Millet System and National-Cultural Autonomy: A Distance Dialogue
Transkript
Millet System and National-Cultural Autonomy: A Distance Dialogue
CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDY SOFIA CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES Issue 6 Advanced Academia Programme 2012–2014 Sofia 2014 The following publication presents part of the author’s research carried out under the Advanced Academia Programme of the Centre for Advanced Study Sofia. This programme is supported by the America for Bulgaria Foundation, Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDY SOFIA 7B, Stefan Karadja St., Sofia 1000, Bulgaria phone:+359 2 9803704, fax:+359 2 9803662 [email protected], www.cas.bg CAS Working Paper Series No. 6/2014 This publication is available also in electronic form at www.cas.bg Copyright © 2014 by the CAS contributors/CAS Copyright remains with the individual authors/CAS. This publication may be distributed to other individuals for non-commercial use, provided that the text and this note remain intact. This publication may not be reprinted or redistributed for commercial use without prior written permission from the author and CAS. If you have any questions about permissions, please, write to [email protected]. Preferred Citation: Barbieri, Sara, Millet System and National-Cultural Autonomy: A Distance Dialogue. CAS Working Paper Series No. 6/2014: Sofia 2014. Advanced Academia programme, a project of the Centre for Advanced Study Sofia. Sara Barbieri Millet System and National-Cultural Autonomy: A Distance Dialogue Introduction In Ottoman history, the term Tanzimat identifies a period of ‘reorganization’ of the socio-political Ottoman order and of the institutional and administrative apparatus of the Sublime Porte. Though the Tanzimat is recognized in the literature as the period framed by the 1839 Hatt-i Sherif (Nobel Rescript) of Gulhane and the 1876 first Ottoman Constitution, the Reform Era belongs to a broader path of reforms, the origin of which goes back to the XVIII century and which brought the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.1 In Berkes’ words, “the emergence in the early eighteenth century of the idea that it would be necessary to reform the existing organization by introducing new methods marked a turning point and the beginning of the modern era in Turkish history.”2 In general, this implied a profound change of attitude from the part of the Ottomans vis-à-vis Western civilization. This new approach is clearly visible in the new forms of dress and social mores introduced during the so-called Tulip Era (1718–1730). It is at the beginning of the XVIII century that the volume of exchanges between the Ottoman and European Worlds increased considerably, causing the progressive ‘westernization’ of the Ottoman society. A growing number of writers, geographers, explorers and diplomats found themselves moving between Europe and the Ottoman lands. In 1793, Selim III wanted the Ottoman Empire to open its diplomatic representations in Europe as part of the ‘New Order’, the aim of which was to systematize the functioning of the Empire by referring to the European experience.3 Among the many possible examples, we recall Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi, who was sent as special envoy to the French Court of Louis XIV with the task of seeking an alliance with France and studying its costumes and ways of living.4 1 2 3 4 C. Vaughn Findley. 2008. “The Tanzimat,” in Reșat Kasaba, The Cambridge History of Turkey. Turkey in the Modern World. Volume 4, Cambridge University Press, 2008: 12. N. Berkes. 1998. The Development of Secularism in Turkey (London: C Hurst & co): 23. C. Vaughn Findley. 2008. “The Tanzimat,” cit: 12. N. Berkes. op.cit: 34. CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 In the XIX century, the process of reform accompanied the development of new forms of personal and group identifications in Southeastern Europe. In this sense, this work shares the assumption that the formation of national identities in Southeastern Europe went hand in hand with the region’s experience of political modernization.5 It is very problematic, however, to refer to the notion of ‘modernization,’ both when addressing its historical and contemporary meanings and when looking at it from different geographic angles (Western/European vis-à-vis Eastern/Oriental perspective). In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the literature commonly refers to modernization as a synonym for ‘westernization,’ as the reform process developed in coincidence with and as a result of the new openness to western culture, society and political debates, and was strongly affected by them.6 Instead, this direct cause-effect correlation between westernization and modernization is called into question by the assumption that modernization in the Ottoman Empire was also driven by an internal process pushed forward by the maturation of political elites, by their recognition of new needs and requirements of the state, or by the combination of these two factors. Seen as an “internal problem,” some authors stress the role played by inner forces (economic growth, development of new forms of group identity and so on) over external factors (interest and diplomacy of the Great Powers) in the evolution of reforms in the Ottoman Empire.7 In either case, it is unequivocal that Western influence played a major role in influencing the nation-building process in the Balkans, as well as in the overall development of the process of reform in the XIX-century Ottoman State. As theorists of Nationalism have stressed, the process of modernization called for linguistic and cultural homogeneity and, in so doing, accelerated the process of creation of a shared communal identity – or of the disintegration of pre-existing macro-identities into different micro-communal identities built around shared elements such as language, history or culture. A further aspect of this argument is that the process of political (Western) modernization implied a consequent process of gradual secularization of society. 5 6 7 D. Mishkova. 2009. We The People. Politics of National Peculiarity in Southeastern Europe (Budapest, New York: CEU Press): 2. Among others, this is the position advanced by R. H. Davison. 1968. “The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire,” in W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers. 1968. Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East: the XIX Century (London: University of Chicago Press): 93. For those who stress the role of internal factors, see among others (see Ortayli, 32) Bülent Özdemir. 2003. Ottoman Reforms and Social Life (Istanbul: ISIS): 38-39. Karpat points out how internal factors determined the evolution of the Balkan and Middle East societies before the arrival of Europeans, and how the latter only intervened to speed up this process. 4 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 The paper consists of three sections. The notion of ‘Millet’ and the ‘Millet system’ are the concern of section 1. As will be seen, the debate over the Millets in the different Ottoman Eras is open and full of contradictions, and a clear theoretical framework is still missing. Section 2 will present the reforms introduced during the Tanzimat period and place them in relation to the evolution of the Millet system and the developing notion of Ottomanism and the Ottoman nation. In particular we will refer to the main imperial Edicts and acts of law adopted with the aim of re-defining the relations between the Ottoman state and its religious communities. The scope of the paper is therefore dual: from the one side it offers a review of the interpretation of the notion of Millet and the Millet system and puts them in relation to the broader debate over the uprising of a political notion of Ottomanism; from the other, it aims to discuss a specific aspect of the complex set of reforms that shook the Ottoman system, attempting its modernization/westernization during the Tanzimats and, namely, the re-definition of relations between the Ottoman state and the Millets. How did the reformers address the issue of regulating stategroup relations against the background of the new nationalist ideas coming from the West? How were these new trends could these new trends be understood and adapted to the specificity of Islamic Ottoman society? Dealing with the evolution of the Millet system during the Tanzimat Reform Era implies looking at the reform of the representation process in the Ottoman state. Since, referring to the Ottoman experience, we define modernization as a synonym for westernization, these developments will be further discussed against the background of debates on the institutional rearrangement for the management of national minorities, which entered the debate at European Empires in the same period. Our attention goes in particular to the way in which the Empires reacted to the rise of the idea of nationalism and the subsequent demands from national groups. We limit our scope here to one very specific aspect of this very broad debate, i.e. the discussion of the ‘Millet system’ in relation to the notion of non-territorial/ personal autonomy developed by the Austro-Marxist school of thought at the end of the XIX century. This notion is briefly introduced in the second paragraph. It was conceived as a non-territorial form of self-rule that would have included all members of a national minority regardless of their place of residence. The beginning assumption, today shared by some scholars of non-territorial arrangement and questioned in this work, is that the ‘Millet system’ was the closest example to the conceptualization of non-territorial autonomy advanced by the Austro-Marxist school of thought at the end of the XIX century. This statement is certainly very problematic and requires a set of considerations on the nature of both experiences, which will be brought about in the third and concluding section. 