri,” Milliyet, Feb. 11, 2009.
22. Oğuz Eser, “Erdoğan: İsrail seçim sonuçları “çok karanlık”’, Timeturk, Feb. 15, 2009. http://
www.stargundem.com/siyaset_haberleri/38679-Erdogan-Israil-secim-sonuclari-cok-karanlikhaberi.html
23. Phyllis Bennis, “Israel: Rise of the Right,” FPIF Commentary, Feb. 12, 2009. http://www.fpif.
org/fpiftxt/5866
24. Mel Frykberg, “Extremism dominates Israeli polls,” Inter Press Service, Feb. 12, 2009. http://
ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45743
25. Mahir Kaynak, “Türkiye-İsrail İlişkiler,” Star, Feb. 17, 2009.
26. Roee Nahmias, “Arab media: “Which extremist will Israel elect?”’, Feb. 10, 2009. http://www.
ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3669604,00.html
27. “İsrail’de “Türkiye’yi boykot” çağrıları,” Milliyet, Jan. 14, 2009.
28. “Peygamberimize büyük hakaret,” Milli Gazete, March 2, 2009.
41