Privatization and the Labor Market in Turkey

Privatization and the Labor Market in Turkey

Privatization and the Labor Market in Turkey**
Süleyman Özmucur*
Department of Economics
Bogazici University
and
University of Pennsylvania (visiting)
** An earlier version of the paper was presented at a seminar held at State Institute of Statistics
and at a workshop at Department of Economics, Middle East Technical University. The author
is indebted to Professor Tuncer Bulutay and organizors and participants of the Seminar and the
Workshop. The author thanks to Professors Tuncer Bulutay, Cevat Karatas, and Insan Tunali
for comments on an earlier version of the paper.
* Süleyman Özmucur, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, Bebek, Istanbul 80815.
Tel: 212 287 2453, 212 263 1540 ext. 1505 ; Fax:212 287 2453, 212 265 1479; e-mail:
[email protected]. During the 1997/98 academic year: University of Pennsylvania,
Department of Economics, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297, USA. Tel: (215)
898 7716, Fax: (215) 573 2057, e-mail- [email protected].
1
1. Introduction
Turkey initiated a privatization program in 1983. Since 1986, a total of 121
companies were privatized either via sale of shares or assets (no state shares were
left in 103 of them), and a revenue of 3.5 billion USD was obtained. Almost fifty
percent of the sales were in the form of block-sales to a single company or a
group (Ozellestirme Idaresi, 1997b).
Privatization program has proceeded more slowly than originally planned (as also
stated by Hazine Mustesarligi, 1997 and OECD,1997). This slow process was
largely due to the objection to the idea of privatization among the general public
and also in the Parliament. A single most important reason for the objection was
the Privatization Program’s possible adverse effects on employment1. This paper
studies these effects of privatization on the labor market.
The paper has six sections. Section 2 of this paper studies employment in cement
industry where a large number of firms were privatized. Section 3 is devoted to
theoretical and empirical issues in privatization and employment. Possible effects
of privatization on employment, labor productivity, and capital/labor ratios are
studied in Section 4. Convergence among firms and convergence in time is
addressed in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted to results on privatized firms, only.
Major conclusions are stated in the final section.
2. Employment in Cement Establishments
In general, employment effects of privatization were studied by comparing
employment figures before and after privatization. This method assumes that
nothing has changed in the environment that these firms were operating. We
argue that one should look at all the firms, and compare employment in privatized,
public and private firms. This enables one to see differences between privatized
and other firms.
1 Those who are against privatization claim that workers will lose their jobs leading to a higher
rate of unemployment, which is already quite high. A policy instrument which was used to
alleviate social problems will get out of the hands of policy makers. Those who argue for
privatization claim that new jobs can be created if the loss of state owned enterprises is not to
be financed by the public.
2
There are 18 private, 5 public and 16 privatized establishments in cement
industry2. It should be noted that establishments with less than fifty percent public
shares (for example Konya, Mardin, Unye) are grouped among private
establishments. All or part of their public shares may have been privatized during
the period under investigation (Table 1). In Table 2 and Figure 1, data on
establishments are given according to ownership, and then according to market
shares in 19903. Those establishments with private ownership throughout the
period were given first. They are followed by public and privatized
establishments.
It is not hard to see that there is a decline in employment after 1989 in almost all
the establishments, private or privatized alike. This decline is not something
special to privatized firms. The reason for this is downsizing and sub-contracting
in cement establishments, partly due to wage hikes in 1989. Industry leaders
made the claim that “We are here to produce cement, not food.” and fired cooks
and purchased “ready-meal” from catering companies. They claimed that “we
are not policemen”, and fired guards and hired a security firm to do the job for
them. These developments resulted in lower employment figures in all the firms.
According to Saygili (1996) as reported by Tansel (1997, pp.10) 1995
employment and sub-contracted worker numbers in some of the cement
establishments were: Ankara 257 and 71, Balikesir 172 and 0, Denizli 243 and 85,
Iskenderun 185 and 86, Konya 347 and 165, Nigde 251 and 99, and Soke 235 and
139. If those who were sub-contracted were excluded, employment numbers are
close if not equal to the numbers we have in Table 24.
3. Privatization and Employment: Theoretical and Empirical Issues
2 The major source of data is Istanbul Sanayi Odasi, 500 largest establishments of Turkey
survey results. There are 41 establishments in cement industry. Two establishments with no
clinker capacity (only with grinding facilities) were left out. Employment in remaining 39
establishments are given in Table 2 and Figure 1. Unfortunately, there are missing values for
some establishments. If the establishment does not appear among the largest 500 or the next
largest 250 (since 1988), data for a public firm can obtained from the reports of Basbakanlik
Yuksek Denetleme Kurulu. Another source is Istanbul Menkul Kiymetler, provided the firm is
quoted there. Data can be made available upon request from the author.
3 See Ozmucur (1992) for market shares and concentration ratios in Turkey and seven regions.
4 There may be differences in these figures if they are obtained from different sources. These
differences depend on when the survey was undertaken and the questions asked. Some surveys
refer to ‘average employment during the year’, others refer to employment at the end of the
year, or in April, or in October. All these cause slight differences among employment figures.
This is one of the reasons why we want to base our calculations on a single source, if possible.
3
Is there a relationship between ownership, employment and performance? 5
Studies based on State Institute of Statistics manufacturing surveys and censuses,
and Istanbul Chamber of Industry 500 largest firms of Turkey surveys reveal
differences among public and private firms. These differences may pertain to
employment, productivity, profitability, and behavior. These studies are based on
aggregate data on manufacturing sub-sectors or manufacturing as a whole. They
give some insights about these indicators, but are rather crude estimates.
Establishments with different sizes, different initial conditions and market
structures are all grouped into one to deal with a rather complicated problem. In
the “before-after” approach, firms before and after privatization are compared
and studied for important differences. Conclusions drawn from this type of
analysis implicitly assume that other environmental variables that firms operate
in do not change over the period. Some arbitrary determination of years before
and after approach is another problem. Using two or three years before and after
privatization seems to be an arbitrary choice. The lag in effect may vary from one
sector to another, even from one firm to another.
An alternative approach may alleviate these problems. Cement sector with a
relatively homogeneous product may be used for comparisons among firms6.
This sector realized relatively large number of privatization episodes (Table 1).
There are enough number of observations to make comparisons among public,
private, and privatized firms.
This approach allows one to make three types of studies: i. keep one group, say
public firms throughout the entire period, as a control group and make
comparisons with that control group. ii. study changes in ,if any, main indicators
of public firms which are privatized. Do this analysis firm by firm and try to see
some common trends, iii. study each firm, regardless of ownership and see
whether ownership is important or not. We will use this more general approach
which allows us to do analyses stated in (i) and (ii), if so desired.
5 See Aktan (1992), Artan (1991), Aysan & Ozmen (1981), Boratav & Turkcan (1993),
HDTM (1989), Kafaoglu (1994), Kamu Ortakligi Idaresi (1994), Karatas (1990, 1992a, 1992b),
Karatas & Onis (1994), Kepenek (1990), Kjellstrom (1990), OECD (1997), Ozellestirme
Idaresi Baskanligi (1997a, 1997b), Ozmen (1987), Suicmez & Yildirim (1993), Tallant (1993),
Walstedt (1977), World Bank (1995, 1997) on state economic enterprises and their
privatization.
6 See Bayat & Durusoy (1996), Cakmak & Zaim (1991), DPT(1993), Ozmucur (1992) ,Saygili
& Taymaz (1996), Tallant (1993), Tansel (1997) on cement industry.