5 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 Millet and the Millet System. Problems of definition and the fascination of a concept The literature identifies the religious Millets as the basic social units in which the whole population of the Ottoman Empire was divided. They are conventionally seen as semi-autonomous bodies functioning within the framework of the Ottoman governmental system.8 Their autonomy was recognized in the fields of schooling, religion and culture. They had also juridical and economic capacities. Sketching a general definition, the Millets could be therefore seen as a form of religious corporation that stood upon pre-Ottoman religious structures and that exercised its control over the non-Muslim subjects on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of their place of living. In this sense, the Millets can be understood as a non-territorial religious arrangement whose religious leaders served as functionaries at the court of the Sultan and as representatives of the religious communities within the imperial apparatus. At the same time, the authority of the patriarchs had a personal character, as individuals were subject to one or another law depending on their religious belonging and not on their place of living.9 The recognition of a certain degree of autonomy was coupled, however, with the imposition of an inferior status for non-Muslim communities vis-à-vis their Muslim counterparts. As explained in the Encyclopedia of Islam, the subordination of non-Muslim dhimma to the primacy of Islam and their inferior role vis-à-vis the Muslim population was symbolized by the prohibition of wearing Arab dress, the respect for a specific code of conduct vis-à-vis Muslims and of a specific fiscal status which was, once again, in line with mediaeval uses where non-dominant religious communities were concerned.10 In this sense it is appropriate to imagine Ottoman society along two axes, horizontal and vertical. The superiority of the Muslim Millet over the other Millets is represented in the vertical axis. The horizontal axis cuts across the Millets and divides the society into different social classes.11 Though this definition of the Millet as communal institution is accepted in the literature, the debate over the evolution of the legal status of religious communities is still open.12 The evolution of the concept of Millet is particularly problematic in 8 9 10 11 12 In Bernard Lewis’s words, the term Millet is a “technical term” used within the framework of the Ottoman Empire to identify “the organized, recognized, religious-political communities enjoying certain rights of autonomy under their own chiefs”. B. Lewis. 1988. The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 38-39. R. H. Davison. 1973. Reform in the Ottoman Empire. 1856–1876 (New York: Gordian Press): 13. Non-Muslims were obliged to pay extra-taxes, were subject to restrictions in their behavior and actions and had inferior status. B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 5. See also B. Jarevich. 1990. History of the Balkans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 40. F. Bieber. 2000. “Muslim Identity in the Balkans before the Establishment of Nation States,” in Nationalities Papers 28(1): 14. D. Stamatopoulos. 2006. From Millets to Minorities in the 19th-Century Ottoman Empire: An 6 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 the era of nationalism, when ethnic and religious identities began to overlap both within and outside the Millets’ walls.13 Let us first refer to the meaning of the term in the pre-Tanzimat period. In his famous work, Braude defines the Millet as a “religiously-defined people.” In his view, before the period of reforms, the term ‘Millet’ was actually used to identify the community of Muslims in contraposition to dhimmis.14 In this sense, the term was also used as a synonym for umma/ȕmmet, the people of Islam. It follows that all Muslims were part of the Millet with the single exception of heretics. M. O. H. Ursinus, on the other hand, rejects this assumption, arguing that “until the Tanzimat period and afterwards,” Millet identified at once “religion [confession, rite], religious community and nation,” that is, Muslims and non-Muslims.15 Sharing Ursinus’s view, Ilber Ortayli defines the Millet as a “form of organization and legal status arising from the submission of followers of monotheistic religions (ehl-i zimmet) to the authority of Islam after the annexation of a region to the Empire, under an ahidname or treaty granting protection.”16 Both authors put into direct relation the term Millet and the concept implicit in the term Zimmi/Dhimmi – ‘protected’ communities’ or ‘people of the pact.’ In Ursinus’s view, however, it is not clear whether at the end of XVII century Millets were understood as an “empire-wide corporation (i. e. as a religious community holding the same status throughout the empire and as such deserving the same protection everywhere).”17Used metonymically, the term Millet also appears in documents dated from the XV and XVII centuries, to identify single individuals and to recognize special titles and honors. For example, according to Braude, there are instances of the use of the expression “the illustrious among the Christian Millet” to identify the Doge of Venice; “the pride of the Christian Millet” to identify the King of France; “exemplar of the women of the Christian Millet” to identify the Queen of England.18 An additional example is provided by Ursinus, who presents a document dated before 1650 in which the Polish King, John Casimir IV, is called “the noble ruler of all of Christianity” (barča millet-i mesihiyyenin ulugh padishahi).19 On the other hand, Braude presents the example of a letter dated 1412 and written by Orhan, son of Prince Suleyman, to the Monastery of Saint Paul of Mount Athos, in which he refers to him as “the pride of the Christian Millet.”20 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Ambiguous Modernization (Pisa: Pisa University Press): 254. Among the many discussions of this issue see B. Detrez, Balkan cultural commonality and ethnic diversity. A. Mikhail and C. M. Philliou, op. cit. M. O. H Ursinus. 1993. “Millet,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam. New Edition. Vol. VII (Leiden: Brill): 61-62. As reported in B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 4. M. O. H. Ursinus. 1993. “Millet,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam. New Edition. Vol. VII (Leiden: Brill): 62. A. Mikhail and C. M. Philliou, op. cit. M. O. H. Ursinus. 1993. “Millet,” cit.: 62. B. Braude, in B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 70. 7 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 The identification between Millet and “religion [confession, rite], religious community” in the early Ottoman Era is self-explanatory. It stands on the all-encompassing religious medieval spirit, which at the time shaped both Muslim and Christian civilizations.21 The Ottoman state was above all a Muslim state, and as such it followed the commandments of Islam as to which rights, duties and status of the individual vis-à-vis the whole society depended from his membership in a religious community. It is in the XIX century that the term Millet began to be associated with a substantially different idea from those it suggested in pre-modern time. This shift is most commonly explained by referring to the strong influence exercised by Western powers over centuries (and especially during the Reform Era) and to their capacity to bring about changes in the Ottoman socio-political vocabulary. Terms such as ‘Greek’ or ‘Armenian’ were by no means new, and were regularly used even before the XIX century. They simply had a different significance from the exclusive national meaning that they acquired afterwards.22 In 1876, the year of the first Ottoman Constitution, Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille spoke about “confusion in the spirit of Eastern [people],” referring to the mistaken use of the idea of religion and nation as synonyms.23 According to the two authors, if understood in this way, the term religion abandons its spiritual role in order to enter the field of politics.24 If in its historical conceptualization the term Millet stood primarily on a religious rather than ethnic basis -with the partial exception for Armenian and Jewish, which could be understood both in religious and ethnic terms- the Era of Nationalism would have opened the formation of new ethnic Millets.25 The shift in the meaning of the term is significant and very sensitive to the extent that scholars are still debating the dynamics of identity transformation against the background of the political transformation at the end of the XIX century. In particular, Karpat stresses the changes in the administrative sub-strata of the Millets during the XVII and XVIII century, which caused a shift in the ‘power sharing’ between clergy and lay primates.26 The expansion of trade and economic exchanges during the XIX century further contributed to re-shaping the life of the Millets. Non-Muslim were better educated and more open to foreign exchange. For this reason, they established contact more rapidly with foreign elites and absorbed new political ideas and Western cultural trends, changing the Millets irreparably. The Millet Regulations adopted in the 1860s are the final result of this process. The understanding of the term Millet as nation can find one more support in the fact that the chief of Millets interacted primarily with the Ministry of Foreign Af21 In the same way, one could say, as today the national modern spirit shapes both Eastern and Western societies. For an analysis of social systems in the Ottoman Empire during the medieval period see Niyazi Berkes, op. cit.: 8-10. 22 O. Karpat in Braude: 146. 23 A. Ubicini and A. Pavet de Courteille. 1876. État Présent de l’Empire Ottoman: Statistique, Gouvernement, Administration, Finances, Armée, Communautés Non Musulmanes, Etc., Etc. D’après le Salnâmeh (Annuaire Impérial) Pour l’Année 1293 De l’Hégire (1875–76) Et Les Documents Officiels Les Plus Récent (Paris: Imprimerie de J. Dumaine): 189. 24Ivi. 25 B. Lewis. 1988. The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 39. 26 O. Karpat, in B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 143. 8 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 fairs of the established Sublime Porte. In this sense, as Davison states very clearly, “it appears as if the Millets were considered to be foreign states.”27 Though the understanding of the term Millet as nation appears earlier than the XIX century, this is the period when it started to assume a political connotation on the wave of the social changes within the Millets and the Ottoman system as a whole. From Millet to Millet ‘System’ The difficulty of providing a clear description of the evolution of the term Millet over centuries goes hand in hand with the difficulty of defining a clear framework able to explain the interrelation between the Millets and other Ottoman institutions. This complex set of interrelations –be they political, social or economicforms the so-called ‘Millet System.’ When dealing with this concept, an initial difficulty appears already from the use of the term ‘system.’ A ‘system’ should be understood as a whole composed of connected components that work together as part of the same mechanism. In the case of the Ottoman Millet system, we can identify three different level of interrelations that couple with three different levels of analysis: 1) inter-communal – among different components of the same Millet, i.e., in Levy’s words, the “[c]ommunity life of non-Muslim religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire;”28 2) intra-communal – among different Millets in one defined area or across the Ottoman territory; 3) extra-communal – between the Millets and the Ottoman institutional apparatus. Already in 1906, Count Frédéric Marie Joseph Ghislain Van Den Steen de Jehay recognized the need to “describe with clarity and conciseness [a form of ] organization that necessarily differs a great deal from that of the European states, where all citizens are subjects to the same laws.”29 Perhaps driven by the overall discussion of the nationalities question at the beginning of the XX century in Europe, he refers to the term Millet as a “synonym for the term ‘nation’,” with the latter defined as a coincidence between differences of rites or religions, and race. 30 More interestingly, he refers to the European debate over legal representation and state construction and calls for a comparative analysis of the Millet system vis-à-vis alternative forms of organization. The present work is concerned with this third level of interaction – what we defined as extra-communal. We will limit our discussion to the Tanzimat period. However, as will be seen later, since they were first constituted by Mohammed the Conqueror after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, religious communi27 28 29 30 This situation would have changed only in 1878, when the Millets were incorporated under the control of the Ministry of Justice. R. H. Davison. 1973. Reform in the Ottoman Empire. 1856– 1876 (New York: Gordian Press): 132. A. Levy (ed). 1994. The Jews of the Ottoman Empire (New Jersey: The Darwin Press): 42. F. M. J, Ghislain Van Den Steen de Jehay. 1906. De la situation légale des subjects Ottomans nonMusulmans (Bruxelles: Société Belge de Libraires): 4. Ibidem: 23 9 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 ties and their organizational structure were absorbed into the Ottoman apparatus. This mainstream interpretation foregrounds the idea that separate, parallel and autonomous organizations for Orthodox, Armenians and, to a certain extent, Jewish subjects were created in the form of centralized and hierarchical self-structures so as to guarantee better control on the part of Istanbul. Among others, an example that is generally given in the literature refers to the collection of taxes from nonMuslim subjects through designated representatives of the patriarchs on behalf of the Ottoman state.31 Intra-communal relations among the different Millets against the background of the multi-religious and multiethnic character of the Ottoman Empire are also documented in the literature by a plurality of anecdotes.32 Exchanges were regular and could occur at different moments of everyday life. To offer an example referring to abortion, H. Inalcik and D. Quataert report that Muslim abortion in Aegean coastal areas was primarily practiced by Jewish midwives, who could probably take advantage of the higher level of education that characterized the Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire.33 This notwithstanding, the literature that deals with the Millets generally discusses them as separated social communal construction and tends even to focus on the story of single cities or villages, missing a broader view of inter-communal, intra-communal and extra-communal interactions.Given the different history and characteristics of the three main religious Millets –Orthodox, Jewish and Armenian—their internal organization differed considerably from one case to the other. The first ‘Millet,’ the Orthodox Millet, was founded in 1454. In his ‘Church and Law in the Balkan Peninsula during the Ottoman Rule,’ Pantazopoulos describes the hierarchical structure and organization of the Orthodox Millet by comparing it to the Byzantine tradition of interrelation between religious communities and the imperial apparatus.34 In line with this tradition, after the Fall of Constantino31 32 33 34 Reference made in V. Artinian. 1988. The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire 1839–1863. A Study of its Historical Development (Istanbul: Isis): 15. Territorial losses over the XIX century contributed to a substantial change in the demographic character of the Ottoman empire. As a result of these developments, the Muslim proportion increased consistently; according to the 1831 enumeration, the non-Muslim subjects (being Jewish or Christian) of the Empire made up less than 1 percent of the population. According to the analysis of Hadil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, data from 1840 saw an increase in the number of Muslims to 60 percent of the whole population, to reach 72 percent after the territorial losses of the Russian-Turkish War (of which 23 percent were Christians). The first official registration in 1906 showed a very similar percentage (74 percent, with Christians at about one-quarter of the total). It should also be recalled here that the demographic composition of the Ottoman Empire changed dramatically from one region to another. Data from 1820–1840 suggest that Christians in European Rumelia accounted for about half of the population in the region, while Muslims represented a minority in the area. This proportion was reversed by the end of the century as a result of a relocation of the Muslim population, which reached 48 percent by 1890). H. Inalcik and D. Quataert. 1996. An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300– 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 782. H. Inalcik and D. Quataert. 1996. An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300– 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 790. The chief difference from the Byzantine past is that the Patriarch became a member of the Ottoman bureaucracy and ceased to be a servant of the Emperor. Karpat in B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 145. 10 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 ple, the Patriarch maintained his religious jurisdiction and privileges, and he was elected by the Sultan as the only representative of Orthodoxy, assuming a position of superiority over the other Patriarchs of Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria. Becoming a “political authority,” he obtained the title of Millet-Bashi, “i.e. Ethnarch of all Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire.”35 This granted him the rank of executive official of the Ottoman Empire, and gave him control over the properties of the Church and its faithful “from the Danube to the Gulf of Persia and from the Adriatic to the Euphrates River.”36 In the words of Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille, “[…] all those among the new subjects of the sultan who professed the Orthodox faith, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians found themselves ipso facto part of the Roum [i.e. Orthodox -sb] millet.”37 To administer his power, the Oecumenical Patriarch had at his disposal a court and a hierarchically organized administration whose capacity covered the whole territory of the Empire.38 The control of the Patriarch over his community evolved over centuries. This is clear, among other possible examples, from his increasing jurisdiction for the collection of taxes to be paid to the Sultan.39 Another good example is provided by the Patriarch’s judicial authority. In line with past Byzantine tradition, judicial authority was granted by Mohammed the Conqueror to the Patriarch of Constantinople and his jurisdiction covered all territories of the Empire inhabited by Christians.40 This capacity evolved over the centuries; Episcopal Courts were in charge of different issues in the area of private law, getting to administer, among other things, family law (marriages, adoptions and divorces) and the law of inheritance. The law exercised by the Church is defined by Pantazopoulos as “oecumenical, patriarchal, internal law,” in contrast with the external law, which is to say the Turkish or popular customary law. Tensions emerged, however, between Ecumenical and Turkish Laws on a plurality of issues, as for example in the institution of marriage. Vartan Artinian traces the origin of an organized communal structure for the Armenian community to Constantinople at the end of the twelfth century, when “a priest ministered to the spiritual needs of the Armenians, and a lay council of wealthy merchants managed its financial affairs.”41 The Armenian Millet was constituted in 1461, when Mohammed the Conqueror invited the Armenian primate of Bursa, Bishop Yovakim, to Istanbul and placed him at the head of the non-Orthodox Christian subjects, which is to say the Syrian Jacobite, Ethiopian, Georgian, 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 N. J. Pantazopoulos. 