4
Many indicators can be used in comparisons. Productivity, employment, profit
rates are some of them7. It is also interesting to study the efects of a loss of a state
owned enterprise on the budget. However, this is not the main focus of this paper.
How does ownership affect performance? In a simple micro framework:
Q = f (L, K)
Profit= P Q - wL - rK
Labor productivity= Q/L
where, Q - output, L-labor, K-capital, w-wage rate, r-unit cost of capital
The objective of maximization of profits will yield the condition that marginal
cost is equal to marginal revenue.
The objective function of a public firm is different (Boycko, Shleifer, Vishny,
1996). A public firm tries to maximize the wage bill in addition to profits. The
manager may want to maximize profits, but the representative of the owner
(member of the Parliament) tries to maximize the wage bill, in general by
increasing employment. There tends to be an over-employment in a public firm8.
Such a firm will have the following production function, and a profit relationhip:
Q = f (aL, bK)
Profit= P Q - awL- r bK
Labor productivity= Q/(aL)=Q/L (1/a)
The following hypotheses are to be tested:
i. a >1, and b>1 . There is over-employment and intensive use of capital stock.
This is equivalent to saying that productivity is lower in the public sector.
Unfortunately, capital stock figures are difficult, if not impossible, to find.
Other things, being constant labor productivity and profits will be lower.
ii. If a>1, then profits and labor productivity will be lower in the public firm.
iii. If b>1, the results are ambiguous. Profits may be lower, but labor productivity
may be higher. After privatization, firms increase their investments, therefore
their cost of capital. They also have a more accurate account of depreciation.
These two factors may lead to a decline in profits right after privatization.
4. Trends and Structural Breaks
7 See Cakmak & Zaim (1991), Froutan (1991), Krueger & Tuncer(1980), Nishimizu &
Robinson(1984), Ozmucur(1992, 1993), Ozmucur & Bayazitoglu (1997), Ozmucur &
Karatas(1994) Schmalensee & Willig (1989), Shepherd (1990) and Yildirim (1989)
8 On employment or wages in state economic enterprises see Artan (1991), Bulutay (1995),
Tansel (1997), World Bank (1995, 1997).
5
The method that we are going to adopt is based on the following idea: If there is a
change in ownership, there is a change in the structure or there is a structural
break. Rather than imposing that break on the equation to be estimated, an
equation will be estimated without a restriction and the year of break, if any, will
be determined. This can be done easily by switching regime models and spline
functions (Poirier, 1974).
If there is a structural break at year S, two equation can be derived from an
estimated equation given below:
Yt=β1+ β 2 t + β3 (t- S) Dt+u, u is the random disturbance term.
Dt=1 , t > S ; and Dt=0 , t < S ;
Y - indicator (for example, employment or log of employment), t-time (year) , D
- dummy variable whose value is one after the break and zero before the break, S
- the year of structural break
For both values of D, expected value is the same: E(Yt)= β 1+ β 2 t. Therefore the
resulting function will be continuous. For the first period (before the break):
Yt= β 1+ β 2t . For the second period (after the break): Yt=( β 1- β 3S) + (β 2 + β 3) t
= α1 + α 2 t . Therefore, α1 = β1 - β3S, and α2 = β2 + β3 .
If the dependent variable is in log form (as in employment), that is
ln Yt=β1+ β 2 t + β3 (t- S) Dt+u, then
α1 = β1 +(exp( β3)-1)) S, and α2 = β2 +(exp( β3)-1))
Testing the hypotheses that Ho: α1 =( β 1- β 3S) = β 1
or Ho: α2 = (β 2 + β 3) = β 2
both can be tested by Ho: β 3 = 0
It is claimed that the year of structural change and the year of privatization are
somewhat related. It is expected that the year of privatization is also the year of
structural break. This is a very strong statement. In general, an announcement of
privatization may give the same signal as privatization itself. Therefore, it can be
argued that structural break is followed by privatization. On the other hand, one
may also argue that changes occur (structural break) after privatization. All in all,
6
it may be expected to have the year of privatization and the year of structural
break quite close to each other, if not the same year.
The equation is estimated with S=1985, then S=1986, .. and finally S=1994:
Yt=b1+b2 t +b3 (t- S) Dt+et , where e is the residual
The S value which gives the minimum residual sum of squares, or maximum
determination coefficient is chosen as the year of structural break. This is
equivalent to maximizing the likelihood function.
4.1. Employment
Estimated employment equations for individual establishments are given in Table
3. Since there were not enough observations for three establishments, equations
were estimated for 39 establishments (18 private, 5 public, and 16 privatized).
Since logarithm of employment is used as the dependent variable, coefficients
associated with time refer to average annual rate of changes. For example,
employment in Akcimento declines by 0.013 (1.3 percent) before the break and
by 0.091 (9.1 percent) after the break. Employment in Gaziantep declines by
0.031 (3.1 percent) before the break and by 0.105 (10.5 percent) after the break.
With the exception of Yibitas, Kars and Trakya, there is a break in employment
trends. Rate of decline is higher after the break for all establishments (though
positive trends for Goltas and Sanliurfa). These clearly indicate a downsizing in
all establishments.
It is also important to determine the year of structural break. This can be done by
comparing the date of privatization and date of structural break (Table 3). 4
establishments have the same year, 7 establishments with a lag of 1 year, 2 with a
lag of 2 years, 1 with a lag of 3 years, and 2 with a lag of 4 years. Structural break
comes before privatization. One can conclude that employment is lowered before
privatization. The privatization decision may be more important then the actual
privatization itself, as far as employment is concerned. These companies are
taken into privatization portfolio, and then dressed to look attractive.
One should also note that the determination of the date of structural break is in
general a close call. There is not a lot of difference in determination coefficients
among regressions with S values close to the year of privatization. If one uses the
actual date of privatization, it is possible to get a reasonably good estimate. As an
example, results on Ankara Cimento reveal that one can see a significant change
7
in the trend in 1988 and also in 1989 (Table 3a). Similar results are obtained for
other establishments. We preferred not to put any restriction before the
estimation.
4.2. Labor Productivity
It is claimed that privatization will lead to significant improvements in labor
productivity. Output will not diminish despite the decrease in employment.
All the regressions with the exception of Kars, Ergani and Trakya are highly
significant. There is a positive trend in labor productivity in three private
establishments (Canakkale, Aslan, and Bolu). Five of them (Adana, Cimsa,
Goltas, Bastas, and Konya) show a negative trend. Remaining 10 private
establishments have no significant trend in labor productivity before the break.
Two of the five public establishments (Elazig, and Van) show a negative trend,
and one of them (Siirt) show a positive trend in labor productivity. A large
majority of privatized firms (12 of them) show no significant trends before the
break. Three of them (Trakya, Ankara, Sanliurfa) show a positive, while Bartin
show a negative trend in labor productivity.
There are significant positive trends in privatized establishments after the break.
Eleven out of 15 have positive improvements in labor productivity.
4.3. Capital/labor Ratio
It is claimed that privatization will lead to significant improvements in
capital/labor ratios. Employment will be reduced and with improved technology
capital/labor ratios will increase. This is observed in privatized and private
establishments (Table 5).
Timing of the break is slightly different than what is observed in labor
productivity. In three cases (Denizli, Corum and Sivas) the date of privatization
and the date of the structural break coincide. There are four one period leads and
two one period lags. There are four two period lag-or leads.
4.4. Index of Labor Productivity (Average=1.0)
8
Improvements in labor productivity is an important result, but not sufficient to do
predictions on the effects of privatization. The reason is the possibility of other
factor at work during this period. If average labor productivity is also increasing,
the relative position of the firm will not be affected at all. One should take that
into account, by looking at the labor productivity in relation to the average of the
sector. The critical question is: What happens to Pit/Pat, where Pit is the labor
productivity of the ith establishment and Pat is the average labor productivity for
the sector.