1967. Church and Law in the Balkan Peninsula during the Ottoman Rule (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies): 19. Ibidem: 24. A. Ubicini and A. Pavet de Courteille. 1876. État Présent de l’Empire Ottoman: Statistique, Gouvernemenet, Administration, Finances, Armée, Communautés Non Musulmanes, Etc., Etc. D’après le Salnâmeh (Annuaire Impérial) Pour l’Année 1293 De l’Hégire (1875–76) Et Les Documents Officiels Les Plus Récent (Paris: Imprimerie de J. Dumaine): 186. N. J. Pantazopoulos, op.cit.: 23. Ibidem: 24. Ibidem: 35-55. V. Artinian. 1988. The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire 1839–1863. A Study of its Historical Development (Istanbul: Isis): 15. 11 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 Chaldean and Coptic communities. In particular, he assumed control over the administration and officials in charge of the overall functioning of the Millet, including education and charitable and religious institutions. As for the Orthodox Millet, the Armenian Millet had its own courts and prisons and was in charge of appointing tax collectors. The judicial authority of the Patriarch evolved over centuries, coming to cover matters concerning personal status, divorce, inheritance, the construction of new churches and schools and the publication of different materials. By 1825, he administered fifty dioceses located and relocated within the territory of the Empire through a net of subordinated ecclesiastics.42 Examples of communal organization and interaction with the Ottoman apparatus are finally discussed in the work of A. Levy on the functioning of Jewish communities.43 The structure and functioning of the Jewish Millet, however, was quite different from those of the Orthodox and Armenian communities because of the different character of the Jewish community. In the first instance, Jewish people were organized on a bottom-up more than a top-down basis. According to A. Levy, this organizational structure is a consequence of Jewish history in the Ottoman Empire. During the Byzantine era, there was a comparatively limited number of Jews living in lands under the control of the Ottoman Empire. In the following centuries, Jews escaped from persecution in Europe and found refuge within the borders of the Empire. Bringing with them the different cultures and traditions of their places of origin, Jewish communities remained markedly different one from the other in their customs, languages and religious laws. In the XV and XVI centuries, Jewish structural organization was based on individual congregations that were formed by families and single individuals gathered around a synagogue. Each congregation was led by its own Rabin, who was in charge of religious issues and held juridical capacity, and by lay leaders who were in charge of fiscal and administrative matters. As for the Orthodox and Armenian Millets, they were free to organize educational activities and were considered as fiscal entities. Each congregation was in fact in charge of collecting taxes and other requested internal dues to the Ottoman apparatus through appointed collectors, who were responsible to the executive council of the congregation. These communal organizations were necessary to guarantee a better performance of the community in different fields, such as education, taxation and courts administration, and a stronger bargaining capacity with Ottoman institutions. It was only in 1835 that the Jewish community of Istanbul elected Abraham Levi as Chief Rabbi (haham bași) and asked the Sublime Porte to recognize him officially. The literature does not agree on the reasons behind this election. On one side, some authors read the election of a Chief Rabbi as a necessary step for the Jewish community in the lowest period of its experience in the Ottoman Empire and against a background of the development of violent nationalist movements; on the other, it is seen as an attempt on the part of the Sublime Porte to establish its control over the communal life of Jewish people, 42 43 Ibidem: 15-18 . A. Levy (ed). 1994. The Jews of the Ottoman Empire (New Jersey: The Darwin Press): 44-53. 12 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 while strengthening the centralized character of the Empire. De facto, however, the unusual character of this figure, given the organization of the Jewish communities in the Empire, caused the role of Chief Rabbin to remain vacant for two years between 1837–1839, when Rabbi Mosheh Fresco was elected in time to take part in the proclamation of the 1839 Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane. It is evident that intra-communal and community-state relations changed through the different Eras of the Ottoman history. Taking this reasoning to the extreme, some authors question the existence of a ‘Millet system,’ even if in an embryonic form, before the reforms of the nineteenth century, and see in the Tanzimat the moment when the Ottomans superimposed a “formalized and hierarchical structure” of interrelation between the Sublime Porte and religious communities within the framework of the Empire.44 Following this interpretation, the institutionalization of a Millet system should be seen as a result of the general reorganization of social and political relations in the Western-driven process of modernization of the Ottoman Empire during the Reform Era.45 Stressing the causal effect between XIXcentury reforms and the development of the Millet System, D. J. Schroeter sees the latter as a replacement of the pre-existing “dhimmi system.”46 Tanzimat Reforms and the Millet System In the words of Ali Haydar Midhat, Tanzimat reforms “must be considered as the most remarkable efforts of administrative organization ever displayed in any country.”47 The term entered the Ottoman vocabulary together with the term nizam (order), and it implies the expansion and intensification of ordering and reforms. In this sense, the Tanzimats were both a time of crisis and renewal of the Ottoman system.48 The Tanzimats are presented in the literature as an overwhelming program of reforms, the aim of which was to substantially ‘renew’ the functioning of the Ottoman system, intervening in the field of social relations and military organization of the Empire, as well as its overall administration, health, education and communication systems.49 This reorganization had a clear legislative character, as the tempo of its development was determined by a set of official decrees and legislative acts. As Gregoire Aristarchi Bey states in his Legislation Ottomane, published in 1873–1874, the legislative acts produced in the Ottoman Empire during the XIX century should be divided in two groups, the first referring to the principle included in the 1839 Hatt-i Sherif (Nobel Rescript) of Gulhane, and the second to 44 45 46 47 48 49 D. J. Schroeter. 2002. “The Changing Relationship between the Jews of the Arab Middle East and the Ottoman State in the Nineteenth Century,” in A. Levy (ed), Jew, Turks, Ottomans: a Shared History, Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Century (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press): 89. Ibidem: 91. Ibidem: 90. Ali Haydar Midhat. 1903. The Life of Midhat Pasha. A Record of His Services, Political Reforms, Banishment, and Juridical Murder (London): 22. C. Vaughn Findley. 2008. “The Tanzimat,” op. ct.: 13. R. Devereux. 1963. The First Ottoman Constitutional Period. A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press): 22-23. 13 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 those included in the subsequent 1856 Hatt-i Humayun. The proclamation of these two Edicts signed also the timing of the Reform Era, which was therefore composed of two main phases.50 The Tanzimats are mostly criticized by historians of Ottoman Empire for lacking a clear reform plan that would favor advancement in the process of modernization, pushing toward a substantial shift in the government structure and in the overall organization of the social system. The ineffectiveness of the overall reform process is often attributed to the unwillingness on the part of the leading class to overthrow the pre-existing political arrangement. This can easily be explained by the fact that state bureaucrats and clerks were in large part the engine of the reforms and, at the same time, those who would have gained most from the perpetuation of the pre-established system and of its benefits. This general situation was not changed by the formation of a new ruling class in the second part of the century. Though a careful analysis of the biographies of the new leading elite is certainly needed in order to better understand its attitude towards the reform process, direct connections with the old ruling class played a major role in preventing them from initiating a completely new political and social order. Furthermore, the fact of being educated in Europe would most probably not have been of much help for the new elite. As a matter of fact, the political debate over the mounting nationalities question in the other two European empires, was at the time far from been solved. Besides, the timing of reforms is sometimes mentioned by some historians of the Ottoman Empire as a possible factor for their ineffectiveness. For some, Tanzimat reforms probably took place too late, in a period when it was most certainly impossible to reverse the dissolution of the Empire and to change substantially its organizational and functioning mechanisms.51 In 1839, the Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane introduced into the Ottoman political debate a set of new principles that remained subjects of the whole Reform Era. The character of the Edicts and of the subsequent regulations is presented very well in the writing of Davison. His works are of primary importance for sketching the history of reforms in the Ottoman Empire and the development of interrelations between the state apparatus and its religious communities. We will refer here only to those components of the reform process that best identify the directions taken by the Ottoman elites in addressing issues concerning the relations between the state and the Millets against the background of the development of nationalist ideas in the Ottoman Empire. The Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane called for reforms of the provincial administrative apparatus with the aim of obtaining 1) perfect security for life, honor and property to all subjects; 2) an efficient way to impose and collect taxation to replace the existing tax-farming; 3) an efficient regulation of military conscription and of its duration. 