There are no close timing relationships between privatization and structural
breaks (Table 6). There is a positive and significant change after the break in one
third of privatized establishments, and a negative trend in about half of these
establishments. It may be difficult to interpret these results, because
improvements in any of these firms are reflected in the average figures also.
4.5. Ownership and Trends
After estimating equations for each establishment, the following question is to be
answered: Do coefficients differ according to groups of establishments?9 Three
groups are defined:
1. establishments which stayed as private throughout the entire period
2. establishments which stayed as public throughout entire period.
3. privatized during the period
For each coefficient, the following function is estimated and tested:
coefficient = δ1 G1 + δ 2 G2 + δ 3 G3+v, where G stands for the group, v is the
random disturbance term.
Estimated coefficients are given in Table 7. In employment, b3, a1 and a2
coefficients are significant for the private and privatized firms. They are not
significant for the public firms. The hypothesis that private and privatized firms
have identical coefficients is rejected in all cases. They have different coefficients.
After the break, private firms have a decrease in employment of 7.8, while
privatized firms a decrease of 15.5 percent. There is no significant differences
among them before the break.
Positive increases in labor productivity and capital/labor ratios in private and
privatized firms are also indicated by these results. There are no significant
9 Note that it is not possible to use pooled data estimation methods, because the years of
structural break are different for each of these establishments.
9
differences between these two groups. Coefficients related to the public sector are
not significantly different from zero. There are positive increases before the break
in privatized establishments, but no differences were observed after the break.
5. Convergence
Is it possible to catch the establishment with the highest market share. This is
possible if the productivity is higher in privatized establishments. If those who
are leading have higher growth rates in labor productivity, it may not be possible
to catch-up.
Figure 2 presents labor productivity in relation to labor productivity of
Akcimento. Although there are significant increases in labor productivity in
privatized establishments, there is a long way to reach the level of Akcimento. A
"fixed effects" model with growth (in percentages) in labor productivity (G) as
the dependent and the level of labor productivity (P) a year ago gives the
following result. All coefficients are significant at the five percent level.
G t= 40.8 - 24.9 ln Pt-1 , R2=0.13
This regression indicates that there is convergence (called β convergence by
Barro &Sala-i-Martin, 1995). What happens to the variance of labor productivity
among establishments (called σ convergence by Barro &Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
There is an increase in average labor productivity (XBAR) during the period of
1981-1995. The standard deviation (STDEV) among establishments also show a
positive trend. Coefficient of variation shows a mild positive trend in private
sector (D1COV), but no trend in privatized establishments (D3COV)(Figure 3).
6. Another Look at Privatized Establishments
The preceding analyses may be useful to determine the effects of ownership on
selected indicators. One may want to find out the effects after the date of
privatization. In order to see these effects, similar equations were estimated
assuming a break at the year of privatization. These results are given in Table 8.
Because of insufficient data for the years after privatization, equations for some
of the plants could not be estimated.
There is a significant reduction in employment after privatization. 10
establishments reveal a higher rate of decline after the year of privatization. There
is a significant improvement in labor productivity and capital/labor ratios. Results
10
on Index of labor productivity (average=1) are mixed. As it was indicated earlier,
inclusion of all the firms make interpretation of these results rather difficult.
Therefore log of index of labor productivity (Akcimento=1) regressions were
also estimated. There is a significant improvement in this index in a majority of
privatized establishments.
7. Conclusion
There are significant differences between public and private firms. The
differences between private and privatized firms cannot be observed before
privatization. After the structural break, private firms have a decrease in
employment of 7.8, while privatized firms a decrease of 15.5 percent. These
figures are much lower than 40 to 50 percent reductions in employment as cited
by many others. In general, employment is lowered before privatization. The
privatization decision may be more important then the actual privatization itself,
as far as employment is concerned. These companies are taken into privatization
portfolio, and then dressed to look more attractive.
The positive effects of privatization on labor productivity and capital/labor ratio
are also strongly supported.
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15
Table 1. Firms with no public ownership after privatization
purchased by
establishment regi share at public
on the time share sold
of sale or
public
offering
sales date
Ankara
Balikesir
Pinarhisar
Söke
Afyon
5
1
1
2
5
99.3
98.3
99.9
99.6
99.6
99.3 Ciments Français
98.3 Ciments Français
99.9 Ciments Français
99.6 Ciments Français
51.0 Ciments Français
08.09.1989
08.09.1989
08.09.1989
08.09.1989
08.09.1989
Bolu
Konya
Ünye
Mardin
Adana (A)
Adana (C)
Afyon
4
5
4
7
3
3
5
34.5
39.9
49.2
46.2
23.9
23.4
48.6
10.4 public offering
31.1 public offering
2.9 public offering
25.5 public offering
17.2 public offering
17.2 public offering
39.9 public offering
30.04.1990
24.10.1990
01.11.1990
22.11.1990
18.02.1991
18.02.1991
21.03.1991
Nigde
5
99.8
12.7 public offering
13.05.1991
Nigde
5
87.1
87.1 Oyak/Sabanci
23.03.1992
Iskenderun
Gaziantep
Trabzon
Denizli
Çorum
Sivas
Ladik
Sanliurfa
Bartin
Askale
Adiyaman
Elazig
Van
Lalapasa
Kars
Gümüshan
3
7
4
2
4
5
4
7
4
6
7
6
6
1
6
4
100.0
99.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.8
100.0
100.0
99.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
95.5
100.0 Oyak/Sabanci
99.7 Rumeli Holding
100.0 Rumeli Holding
100.0 Modern Çimento
100.0 Yibitas Holding
100.0 Yibitas Holding
100.0 Rumeli Holding
100.0 Rumeli Holding
99.8 Rumeli Holding
100.0 Erçimsan
100.0 Teksko Giyim San
99.9 Oyak/Gama
100.0 Rumeli Holding
100.0 Rumeli Holding
100.0 Çimentas
95.5 Prekon Insaat
02.12.1992
03.12.1992
03.12.1992
04.12.1992
25.12.1992
25.12.1992
21.04.1993
21.04.1993
06.05.1993
17.06.1993
16.08.1995
12.06.1996
12.06.1996
14.06.1996
18.06.1996
05.07.1996
sales
(Mil.
USD)
33.0 Block
23.0 Block
25.0 Block
11.0 Block
13.0 Block+public
offering
8.3 public offering
17.7 public offering
0.9 public offering
9.2 public offering
25.2 public offering
2.8 public offering
8.4 Block+public
offering
2.6 Block+public
offering
22.5 Block+public
offering
61.5 Block
52.7 Block
32.6 Block
70.1 Block
35.0 Block
29.4 Block
57.6 Block
57.4 Block
20.6 Block
31.2 Block
52.5 Block
27.9 Block
24.5 Block
125.9 Block
22.3 Block
3.5 Block
Ergani
7
Rumeli
26.12.1996
46.7
Siirt
7
Rumeli
24.12.1996
22.7
_____________________________________________________________________
Source: Privatization Administration (1997a). Note: regions: 1. Marmara, 2.
Agean , 3. Mediterranean , 4. Black Sea, 5. Central Anatolia , 6. Eastern
Anatolia, 7. Southeastern Anatolia
16
type of sale
Table 2. Employment in Cement Establishments, 1981-1995
year Akcim Nuhci Canak Aslan Bursa Batici Cimen Anado Adana Cimsa
ento mento kale
m
tas
lu
1981
573
536
419
577
674
406
867
495
1982
698
569
484
555
413
580
662
404
877
477
1983
950
571
431
546
411
570
683
412
863
1984
700
660
381
568
420
575
686
410
834
516
1985
775
698
365
612
410
500
702
426
842
519
1986
723
737
484
651
470
566
723
425
839
1987
726
827
506
645
420
675
786
420
870
485
1988
722
865
524
654
496
750
423
884
525
1989
746 1092
637
643
474
750
815
430
910
586
1990
703
929
589
621
477
669
827
415
932
557
1991
527
735
521
584
425
611
596
291
736
509
1992
516
621
466
560
371
402
673
228
605
411
1993
473
643
357
527
359
430
678
225
634
394
1994
460
700
343
461
354
423
702
594
371
1995
423 1020
353
438
301
416
657
217
561
362
year Goltas Bolu
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
311
333
325
490
625
675
676
551
522
685
601
Unye Bastas Konya Yibita Eskise Mardi Elazig Van
s
hir
n
368
382
390
385
390
410
386
376
384
374
324
376
380
379
353
353
410
368
400
371
341
342
399
294
367
507
373
376
331
391
284
367
361
332
326
377
249
363
691
360
328
315
376
276
400
686
343
320
301
301
359
282
387
336
640
331
322
247
278
375
293
280
356
304
296
247
260
360
253
255
255
312
269
248
217
251
339
206
261
238
315
229
232
322
217
282
224
291
188
217
218
312
273
206
243
182
212
206
17
Table 2. Employment in Cement Establishments, 1981-1995 (Continued)
year Kars
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
318
297
281
282
295
287
277
266
Ergani Siirt
284
280
269
280
292
314
312
308
296
294
291
Balike Traky Soke Ankar Afyon Denizl Corum
sir
a
a
i
415
391
417
269
422
433
441
410
371
300
416
412
426
412
307
419
403
425
280
412
369
283
399
442
265
395
367
296
424
390
438
265
391
368
289
395
303
418
270
399
365
282
404
366
306
419
321
397
366
280
344
344
300
400
310
375
214
259
328
325
310
399
314
272
308
208
281
237
317
365
301
196
220
171
243
244
306
323
292
192
220
130
210
182
186
252
181
216
107
193
182
162
184
174
212
111
189
182
150
169
year Nigde Sivas Gazia Ladik Trabz Bartin Sanliu Askale Adiyaman
ntep
on
rfa
1981
295
1982
440
294
1983
360
476
301
1984
386
328
1985
365
420
455
311
345
319
111
309
301
1986
384
437
413
306
345
310
261
306
300
1987
355
388
395
311
339
314
285
304
305
1988
343
393
400
317
338
307
291
317
328
1989
343
391
397
309
326
304
290
308
301
1990
325
390
381
317
327
336
308
310
327
1991
315
388
342
322
284
310
310
280
324
1992
270
340
302
309
302
290
310
1993
279
221
201
230
202
304
1994
155
194
178
178
192
198
306
1995
152
173
163
239
Source: Istanbul Sanayi Odasi. If not available (not in the largest 500 or the next 250)
Basbakanlik Yuksek Denetleme Kurulu, and Istanbul Menkul Kiymetler Borsasi.
18
Table 3. Trends in Employment
M OW Str
b1
b2
b3
R2
a1
a2
Akçimento
Nuhçimento
Çanakkale
Aslan
Bursa
Batiçimento
Çimentas
Anadolu
Adana
Çimsa
Göltas
Bolu
Ünye
Bastas
Konya
Yibitas
Eskisehir
Mardin
Elazig
Van
Kars
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
5
5
7
6
6
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1989
1989
1990
1989
1990
1989
1989
1989
1989
1990
1988
1989
1992
1989
1990
1991
1987
1988
1987
1990
1987
33.3
-118.1
-0.9
-50.8
-27.5
-60.3
-34.4
1.5
-5.1
-19.2
-307.4
19.9
278.2 *
-155.4
36.4
83.3
68.0
58.7
-41.7
8.9
99.3
-0.013
0.063 *
0.046 *
0.029 *
0.017 *
0.034 *
0.021 *
0.002
0.006
0.013 *
0.158 *
-0.007
-0.137 *
0.081 *
-0.015 *
-0.039
-0.031 *
-0.027 *
0.024
-0.002
-0.047 *
-0.081 *
-0.099 *
-0.165 *
-0.099 *
-0.105 *
-0.137 *
-0.053 *
-0.138 *
-0.090 *
-0.107 *
-0.166 *
-0.057 *
0.067 *
-0.256 *
-0.119 *
-0.153
-0.034 *
-0.035 *
-0.057 *
-0.099 *
0.038
0.876 *
0.514 *
0.695 *
0.949 *
0.880 *
0.734 *
0.395
0.896 *
0.899 *
0.893 *
0.882 *
0.748 *
0.999 *
0.840 *
0.990 *
0.969
0.937 *
0.998 *
0.626 *
0.771 *
0.777 *
187.5
68.8
301.8
136.3
170.1
195.0
67.7
257.4
166.1
182.4
-4.2
129.9
140.6
294.1
259.7
365.8
134.6
126.7
67.5
197.2
22.3
-0.091
-0.031
-0.106
-0.065
-0.082
-0.095
-0.031
-0.126
-0.080
-0.088
0.005
-0.062
-0.068
-0.145
-0.127
-0.181
-0.065
-0.061
-0.031
-0.096
-0.008
Ergani
Siirt
Balikesir
Trakya
Söke
Ankara
Afyon
Denizli
Çorum
Nigde
Sivas
Gaziantep
Ladik
Trabzon
Bartin
Sanliurfa
Askale
Adiyaman
7
7
1
1
2
5
5
2
4
5
5
7
4
4
4
7
6
7
1
1
89
89
89
89
89
92
92
92
92
92
93
93
93
93
94
95
1991
1991
1989
1987
1989
1988
1989
1991
1991
1991
1992
1990
1992
1990
1992
1987
1990
1994
-37.1
-53.9
27.4
9.1
4.2
14.4
79.7
-43.5
37.1
60.8
52.3
68.2
0.0
29.3
-0.5
-987.3
-3.4
1.3
0.022 *
0.023 *
-0.011
-0.002
0.001
-0.004
-0.037 *
0.025
-0.016 *
-0.028 *
-0.026 *
-0.031 *
0.003
-0.012 *
0.003
0.500 *
0.005
0.002
-0.038 *
-0.070 *
-0.144 *
-0.078
-0.180 *
-0.114 *
-0.079 *
-0.234 *
-0.205 *
-0.175 *
-0.234 *
-0.077 *
-0.360 *
-0.143 *
-0.294 *
-0.564 *
-0.129 *
-0.274 *
0.664 *
0.606 *
0.979 *
0.788 *
0.975 *
0.984 *
0.935 *
0.930 *
0.985 *
0.971 *
0.977 *
0.965 *
0.984 *
0.998 *
0.953 *
0.782 *
0.992 *
0.848 *
36.6
80.9
294.8
157.6
332.0
227.9
230.6
372.5
406.5
380.6
467.4
215.1
602.3
295.0
507.1
-130.4
237.3
478.7
-0.015
-0.045
-0.145
-0.076
-0.164
-0.112
-0.113
-0.184
-0.201
-0.188
-0.235
-0.105
-0.299
-0.145
-0.252
0.069
-0.116
-0.237
(*) significant at the five percent, (**) significant at the ten percent. Note: M - region: 1. Marmara, 2. Agean, 3.
Mediterranean, 4. Black Sea, 5. Central Anatolia, 6. Eastern Anatolia, 7. Southeastern Anatolia; OW-ownership: 1.