50 51 R. H. Davison, op.cit: 5. Ibidem: 6. 14 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 It was therefore in the 1839 edict that the notion of equality among all Ottoman subjects appeared for the first time. In fact, the Gulhanne decree did not declare that all individuals are equal, nor that Muslim and non-Muslim communities enjoy the same rights. It vaguely declared that “imperial concessions” are extended to all subjects, “of whatever religion or sect they may be.”52 In concrete terms, this meant the institutionalization of mixed tribunals and police courts and the right for non-Muslims to testify against Muslims in tribunal courts. One more example is provided by the formal recognition of the possibility for non-Muslims to serve equally with Muslims in the army, though in the lower ranks and using only inferior weapons. The revolutionary character of these provisions is evident; to give up the traditional principle of inequality was enough to provoke a reaction from the majority of Muslims, who saw these decisions as an act against religion and traditional practices.53 While taking a step toward equality among Ottoman subjects, the Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane still recognized the communal character of the Millets within the Ottoman social system. An example in this respect appears in the writing of Count Frédéric Marie Joseph Ghislain Van Den Steen de Jehay, who recalls that, in the aftermath of the promulgation of the Gulhane, a new regulation made the Millets responsible for the repartition among taxpayers of the Kharadj, which was to become a collective taxation paid by the municipal communities within the framework of the religious supra-structure.54 In 1840, an imperial irade obliged the Armenian patriarch to accomplish this duty. The dual nature of the Hatt-i Sherif was therefore a result of the attempt to combine a new attitude on the part of the Sublime Porte towards religious communities, which was to answer to the new need for reform of the state apparatus and to pressure from the Western powers, with the traditional character of the Ottoman state, which was to answer, on the contrary, to the needs of the ruling elites.55 In 1840, representative councils (meclis) were formed following a firman issued by the Sultan, in line with the request put forward by the Edict. The Councils represent a first attempt to institutionalize an embryonic representative government in the provinces for both Muslims and non-Muslims. They were composed of 13 members, of which 6 were appointed government functionaries and the remaining 7 were representatives of the local population. In areas with mixed demographies, 3 places were to be given to representatives of the non-Muslim population. The firman foresaw multi-religious representation also in the smaller centers, where the administrative councils were to be composed of only 5 members, 3 Muslim and 2 non-Muslim. Non-Muslim representatives were elected and were to act on behalf of their communities. They were selected among their groups and not from a single 52 53 54 55 A. Ubicini and A. Pavet de Courteille, op. cit.: 233. V. Artinian, op. cit.: 50. F. M. J, Ghislain Van Den Steen de Jehay, op. cit.: 11. R. H. Davison, op. cit.: 39. 15 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 electoral list for the whole territory under the control of the constituted Council.56 Though the role played by non-Muslims in the administration of local affairs was again not meant to be equal to that played by the Muslim population, one needs to recognize once again the revolutionary character of this reform and its importance in the attempt to lead towards the formation of a representative system in the Ottoman Empire. At the central level, non-Muslim representatives assumed the role of representing their communities within the framework of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, Meclis-i vâlâ-i ahkâm-i adliye. Though institutionalized already in 1838 by Mahmud II, representatives of the non-Muslim communities appeared in the Supreme Council only in the second Tanzimat period, following the provisions included in the 1856 Hatt-i Humayun. In 1854, the Supreme Council was actually weakened by the formation of a Tanzimat Council. The two bodies merged once again in 1861, when the re-constituted Supreme Council was divided into three divisions: administrative, legislative and judicial. The effective role of non-Muslims in the Council, especially in the legislative division, however, is disputed in the literature.57 It was the 1856 Hatt-i Humayun that made a first real cut with tradition by openly promoting equality among all subjects of the Empire.58 Muslims and non-Muslims are recognized as equal in professing their religion, in taking part in military service59 and scientific education, in possessing real estate and in taxation. At the same time, however, Hatt-i Humayun recognized the “privileges and spiritual immunities” acknowledged to “all Christian communities or other non-Muslim persuasions” over centuries (“ab antiquo”)60 and prompted their reconsideration on the part of ad hoc mixed commissions. Besides religious schools, each community could open new schools in the fields of science, arts and industry, whose curricula would be written by mixed councils. The debate over the formation of new schools in the second half of the XIX century played a major role in the internal fight between reformist and traditionalist factions in the religious Millets. If from the one side non-religious education signaled a move towards secularization, from the other it assumed major relevance in the development of national identities, 56 57 58 59 60 R. H. Davison, Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire, in W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.). 1968. Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East. The Nineteenth Century (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press): 99. R. H. Davison. 1973. Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876, cit.: 239. See also, R. H. Davison, Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire, cit.:101. Recalling the intentions behind the drafting of the Hatt, in 1866, Mehmed Faud Pasha, at the time Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte called it a “Chart of Equality.” In particular, he recognizes the psychological and moral relevance of the achievements that followed the implementation of the Hatt, though recognizing that the principle was not accepted and put into practice in all territories of the Empire. A. Ubicini and A. Pavet de Courteille, op. cit.: 245. This issue, and the related issue concerning payment of the Haraç for non-Muslims and a new sense of patriotism, remained unresolved for the whole Tanzimat period to the extent that it was again the subject of discussion in the 1877–1878 sections of the Ottoman Parliament. Z. Karal. 1984. “Non-Muslim Representatives in the First Constitutional Assembly. 1876–1877,” in B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 398. A. Ubicini and A. Pavet de Courteille, op. cit.: 236 16 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 to the detriment of an Ottoman nation that was still being made.61 The judicial authority of religious leaders was also recognized. Finally, in line with the Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane, the Hatt-i Humayun called for the participation of non-Muslim representatives in the provincial councils and in the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinance in those cases where issues of interest for the “generality of the subjects of the empire” were at stake. In both cases, non-Muslims were to act as representatives of their communities. Corporate representation at the local level was also the subject of the 1864 Law on vilayet. We refer here to the revised version of the Law, which appeared in 1867. A final reform of the vilayet system followed in 1871. Besides redrawing the geography of the Empire by dividing its territory into vylayet, sancaks, kazas and kariye/ nahiye,62 the Law aimed at improving the functioning of the local governments and provincial councils established in 1840. Communal representation characterized the newly instituted organs of power at the three upper administrative levels: the administrative council, local courts and the general assembly. Non-Muslim communities were represented in the administrative councils in two different ways: on the one hand, through local spiritual leaders and, on the other, through elected representatives (‘permanent members’). In both cases, they acted as representatives of their communities. Representatives of non-Muslim communities elected with the same indirect electoral system used for the administrative councils were also present in the judiciary courts of the three upper administrative levels: the High Court of Justice of the vilayet (art 19) and the civil and criminal courts at sancaks (Art. 39) and kazas (Art. 51). Finally, the vilayets’ General Assembly was composed of two Muslims and two non-Muslim representatives for each Sancak composing the vilayet. The Assembly had an advisory role in issues concerning public work, taxes, police, agriculture and commerce. General Assemblies were not constituted at lower administrative levels. Millet and Ottomansim between Tradition and Modernization The notion of the Ottoman Nation and Ottomanism developed against the background of these reforms. As is the case for the Millet, the literature is rather divided on the correct interpretation of ‘Ottomanism.’ On the one hand, the notions of ‘Millet’ and ‘Ottomanism’ can be seen in antinomy one with the other, with the Millet identifying an exclusive idea of community (be it interpreted as religious community or nation) and Ottomansim an inclusive concept implying a shared sense of belonging of all Ottoman subjects to the state. On the other hand, one can 61 62 R. H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876, op. cit.: 132-133. The Empire was re-divided into vilayets (previously called eyalet), which were themselves divided into sancaks (also called liva), divided in turn into kazas, which finally were divided into groups of villages (kariye’s or nahiye’s). R. H. Davison. 1973. Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876, cit.: 146. 17 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 see a de facto coincidence between the two notions and imagine the formation of a single Ottoman nation, breaking the walls of the Millets.63 In line with the first interpretation, Ottomanism can be seen as an ideology that aimed at attracting all non-Muslims living in the Ottoman lands by promoting a shared identification with the state, independent from religious and national belonging.64 Put somewhat differently, Ottomanism can be seen as a state “identity policy,”65 an alternative to nationalism (whether Turkish or non-Muslim nationalism). This would imply the development of alternative identities and, implicitly, the recognition of a double identity for the subjects of the Sultan, one to coincide with the Millets and one to reach the broader limits – “supra-ethnic and supranational”66 – of the Empire. On the other hand, the second interpretation was often proposed by foreigners who were most certainly influenced by the latest Western political developments.67 Among the prominent exceptions, there is the position assumed by Ahmet Mithat in the first post-Constitutional period, when he envisaged the formation of a new multiethnic Ottoman nation around the figure of the Sultan.68 The legal status of the Ottoman nation was finally recognized in the provisions of the 1869 Law on nationalities and nationalization. In line with Roman Law, the Law on nationalities and nationalization recognizes Ius sanguis as the basis for belonging to the Ottoman nation. In particular, Art 1 reads that “[a]ll individuals born of an Ottoman father and an Ottoman mother, or only of an Ottoman father, are Ottoman subjects.” This notwithstanding, as stated in Art. 2, Ius solis is also recognized for foreigners who were born on the Ottoman territory: “All people born on the Ottoman territory of foreigners can claim the condition of Ottoman subjects within three years of coming of age.” The relevance of the Law on nationalities and nationalization in the overall debate over Millet and Ottomanism can be summarized in two main points: 1) It recognizes equality among all Ottoman subjects; 2) Making a connection between nationhood and territory, the latter assumes a political connotation proper of the discourse concerning the Western understanding of nation-state. The Ottoman nation was finally recognized in the provisions of the first Ottoman Constitution issued in 1876. According to the Constitution, all subjects of the Empire were declared to be Ottomans (Article 8), and as such equal before the law without distinction caused by belonging to different Millets. This new category 63 64 65 66 67 68 A. Verzenkov in D. Mishkova, op. cit.: 61. Ibidem: 48. Ibidem: 50. O. Karpat, Politicization of Islam, cit.: 370. A. Vezenkov in D. Mishkova, op. cit.: 63. O. Karpat, Politization of Islam, cit.: 359 18 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 –‘Ottomans’- took the place of the old distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim. In prompt contradiction, Article 11 guaranteed the freedom of religion and the continuation of pre-existing privileges for religious communities. Religious education was among these. Millets maintained control over schooling and schools grew considerably in number in the second half of the XIX century, assuming a major role in the development of an alternative sense of belonging for non-Muslim subjects. Reasoning in modern terms, the first Ottoman Constitution seems to recognize the development of a double sense of identity: a religious (traditional) belonging to the Millet in the respect of the religious law and a civic (modern) belonging to the Ottoman nation, in the respect of the state law. This new term of unity was also shared by the deputies of the Assembly constituted after the adoption of the constitutional text.69 The Parliament was a remarkable example of pluralism and a clear representation of the multinational and multi-religious character of the Empire. Of the 115 deputies, 48 were non-Muslim. The Ottoman Parliament was the first Parliamentary experiment that saw the participation of deputies from three continents, as well as different religious and ethnic identities. It is sufficient to mention that 14 different languages were spoken in the Assembly, which, however, managed to overcome language barriers thanks to the fact that all deputies spoke Turkish as demanded by law. The tension between the evolution of the notion of ‘Millet’ and the rising new notion of ‘Ottomanism’ is an expression of the overall process of transformation and secularization of Ottoman society. As mentioned above, this process is clearly evident in the evolution of the relations between clergy and laymen within the borders of the Millets, and found final recognition in the new Millet Regulations adopted at the request of the Sublime Porte between 1860 and 1865, with the aim of reforming the internal structure and functioning of the religious communities. National Regulations adopted the language of Western ideas and were weighted in favor of the lay elements, reducing the power of religious leaders.70 This is evident in the composition of the Armenian National General Assembly, where only one in seven of the hundred and forty deputies was a clergy delegate, or in the full executive power guaranteed to the council of lay notables (meclis-i cismani) by the Jewish Hahamhane Nizamnamesi. 69 70 Examples in this respect are reported by Z. Karal. He reports Vasilaki Efendi saying “[d]iscrimination is against the Constitution. Let not such discussion occur here. Let us refrain from terms such us ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim,’ ‘Greek’ and ‘Armenians.’ Let us not speak such words here again” or Manok Efendy saying “[w]e are not becoming Ottomans now; we have been Ottomans for six hundred years. Thanks to our Sultan, our Ottomanism has been strengthened.” Z. Karal. 1984. “Non-Muslim Representatives in the First Constitutional Assembly. 1876–1877,” in B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 397. For a discussion of the event that brought about the adoption of the Armenian Constitution, see V. Artinian, op. cit.: 75-106. 19 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 Political identity versus cultural identity. Imperial discourses at the end of the XIX century Let now turn our attention to the notion of National-cultural autonomy as conceived by the Austro-Marxists at the end of the XIX century. The notion of national-cultural autonomy developed in a period of important changes in the relations between the Austrian Empire and the national groups located and relocated within its borders. In particular it rests on the interpretation offered by Karl Renner of the ideas of state and nation, and on his criticism of the ‘territorial principle’ presumed to underlie the construction of the modern NationState.71 In State and Nation (1899) Renner defined state and nation as ‘antinomic:’ “The state is a territorial authority, the nation is a de facto association of people.”72 It follows that, in his view, the modern state rests on the territorial principle, while the nation rests on the personality principle.73 According to Renner, the state is the framework within which the interests of the nation should find realization. Because nations are gathered within the structure of the state and do not coincide with it, he argues, the entire notion of the nationstate must be reconsidered and substituted by the idea of the multinational state. For this reason, as is claimed by Arduino Agnelli, the nationalities question could be solved only by redefining the relationship between state and nation.74 Expressed somewhat differently, Renner’s approach to the nationalities question asserted the need to find a way to include the nation within the state construction, making it a functional part of the system (and not its only and exclusive constitutive element). For a broader understanding of the position taken by Renner in relation to the nationalities question, it is necessary to turn to the declaration issued by the Austrian Social-Democrats at the Party Congress held in Brno in 1899. The Brno Congress took up discussion of the nationalities question initiated at the Kremsier Parliament in 1848 and moved it onto the field of the contrast between the implementation of a territorial system, “which established a fixed relation between law, territory and administration,” and a personal system, or “system of association.”75 This contraposition was mirrored in the positions taken by the Czech and Slovenian delegations during the Congress. The proposal advanced by the Czech delegates sought to solve the minorities issue by supporting the implementation of the territorial principle and forming territorial districts drawn on an ethnic basis.76 In 71 72 73 74 75 76 R. Monteleone. 1982. Marxismo, internazionalismo e questione nazionale (Torino: Loesher Editore): 113. Ibidem: 112. Ibidem: 114. A. Agnelli. 