Private, 0-public, and the year of privatization if privatized; St- year of structural change as obtained from the
regression
19
Table 3a. Determination Coefficient, Residual Sum of squares and the log
likelihood in alternative years of structural break (S) for Ankara Cimento
S Determination
residual sum of
log likelihood
coefficient
squares
1985
0.944718
0.071376
18.82474
1986
0.969332
0.039596
23.24402
1987
0.980247
0.025504
26.54319
1988
0.989397
0.020145
28.31229
1989
0.968558
0.040596
23.05701
1990
0.948084
0.067030
19.29591
1991
0.915308
0.109348
15.62544
1992
0.878721
0.156586
12.93244
1993
0.844344
0.200971
11.06077
1994
0.820162
0.232193
9.97771
20
Table 4 . Trends in Labor Productivity
M OW Str
Akçimento
Nuhçimento
Çanakkale
Aslan
Bursa
Batiçimento
Çimentas
Anadolu
Adana
Çimsa
Göltas
Bolu
Ünye
Bastas
Konya
Yibitas
Eskisehir
Mardin
Elazig
Van
Kars
Ergani
Siirt
Balikesir
Trakya
Söke
Ankara
Afyon
Denizli
Çorum
Nigde
Sivas
Gaziantep
Ladik
Trabzon
Bartin
Sanliurfa
Askale
Adiyaman
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
5
5
7
6
6
6
7
7
1
1
2
5
5
2
4
5
5
7
4
4
4
7
6
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
89
89
89
89
89
92
92
92
92
92
93
93
93
93
94
95
1988
1987
1990
1987
1987
1989
1988
1989
1987
1989
1990
1991
1993
1988
1988
1991
1987
1989
1987
1989
1990
1993
1987
1988
1991
1992
1991
1988
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1990
1990
1987
1993
1994
b1
-157.6
151.8
-245.6 *
-184.8 *
42.8
-14.2
84.9
8.8
772.6 *
346.6 **
200.0 *
-183.7 *
-741.1
175.7 **
219.2 *
-357.7
-5.9
-2.2
247.0 *
92.2 **
7.1
-9.9
-719.2 *
20.8
-249.4 *
-43.4
-109.3 *
-21.6
34.9
63.2
45.1
31.6
-8.1
-32.7
32.1
94.3 *
-1220.3 *
45.8
17.8
b2
b3
0.081
-0.076
0.124 *
0.094 *
-0.021
0.008
-0.042
-0.004
-0.388 *
-0.173 **
-0.100 *
0.093 *
0.373
-0.088 **
-0.110 *
0.181
0.004
0.002
-0.124 *
-0.046 **
-0.003
0.006
0.362 *
-0.010
0.126 *
0.022
0.056 *
0.012
-0.017
-0.031
-0.022
-0.016
0.005
0.017
-0.016
-0.047 *
0.615 *
-0.023
-0.008
0.394 **
0.294 *
0.783 *
-0.023
0.255 *
0.503 *
0.190 *
0.374 *
0.645 *
0.758 *
0.213 *
0.517 *
-0.330
0.299 *
0.469 *
0.356
0.187 *
0.192 *
0.156 *
0.158 *
0.104
-0.085
-0.378 *
0.174 *
0.077
0.930 *
0.374 *
0.112
0.703 **
0.368 *
0.528 *
0.306 *
0.529 *
1.814 *
0.261
0.180 *
-0.589 *
0.560 *
0.262
R2
0.801 *
0.583 *
0.984 *
0.669 *
0.849 *
0.917 *
0.663 *
0.948 *
0.608 *
0.743 *
0.568 *
0.970 *
0.538
0.683 *
0.853 *
0.916
0.854 *
0.780 *
0.618 *
0.845 *
0.491
0.097
0.805 *
0.758 *
0.722
0.933 *
0.890 *
0.478 *
0.863 *
0.814 *
0.963 *
0.897 *
0.657 *
0.654 *
0.630 *
0.587 *
0.791 *
0.967 *
0.098 *
a1
-939.9
-432.5
-1803.5
-139.3
-464.4
-1013.7
-293.3
-735.5
-508.0
-1160.9
-223.5
-1213.7
-82.7
-419.1
-712.4
-1066.0
-376.6
-384.7
-62.9
-221.4
-200.6
159.5
31.1
-325.4
-402.9
-1895.8
-854.9
-243.8
-1365.3
-669.1
-1006.7
-576.8
-1062.1
-3646.7
-486.4
-263.4
-50.2
-1071.2
-504.8
a2
0.474
0.218
0.907
0.071
0.234
0.511
0.148
0.370
0.256
0.585
0.113
0.610
0.043
0.211
0.359
0.536
0.190
0.194
0.032
0.112
0.101
-0.079
-0.015
0.164
0.203
0.952
0.430
0.123
0.686
0.337
0.506
0.290
0.534
1.832
0.245
0.133
0.026
0.538
0.254
(*) significant at the five percent, (**) significant at the ten percent. Note: M - region: 1. Marmara, 2. Agean, 3.
Mediterranean, 4. Black Sea, 5. Central Anatolia, 6. Eastern Anatolia, 7. Southeastern Anatolia; OW-ownership: 1.
Private, 0-public, and the year of privatization if privatized; St- year of structural change as obtained from the
regression
21
Table 5. Trends in Capital/Labor Ratio
M OW Str
Akçimento
Nuhçimento
Çanakkale
Aslan
Bursa
Batiçimento
Çimentas
Anadolu
Adana
Çimsa
Göltas
Bolu
Ünye
Bastas
Konya
Yibitas
Eskisehir
Mardin
Elazig
Van
Kars
Ergani
Siirt
Balikesir
Trakya
Söke
Ankara
Afyon
Denizli
Çorum
Nigde
Sivas
Gaziantep
Ladik
Trabzon
Bartin
Sanliurfa
Askale
Adiyaman
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
5
5
7
6
6
6
7
7
1
1
2
5
5
2
4
5
5
7
4
4
4
7
6
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
89
89
89
89
89
92
92
92
92
92
93
93
93
93
94
95
1994
1989
1992
1991
1994
1989
1990
1989
1990
1991
1990
1989
1994
1988
1990
1991
1994
1989
1989
1988
1989
1992
1992
1990
1991
1991
1991
1990
1992
1992
1991
1992
1991
1992
1990
1991
1987
1993
1987
b1
-325.6 *
17.8
-25.1
-5.6
-276.2 *
-0.1
15.4
73.1
21.6
-164.0 **
173.5 *
-71.2
-572.0
18.2
-59.4 **
109.0
-215.3 *
197.0 *
-53.4
-69.4 **
-16.0
510.4 *
528.1 *
23.3
-160.8 **
-5.3
-40.5
-41.6
150.2
41.2
56.2
5.9
-18.2
393.6 *
-68.9
29.8
3550.7 *
80.4 *
826.3 *
b2
b3
0.165 *
-0.008
0.014
0.003
0.140 *
0.001
-0.007
-0.037
-0.010
0.084 **
-0.087 *
0.036
0.288
-0.009
0.030 **
-0.054
0.109 *
-0.099 *
0.027
0.035 **
0.008
-0.256 *
-0.265 *
-0.011
0.081 **
0.003
0.021
0.021
-0.074
-0.020
-0.028
-0.003
0.009
-0.197 *
0.035
-0.015
-1.786 *
-0.040 *
-0.415 *
1.909 *
0.228 *
2.466 *
0.376 *
1.676 *
0.352 *
0.327 *
0.247 *
0.552 *
0.640 *
0.242 *
0.767 *
0.254
0.262 *
0.371 *
1.052 **
1.019 *
0.429 *
-0.032
-0.029
-0.045 *
0.278 *
0.382
0.225 *
0.668 *
0.562 *
2.956 *
0.089
1.705 *
0.883 *
0.453 *
0.581 *
0.400 *
2.038 *
0.290
0.356 **
1.821 *
0.999 *
0.365 *
R2
0.934 *
0.771 *
0.953
0.926 *
0.940 *
0.855 *
0.982 *
0.763 *
0.952 *
0.916 *
0.832 *
0.948 *
0.868
0.814 *
0.973 *
0.991 **
0.911 *
0.983 *
0.295
0.701 *
0.874 *
0.929 *
0.937 *
0.893 *
0.945 *
0.984 *
0.994 *
0.652 *
0.964 *
0.923 *
0.909 *
0.985 *
0.847 *
0.934 *
0.618 **
0.483 **
0.702 *
0.995 *
0.707 *
a1
-4133.0
-436.4
-4936.7
-755.2
-3619.1
-700.9
-635.3
-418.3
-1076.2
-1438.2
-308.1
-1597.6
-1079.3
-502.0
-797.4
-1985.4
-2248.1
-655.6
9.3
-11.2
73.6
-44.2
-232.1
-423.5
-1491.3
-1124.8
-5924.9
-219.4
-3245.5
-1718.6
-845.1
-1151.7
-815.4
-3666.4
-645.7
-679.2
-66.7
-1910.8
101.3
a2
2.074
0.220
2.480
0.380
1.816
0.353
0.320
0.211
0.541
0.724
0.155
0.804
0.542
0.253
0.401
0.998
1.128
0.330
-0.004
0.006
-0.037
0.023
0.117
0.213
0.750
0.565
2.976
0.111
1.630
0.863
0.425
0.578
0.410
1.841
0.325
0.341
0.035
0.959
-0.050
(*) significant at the five percent, (**) significant at the ten percent. Note: M - region: 1. Marmara, 2. Agean, 3.