1969. Questione nazionale e socialismo. Contributo allo studio del pensiero di K. Renner e O. Bauer (Bologna: Il Mulino): 55. Ibidem: 45. It was not clear, however, what the territorial principle was meant to refer to. For some, territorial units should be formed on the basis of the historical-political principle (the Lands of the Crown 20 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 contrast, the Slovenians sought to break the connection between state and nation by institutionalizing cultural autonomies based on the experience of the Catholic Church. If the Czechs defined the nation on the basis of an unavoidable cohabitation or living together, the Slovenians chose a different interpretation based on the recognition of the willingness of individuals to share a given national identity or belonging.77 Notwithstanding the attempt to combine the two principles, it is clear from the final Five Point Resolution of the Brno Conference that the position taken by the Austrian Social-Democrats largely coincided with the ‘territorial solution’ braced by the Czech delegates. Critical of this solution –which in his view would have replicated at a lower level the same nationalities problems experienced by the larger federation- Renner advanced his hypothesis to reshape the relation between state and nation. The latter should have been “incorporated” (eingegliedert) into the state. As a matter of fact, he continues, it is the gap between the institutional order and the national composition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that causes the need for institutional reforms in order to adapt the whole juridical system to the multiethnic composition of the state.78 His emphasis on the juridical system is explained by the definition of the nation advanced by Renner. In State and Nation, he clearly states that “[r]ights, and moreover ‘inviolable’ rights,” can be held only by legal entities.”79 On the basis of this consideration, Renner openly criticizes the position taken by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party, which refers to the right of self-determination of nations but refrains from a more detailed definition of the concrete legal entity to which this right applies.80 Following this same logic, the right of nationality is possible only if national affiliation becomes a “feature of the legal status of the individual, like Catholicism, majority, fatherhood, etc.”81 The nation is in fact defined as a communion of people 77 78 79 80 81 and the ancient Kingdoms), while according to others they should be formed on the basis of the ethnic-political principle. Ivi. A. Agnelli, op. cit.: 66-68. Ibidem: 85 and following. This position is also debated by Renner in National Problem (War of Nationalities in Austria). In Renner’s words: “Questions on the subjects of law, on the content of right and on juridical sanctions, which the legislator should ask himself while producing any act of law, if only he wants to make it a basic element of the social mechanism, [these question] should also be applied in regards to the nation in its entirety and in its organic components. It is not possible to talk about the law of nations if this fundamental point is not solved.” Rudolf Springer, “Natsional’naya problema (Bor’ba natsional’nostei v Avstrii) [izvlechenie],” in “Natsional’naya problema (Bor’ba natsional’nostei v Avstrii) [izvlechenie],” in Natsional’no-Kul’turnye avtonomii i ob’’edineniya. Istoriografiya. Politika. Praktika. Antologiya. 1995 (Moskva: Tom 1): 67. K. Renner, “State and Nation,” in E. Nimni. 2005. National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics (London; New York: Routledge): 18-19. Ibidem: 22. In Bauer’s view, the nation “is only manifested in the national character, in the nationality of the individual; and the nationality of the individual is only one aspect of his determination by the history of society, by the development of the conditions and techniques of labor.” T. Bottomore (ed.). 1991. “Austro-Marxism,” in A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Oxford, Blackwell Publisher): 40. 21 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 but not a societas, “as the individuation principle is not a form of collective will,”82 but originates from the shared desire of single individuals. Free from any connection with territorial boundaries, the nation is therefore a cultural communion with a “dominant orientation of thought and feelings.”83 The state, on the contrary, is understood as a “sovereign territorial entity” that cannot exist without “exclusive territorial domination.”84 As the state needs the nation to guarantee its sovereignty, the nation needs the state to guarantee its survival. When they coincide, “the machinery of the state is confronted with the least possible resistance” and “the nation is to experience the least possible level of resistance to its development.”85 The resolution of the problem is easier where nationalities are clearly separated and the state apparatus “can exercise all sovereignty rights.” On the contrary, the situation is much more difficult when nations are small, mingled together and “the territory is neither adequately delineated nor large enough to afford the state-formative interests of the dominant groups an adequate material basis.”86 To move away from the illusion connected with the existence of the nation-state and closer to the reality of Multinational States, Renner advances his hypothesis, coupling the territorial principle with the personality principle, and on that basis redefining the structure and functioning of the state administrative and juridical apparatus. Personality and territoriality principles are not mutually exclusive. In Renner’s words, This is not to say that the territorial principle is wrong in itself and untenable. On the contrary, it is the formula for nation state formation. [...] The nation state is the form of state system with the least internal frictions; it is the inevitable ideal of every nation, or at least of those members who are granted ‘active’ nationalities. It is one of the conceivable ways of solving the nationalities question.87 However, it was not the only way, and given the political reality of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, not the most effective. The personality principle rests on the decision of the single person to belong to one or another national group. Political authorities would receive the obligatory declaration of nationality from all citizens of age and record them in a national register. After this, nations would be functionally integrated into the state apparatus as ‘subjects’ of law or “legal entities under public and private law.”88 As such they would be granted both the possibility of making legal claims (Rechtsansprüche) and corresponding obligations (Verpflichtungen) “vis-à-vis their own members, vis-à- 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 Renner, State and Nation, cit.: 25. Ibidem: 25. Ibidem: 24, 26. Ibidem: 26. Ibidem: 27. Ibidem: 30. Ibidem: 31. 22 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 vis the state, and vis-à-vis foreign nations.”89 As can be seen, in the institutionalization of National-cultural autonomies, the formation of national registers is as important a step as the designation of territorial jurisdiction in the case of National territorial units. Nations gather together all individuals who express the desire to become members by enrolling in the national register, independently of whether they may live within a determined territory or outside its borders. As part of the overall reorganization of the state system, National-personal autonomies (or Extra-territorial Autonomies) would become instruments for national groups to develop their own national cultures and traditions without the need to assert political control over the state itself.90 Renner’s reasoning is built on two levels. The first is represented by the political unit or polity, and the second by the different national units. The political unit would have intervened in issues of interest to all national components, while the national units would maintain exclusive competence over all issues of particular or exclusive national interest.91 In modern terms, this schema describes a state construction that stands on the recognition of the co-existence of civic and ethnic identities, of distinct civic and ethnic needs and requirements. Conclusions The Tanzimat reforms represented an attempt on the part of the Ottoman Empire to react to the challenges of social changes by institutionalizing a centralized state system. This process coincided with the development of a sense of political belonging that surpassed the borders of the Millets. In Levy’s view, through the Reform Era, the Sublime Porte wanted to assure nonMuslim communities that their future within the Ottoman Empire was more secure than in small nation-state constructions.92 At the same time, the recognition of religious communities was instrumental to obtain the support of the Western Powers in the light of the progressive weakening of Ottoman military and political capacity. The whole process of reform caused a substantial modernization of the Empire, bringing about structural changes both in values and in its institutional arrangements. In the idea of the reformers, these changes should have not dismantled the Ottoman State but, on the contrary, strengthened its capacity to react to internal and external pressures. 89 90 91 92 K. Renner in Der Kampf der Ősterreichischen Nationen, as reported in J. Fouques-Duparc, 1922. La protection des minorités de race, de langue et de religion. Étude de droit des gens (Paris: Librairie Dalloz): 46-47. See also J. Schwarzmantel, “Karl Renner and Multiculturalism,” in E. Nimni, op. cit.: 67. R. Monteleone, op. cit., 114. J. Fouques-Duparc, op. cit., 50-51. A. Levy. 1994 “Millet Politics: The Appointment of a Chief Rabbi in 1835,” in A. Levy (ed), The Jews of the Ottoman Empire (USA: The Darwin Press): 433. 23 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 This resulted in a fundamental paradox, however. As is clear from the provisions of the 1869 Law and of the following 1876 Ottoman Constitution, the notion of ‘Ottomanism’ gathers values such as equality and individuality, producing an echo of the secular principles at the heart of the French Revolution. At the same time, however, in the Ottoman context, the concept of citizenship could not be conceived outside the logic of the traditional/Islamic conceptualization of society, to the extent that, according to Vezenkov, it is incorrect to talk about Islamism as a later substitution to the notion of Ottomanism in the afterwards of the First Parliamentary experience, since Islam was already a substantial part of its ‘Ottoman-ness’ in the past and a vivid factor in the rhetoric of reform, at least in its initial phases.93 Not yet an ideology, ‘Ottoman-ness’ refers to those habits and uses which determined social differentiation between the Muslim majority and non-Muslim Millets for centuries.94 Western ideas transformed ‘Ottoman-ness’ into a political ideology and reversed its founding principle. If on the one hand the Tanzimat reforms attempted to introduce the Western (French) notion of citoyen, on the other, it had to deal with a strong sense of communal belonging that originated from the ancient Roman and Byzantine Empires and was reified over centuries within the borders of the Millets.95 Communal representation accompanied the process of institutional reforms at both local and central levels. Besides, the Millets Constitutions adopted between 1860 and 1865 are a clear attempt to move towards secularization within the ‘walls’ of tradition. The statutes not only formalized the existence of the autonomous Millets structures, but defined how communal organization was to be reformed in order to accompany the broader process of modernization of the Ottoman state apparatus. The role assumed by the lay elements in the administration of the communities is here a case in point. The role of the clergy was perceptibly reduced, while the intervention of the government on issues once under the exclusive control of the Millets became more and more evident. Karpat offers in this respect two main examples: the possibility available to all subjects of the Empire to appeal to state courts, even for issues once under the exclusive control of the Millet; and the 1869 Education Law, which extended the capacity of control of the government over the Millet schools.96 The foundations of the Millets were also undermined as a result of newly conceptualized connections between the state and the individual. In the pre-modern arrangement, all subjects of the Empire were subjects of the Sultan. However, the Sultan recognized the right of religious leaders to administer part of his power. This dynamic collided with the reconfiguration of the state as a centralized organism, 93 94 95 96 As A. Vezenkov reminds us, the 1839 Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane begins by referring to the Koran. In D. Mishkova, op. cit.: 58. I. Ortayli. 1994. Studies on Ottoman Transformation (Istanbul: ISI Press): 20. For the purpose of this study, it is interesting to recall here the comment of O. Karpat in relation to the incapacity of the Hungarian Arminius Vambery to recognize the “multidimensional evolution” that characterized the Ottoman society in the XIX century. O. Karpat, Politicization of Islam, cit.: 328. O. Karpat in B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 165. 24 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 and with the recognition of Ottoman subjects as citizens of the state. However, as has been seen, representation maintained a corporative character even during the first constitutional period at the end of the Tanzimat Era. It follows that the Ottomanist idea stood on the fragile equilibrium of modern, secular and individualistic principles and weakening communal liaisons.97 By the end of the XIX century, nine Millets represented the different denominations on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Their capacity was extremely limited, to the extent that Karpat defines them as “confessional groupings.”98 As a step towards conclusion, we define the ‘Millet system’ as a pre-modern arrangement for managing (religious) diversities transposed to the era of nationalism and adapted to its new dynamics. It is undeniable that forms of interactions at intra-communal, inter-communal and extra-communal levels existed even before the Tanzimat period. A fluid concept, the ‘Millet system’ evolved over centuries, only to founder against the emergence of the nation-states and the demand that the political and national (religious) systems be expressions of each other.99 Above and beyond this, the reconsideration of the relation between state and nation caused the consequent reconceptualization of the territory as a political entity. What about the Millet System and Cultural Autonomy? In his comparative study on empires, Dominic Lieven refers to the Austro-Marxist model of Cultural Autonomy, stating that Renner’s aim was to guarantee individuals national identity wherever they might migrate, and to take the struggle for territory and its symbols out of politics. In many ways the Austro-Marxist were offering a modernized version of the millet system. But there were major difficulties in adapting this type of solution to ethnic issues in the early twentieth-century context (emphasis added).100 This statement opens the floor for a set of considerations on the possibility to debate the Millet System and Cultural Autonomy against the background of the reforms of the Empire since mid XIX century. In the first instance, as Lieven points out, the Millet System and Cultural Autonomy belong to two different historical periods. As illustrated above, the Millet System originates from the pre-modern imperial tradition and should be understood in relation to the religious conceptualization of the Islamic society; it was eventually blown away in the transition between pre-national and national order. Cultural Autonomy was conceived as a reaction to the nation-state but conceptualized within the logic of nationalism. It is not by chance that Cultural Autonomy is also known 97 A. Mikhail and C. M. Philliou. 2012. “The Ottoman Empire and the Imperial Turn,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 54(4): 728. 98 O. Karpat, in B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 165. 99 Ibidem: 164. 100 D. Lieven. 2000. Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals (London: John Murray): 190. 25 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 as National-Cultural Autonomy. Cultural Autonomy was constituted on the basis of national registers; people voluntarily defined their ‘enrollment’ in this or that national group by adding their name to a national list. National belonging (whatever the definition of this concept could have been at the end of the XIX or beginning of the XX century) was the core of Cultural Autonomy. The Millet was on the contrary a-national and universal, though internally composed of ethnic groups that managed to maintain their cultural differentiation over centuries. During the Tanzimat Era, the latter came to the surface, breaking the walls of the Millets and lowering their socio-political relevance to the level of “confessional groupings.”101 National-cultural autonomy is also defined by Austro-Marxists as Personal-cultural autonomy. The example adduced by Renner in his 1899 State and Nation brings us back to the Carolingian and Frankish Empire and to the example of religious communities, referring in particular to the Catholic Denomination. In contrast with these examples, the emergence of the modern state and of the territorial principle would have brought about the imposition of one domination, one law and one language over citizens. The existence of the Personality Principle in the Carolingian Empire was represented in the formula “‘Quo jure vivi’ – Which law do you live by?” The Empire guaranteed the existence within its borders of different “nations” (this is the term used by Renner), which had the right to use their language (and therefore to develop a form of identity) and to resort to their legal codes. Similarly, the Personality Principle was dominant in the Frankish Empire, where it was applied “not only in the more formal respect of the language, but also in regard to the gamut of private and public law.”102 However, Renner does not make any reference to the Ottoman Millet System. Individual participation to the Millet was not voluntary. In the words of Ilbert Ortaylı, “individuals lived in the religious section, the millet, in which they were born and came under the spiritual, financial and administrative authority of the community concerned.” It was through their participation in a religious community that individuals were represented vis-à-vis the state and therefore included in the socio-political system of the Empire. Conversion from one Millet to another was also particularly problematic, except for the case of Non-Muslims, who could be converted to Islam. The different character of Ottoman bureaucracy and that of modern European states is one of the “major difficulties” that Lieven has in mind when he defines Cultural Autonomies as a “modernized version of the millet system.” In pre-modern times, Millets autonomously administered their internal affairs, besides protecting their socio-cultural and religious interests. As recalled above, the Patriarchs were members of the Ottoman state bureaucracy. In modern times, the difficulty lies in dividing national-cultural from territorial administration. A final consideration of the non-territorial character of the Millet System and Cul101 O. Karpat, in B. Braude and B. Lewis, op. cit.: 165. 102 K. Renner, State and Nation, in E. Nimni, National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics, cit., 29. 26 CAS WORKING PAPER SERIES 6 tural Autonomy. At a superficial level, this is the strongest point of contact between the two models. However, a major difference has to be kept in mind. The Ottoman Millet System was a non-territorial arrangement that assumed a pre-modern understanding of the territory as the exclusive property of the Sultan (or of the Emperor). The re-interpretation of the territory as a political unit is on the contrary a central component in the notion of the nation-state. At the end of the XIX century, this is how the territory was understood by the Austro-Marxists. 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