Mediterranean, 4. Black Sea, 5. Central Anatolia, 6. Eastern Anatolia, 7. Southeastern Anatolia; OW-ownership: 1.
Private, 0-public, and the year of privatization if privatized; St- year of structural change as obtained from the
regression
22
Table 6. Trends in Index of Labor Productivity
M OW Str
Akçimento
Nuhçimento
Çanakkale
Aslan
Bursa
Baticimento
Çimentas
Anadolu
Adana
Çimsa
Göltas
Bolu
Ünye
Bastas
Konya
Yibitas
Eskisehir
Mardin
Elazig
Van
Kars
Ergani
Siirt
Balikesir
Trakya
Söke
Ankara
Afyon
Denizli
Çorum
Nigde
Sivas
Gaziantep
Ladik
Trabzon
Bartin
Sanliurfa
Askale
Adiyaman
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
5
5
7
6
6
6
7
7
1
1
2
5
5
2
4
5
5
7
4
4
4
7
6
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
89
89
89
89
89
92
92
92
92
92
93
93
93
93
94
95
1993
1993
1988
1988
1991
1987
1991
1992
1987
1989
1990
1993
1993
1992
1987
1990
1991
1987
1987
1989
1988
1990
1988
1991
1990
1992
1987
1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
1987
1987
1990
1992
1988
1988
1989
b1
-175.4 *
-54.0 *
-149.7 *
-231.1 *
-96.3 *
-154.4 *
-27.1
-68.6 *
239.2 *
48.1
217.4 *
-55.8 *
40.6
-0.2
18.0
-232.8
-128.9 *
154.9
208.9 *
70.8 *
-5.7
56.5
-379.9 *
-56.4 *
-151.2 **
17.9
-208.1 *
-31.8
119.6
60.7 *
34.9 **
54.8 *
-19.3
-581.1
77.7 *
-0.2
-647.2 *
152.1 *
1.6
b2
b3
0.089 *
0.028 *
0.076 *
0.117 *
0.049 *
0.078 *
0.014
0.035 *
-0.120 *
-0.023
-0.109 *
0.029 *
-0.020
0.001
-0.009
0.118
0.065 *
-0.078
-0.105 *
-0.035 *
0.003
-0.028
0.191 *
0.029 *
0.077 **
-0.009
0.105 *
0.016
-0.060
-0.030 *
-0.017 **
-0.027 *
0.010
0.293
-0.039 *
0.000
0.326 *
-0.076 *
0.000
-0.451 *
-0.354 *
0.062
-0.243 *
-0.140 *
-0.062
-0.124 *
-0.066
0.121 *
0.056
0.048
0.101
-0.046
-0.080
0.042 *
-0.139
-0.175 *
0.072
0.080 *
0.034
-0.019
-0.055
-0.286 *
-0.092 *
-0.195 *
0.228 *
-0.147 *
-0.104 *
0.228
0.086 *
0.143 *
0.083 *
-0.047
-0.388 **
0.045
-0.041 **
-0.418 *
0.070 *
-0.102
R2
a1
0.826 *
0.584 *
0.928 *
0.919 *
0.716 *
0.621 *
0.539 *
0.685 *
0.654 *
0.157
0.804 *
0.748 *
0.471
0.284
0.597 *
0.821
0.842 *
0.383
0.885 *
0.767 *
0.140
0.790 *
0.893 *
0.359 **
0.458 **
0.674 *
0.758 *
0.367
0.465
0.612 *
0.630 *
0.649 *
0.346
0.429
0.569 **
0.692 *
0.950 *
0.889 *
0.713 *
a2
723.7
652.0
-272.8
252.4
183.2
-31.3
220.0
63.5
-2.1
-63.5
122.2
-257.0
132.9
158.6
-65.6
25.9
220.0
11.1
50.0
3.8
31.1
165.7
189.1
126.9
236.1
-436.6
83.2
174.9
-335.2
-109.7
-250.0
-111.5
73.6
190.6
-12.3
80.5
184.2
12.1
203.7
-0.362
-0.326
0.138
-0.126
-0.091
0.017
-0.110
-0.031
0.002
0.033
-0.061
0.130
-0.066
-0.079
0.033
-0.012
-0.110
-0.005
-0.025
-0.002
-0.015
-0.083
-0.095
-0.063
-0.118
0.219
-0.041
-0.087
0.169
0.055
0.126
0.056
-0.037
-0.095
0.007
-0.040
-0.092
-0.006
-0.102
(*) significant at the five percent, (**) significant at the ten percent. Note: M - region: 1. Marmara, 2. Agean, 3.
Mediterranean, 4. Black Sea, 5. Central Anatolia, 6. Eastern Anatolia, 7. Southeastern Anatolia; OW-ownership: 1.
Private, 0-public, and the year of privatization if privatized; St- year of structural change as obtained from the
regression
23
Table 7. Coefficients by ownership groups
employment
c1
c2
c3
R2
F(c1= c3)
b1
-35.1
-4.9
-40.5
0.004
0.0
labor
productivity
c1
c2
c3
R2
F(c1= c3)
b1
capital/labor
ratio
c1
c2
c3
R2
F(c1= c3)
index of labor
productivity
c1
c2
c3
R2
F(c1= c3)
75.5
-76.6
-88.9
0.073
2.3
b1
-39.1
179.9
311.5 **
0.070
2.5
b1
-29.0
-9.9
-86.4 **
0.028
0.7
b2
0.023
0.004
0.023
0.006
0.0
b3
-0.109 *
-0.045
-0.203 *
0.289 *
7.7 *
b2
b3
-0.037
0.039
0.045
0.072
2.3
0.378 *
-0.009
0.392 *
0.127
0.0
b2
b3
0.020
-0.090
-0.156 **
0.070
2.5
0.742 *
0.111
0.846 *
0.113
0.2
b2
0.015
0.005
0.044 **
0.027
0.7
b3
-0.075 **
-0.049
-0.058
0.003
0.1
(*) significant at the five percent, (**) significant at the ten percent.
Table 8. Indicators before and after privatization
24
a1
167.1 *
80.9
313.5 *
0.326 *
9.7 *
a1
-676.3 *
-58.9
-870.7 *
0.147 **
0.7
a1
-1516 *
-40.9
-1372 *
0.116
0.1
a1
119.7 *
87.9
29.7
0.037
1.3
a2
-0.078 *
-0.039
-0.155 *
0.337 *
10.8 *
a2
0.341 *
0.030
0.438 *
0.147 **
0.7
a2
0.762 *
0.021
0.689 *
0.116
0.1
a2
-0.059 *
-0.044
-0.015
0.037
1.3
log Employment
establish M O struct b1
ment
W
Balikesir 1 89 1989
27.4
Trakya
1 89 1989
70.8
Söke
2 89 1989
4.2
Ankara
5 89 1989
38.7 *
Afyon
5 89 1989
79.7 *
Denizli
2 92 1992
51.3
Çorum
4 92 1992
59.9 *
Nigde
5 92 1992
77.3 *
Sivas
5 92 1992
58.3 *
Gaziantep 7 92 1992
Ladik
4 93 1993
Trabzon
4 93 1993
120.5 *
Bartin
4 93 1993
19.6
Sanliurfa 7 93 1993
-91.8
Askale
6 94 1994
89.9 *
Adiyaman 7 95 1995
b2
b3
R2
a1
a2
-0.011
-0.033
0.001
-0.016 *
-0.037 *
-0.023
-0.027 *
-0.036 *
-0.026 *
-0.144 *
-0.052
-0.180 *
-0.111 *
-0.079 *
-0.227 *
-0.248 *
-0.212 *
-0.234 *
0.949 *
0.766 *
0.975 *
0.969 *
0.935 *
0.918 *
0.963 *
0.955 *
0.977 *
294.8
171.4
331.9
248.3
230.6
455.6
497.3
457.7
473.4
-0.145
-0.083
-0.164
-0.122
-0.113
-0.226
-0.247
-0.227
-0.235
-0.058 *
-0.007
0.049
-0.042 *
-0.241
-0.482 *
-0.511
-0.307 **
0.857 *
0.749 *
0.220
0.859 *
547.5
782.0
705.6
616.9
-0.272
-0.390
-0.351
-0.307
Labor productivity
establish M O struct b1
b2
b3
R2
ment
W
Balikesir 1 89 1989
-19.8
0.011
0.167 *
0.733 *
Trakya
1 89 1989 -276.5 **
0.140 **
0.017
0.712 *
Söke
2 89 1989
141.3
-0.071
0.529 *
0.831 *
Ankara
5 89 1989
-62.3
0.032
0.260 *
0.845 *
Afyon
5 89 1989
-45.2
0.023
0.112
0.478 *
Denizli
2 92 1992 -238.6
0.121
0.694 **
0.860 *
Çorum
4 92 1992
17.4
-0.008
0.428 *
0.740 *
Nigde
5 92 1992
-0.6
0.001
0.652 *
0.945 *
Sivas
5 92 1992
-29.7
0.015
0.340 *
0.861 *
Gaziantep 7 92 1992
Ladik
4 93 1993
Trabzon
4 93 1993 -220.6 **
0.112 **
-0.254
0.441
Bartin
4 93 1993
25.8
-0.012
0.312
0.142
Sanliurfa 7 93 1993 -325.1 *
0.164 *
-0.897 **
0.689 *
Askale
6 94 1994
-55.1
0.028
0.719 *
0.810 *
Adiyaman 7 95 1995
a1
-351.0
-310.9
-911.4
-579.1
-267.1
-1621.9
-835.2
-1300.3
-706.4
0.177
0.157
0.459
0.292
0.135
0.815
0.420
0.653
0.355
286.0
-596.8
1462.3
-1489.3
-0.143
0.300
-0.733
0.747
Table 8. Indicators before and after privatization (Continued)
25
a2
Capital/labor ratio
establish M O struct b1
ment
W
Balikesir 1 89 1989
44.1
Trakya
1 89 1989
55.6
Söke
2 89 1989
55.1
Ankara
5 89 1989
396.1
Afyon
5 89 1989
-33.4
Denizli
2 92 1992
150.2
Çorum
4 92 1992
41.2
Nigde
5 92 1992
18.6
Sivas
5 92 1992
5.9
Gaziantep 7 92 1992
Ladik
4 93 1993
Trabzon
4 93 1993 -382.2 *
Bartin
4 93 1993 -107.5
Sanliurfa 7 93 1993
588.0
Askale
6 94 1994 -134.3
Adiyaman 7 95 1995
b2
b3
R2
-0.022
-0.028
-0.028
-0.199
0.017
-0.074
-0.020
-0.009
-0.003
0.193 *
0.054
-0.294
0.068
a1
a2
0.195 *
0.578 *
0.387 *
2.095 *
0.078
1.705 *
0.883 *
0.564 *
0.581 *
0.842 *
0.940 *
0.937 *
0.892 *
0.638 *
0.964 *
0.923 *
0.900 *
0.985 *
-343.7
-1093.4
-714.0
-3770.5
-188.0
-3245.5
-1718.6
-1105.0
-1151.7
0.173
0.550
0.359
1.895
0.095
1.630
0.863
0.555
0.578
-0.538
0.003
0.973
1.104 *
0.548 **
0.229
0.314
0.863 *
690.2
-112.6
-1350.2
-2335.7
-0.346
0.057
0.678
1.172
index of labor productivity
establish M O struct b1
b2
b3
R2
a1
a2
ment
W
Balikesir 1 89 1989
-62.0 **
0.032 **
-0.056
0.245
50.2 -0.025
Trakya
1 89 1989 -191.0 *
0.097 *
-0.189 *
0.455 **
184.1 -0.092
Söke
2 89 1989
45.5
-0.023
0.110 *
0.470 *
-172.9
0.087
Ankara
5 89 1989 -119.4 *
0.061 *
-0.108 *
0.478 *
95.5 -0.047
Afyon
5 89 1989
-50.5
0.026
-0.078 **
0.315
104.1 -0.052
Denizli
2 92 1992
119.6
-0.060
0.228
0.465
-335.2
0.169
Çorum
4 92 1992
60.7 *
-0.030 *
0.086 *
0.612 *
-109.7
0.055
Nigde
5 92 1992
34.9 **
-0.017 **
0.143 *
0.630 *
-250.0
0.126
Sivas
5 92 1992
54.8 *
-0.027 *
0.083 *
0.649 *
-111.5
0.056
Gaziantep 7 92 1992
Ladik
4 93 1993
Trabzon
4 93 1993
32.0
-0.016
-0.059
0.445
150.2 -0.075
Bartin
4 93 1993
45.7 *
-0.023 *
0.024
0.573 *
-2.4
0.001
Sanliurfa 7 93 1993 -101.7
0.051
-0.496
0.267
886.3 -0.444
Askale
6 94 1994
58.9 *
-0.029 *
0.111
0.694 *
-163.2
0.082
Adiyaman 7 95 1995
Table 8. Indicators before and after privatization (Continued)
26
Log of index of labor productivity (Akcimento=1)
establish M O struct b1
b2
b3
ment
W
Balikesir 1 89 1989
48.3
-0.025
0.007
Trakya
1 89 1989
-62.1
0.031
-0.095
Söke
2 89 1989
187.5 *
-0.095 *
0.207 *
Ankara
5 89 1989
52.1
-0.026
0.005
Afyon
5 89 1989
63.6
-0.032
-0.019
Denizli
2 92 1992
231.1 **
-0.116 **
0.378 *
Çorum
4 92 1992
187.3 *
-0.095 *
0.276 *
Nigde
5 92 1992
148.6 *
-0.075 *
0.337 *
Sivas
5 92 1992
200.7 *
-0.102 *
0.310 *
Gaziantep 7 92 1992
Ladik
4 93 1993
Trabzon
4 93 1993
126.9 *
-0.064 *
0.173
Bartin
4 93 1993
192.5 *
-0.097 *
0.355 *
Sanliurfa 7 93 1993
60.2
-0.031
-0.340
Askale
6 94 1994
129.2 *
-0.065 *
0.459 *
Adiyaman 7 95 1995
R2
a1
a2
0.167
0.262
0.399 **
0.226
0.642 *
0.737 *
0.909 *
0.887 *
0.844 *
34.3
118.7
-269.1
41.1
100.8
-684.4
-444.9
-650.7
-522.8
-0.018
-0.060
0.135
-0.021
-0.051
0.343
0.223
0.326
0.262
0.800 *
0.908 *
0.315
0.691 *
-248.9
-658.1
634.7
-1032.9
0.124
0.329
-0.319
0.517
(*) significant at the five percent, (**) significant at the ten percent. Note: M - region: 1. Marmara, 2. Agean, 3.
Mediterranean, 4. Black Sea, 5. Central Anatolia, 6. Eastern Anatolia, 7. Southeastern Anatolia; OW-ownership: 1.
Private, 0-public, and the year of privatization if privatized; St- year of structural change as obtained from the
regression
27
Figure 1. Employment in Cement Establishments, 1981-1995
1000
1100
900
1000
800
900
700
800
600
700
500
600
400
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
500
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
AKCIMENTO
NUHCIMENTO
650
700
600
650
550
600
500
550
450
500
400
350
450
300
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
400
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
CANAKKALE
ASLAN
500
800
450
700
400
600
350
500
300
400
250
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
300
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
BURSA
850
BATICIM
450
800
400
750
350
700
300
650
250
600
550
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
200
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
CIMENTAS
ANADOLU
28
Figure 1. Employment in Cement Establishments, 1981-1995 (continued)
1000
600
900
550
800
500
700
450
600
400
500
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
350
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
CIMSA
ADANA
700
440
400
600
360
500
320
400
280
300
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
240
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
GOLTAS
340
BOLU
700
320
600
300
500
280
260
400
240
300
220
200
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
200
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
UNYE
BASTAS
400
340
350
320
300
300
250
280
200
260
150
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
240
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
KONYA
YIBITAS
29
Figure 1. Employment in Cement Establishments, 1981-1995 (continued)
450
360
400
320
350
280
300
240
250
200
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
200
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
ESKISEHIR
420
MARDIN
300
400
280
380
260
360
240
340
220
320
300
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
200
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
ELAZIG
VAN
320
320
310
310
300
300
290
290
280
280
270
270
260
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
260
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
KARS
ERGANI
330
320
310
300
290
280
270
260
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
SIIRT
30
Figure 1. Employment in Cement Establishments, 1981-1995 (continued)
450
400
400
350
350
300
300
250
250
200
150
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
200
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
BALIKESIR
350
TRAKYA
450
400
300
350
250
300
200
250
150
200
100
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
150
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
SOKE
450
ANKARA
350
400
300
350
250
300
200
250
150
200
150
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
100
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
AFYON
DENIZLI
450
450
400
400
350
350
300
300
250
250
200
200
150
150
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
100
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
CORUM
NIGDE
31
Figure 1. Employment in Cement Establishments, 1981-1995 (continued)
450
500
400
450
350
300
400
250
350
200
150
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
300
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
SIVAS
340
GAZIANTEP
350
320
300
300
280
250
260
200
240
220
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
150
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
LADIK
350
TRABZON
350
300
300
250
250
200
200
150
150
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
100
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
BARTIN
320
SANLIURFA
340
320
280
300
240
280
260
200
240
160
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
220
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
ASKALE
ADIYAMAN
32
Figure 2. Labor Productivity Index (Akcimento=1.0)
1.0
1.4
0.9
1.2
0.8
1.0
0.7
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
NUHCIMENTO
CANAKKALE
1.2
0.9
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.5
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
ASLAN
1.2
BURSA
1.0
1.1
0.8
1.0
0.9
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.7
0.6
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
BATICIM
0.9
CIMENTAS
1.2
0.8
1.0
0.7
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
ANADOLU
ADANA
33
Figure 2. Labor Productivity Index (Akcimento=1.0) (Continued)
1.4
1.4
1.2
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.6
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
CIMSA
GOLTAS
0.9
0.68
0.8
0.64
0.7
0.60
0.6
0.56
0.5
0.52
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.48
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
BOLU
1.0
UNYE
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.3
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
BASTAS
KONYA
0.8
0.66
0.64
0.7
0.62
0.60
0.6
0.58
0.56
0.5
0.54
0.52
0.50
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
ESKISEHIR
YIBITAS
34
Figure 2. Labor Productivity Index (Akcimento=1.0) (Continued)
1.0
0.8
0.7
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.1
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
MARDIN
0.35
ELAZIG
0.26
0.24
0.30
0.22
0.25
0.20
0.20
0.18
0.15
0.16
0.10
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.14
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
VAN
0.7
KARS
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.1
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
ERGANI
SIIRT
35
Figure 2. Labor Productivity Index (Akcimento=1.0) (Continued)
0.7
1.0
0.9
0.6
0.8
0.5
0.7
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.5
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
BALIKESIR
TRAKYA
0.9
1.0
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.5
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.4
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
SOKE
0.8
ANKARA
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.3
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
AFYON
0.7
DENIZLI
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
CORUM
NIGDE
36
Figure 2. Labor Productivity Index (Akcimento=1.0) (Continued)
0.7
0.40
0.35
0.6
0.30
0.5
0.25
0.4
0.20
0.15
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.3
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
GAZIANTEP
SIVAS
1.2
0.60
0.55
1.0
0.50
0.8
0.45
0.6
0.40
0.4
0.35
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.30
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
LADIK
0.7
TRABZON
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.0
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
BARTIN
SANLIURFA
0.55
0.7
0.50
0.6
0.45
0.5
0.40
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.30
0.25
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
0.2
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
ADIYAMAN
ASKALE
37
Figure 3. Convergence in Labor Productivity (sigma-convergence)
(COV-coefficient of variation, left scale; XBAR-average, STDEV-standard
deviation, right scale)(D1-private, D2-public, D3-privatized establishments)
0.50
4
0.45
0.55
1.4
0.50
1.2
0.45
1.0
0.40
0.8
0.35
0.6
0.30
0.4
3
0.40
0.35
2
0.30
0.25
1
0.20
0.15
82
84
86
D1COV
88
90
D1XBAR
92
94
0
0.25
0.2
82
D1STDEV
0.4
84
86
D2COV
88
90
D2XBAR
92
94
D2STDEV
3.0
0.50
3.5
2.5
0.45
3.0
2.0
0.40
1.5
0.35
1.0
0.30
0.5
0.25
0.0
0.20
0.3
2.5
2.0
0.2
1.5
1.0
0.1
0.0
82
84
D3COV
86
88
90
D3XBAR
92
94
D3STDEV
0.5
82
84
86
COV
38
88
XBAR
90
92
STDEV
94
0.0