1 Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi`ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar

1 Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi`ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar

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Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi’ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar
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Resmi Gazete
YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ
TÜZÜKLER
2009/15228
2009/15229
Vakıflar Tüzüğünün Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Tüzük
Vakıflarda İntifa Haklarının Ne Suretle Tesbit ve İta Edileceği Hakkında 17/7/1936 Tarihli Vakıflar
Nizamnamesine Ek Nizamnamenin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Tüzük
2009/15230
Vakıf Zeytinlik, İncirlik, Fındıklık, Narenciye ve Meyvalıkların Satış Şekli Hakkındaki Nizamnamenin
Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Tüzük
BAKANLAR KURULU KARARLARI
2009/15158
Devlet Demiryolları İşletmesi Genel Müdürlüğünde 657 Sayılı Devlet Memurları Kanununa Tabi Olarak
Görev Yapan Personele, 2009 Yılında 5.500 Saate Kadar Fazla Çalışma Yaptırılması ve Saat Başına,
1,10 TL Fazla Çalışma Ücreti Ödenmesi Hakkında Karar
2009/15165
Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumunca, 4734 Sayılı Kamu İhale Kanununun 3 üncü
Maddesinin (f) Bendi Kapsamında Yapılacak İhalelere İlişkin 2/4/2004 Tarihli ve 2004/7113 Sayılı
Kararnamenin Yürürlükten Kaldırılması Hakkında Karar
2009/15173
Türkiye Tarım Havzalarının Belirlenmesine İlişkin Karar
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2009/15175
Gümrük Müsteşarlığı Gümrükler Genel Müdürlüğü Bünyesinde Yer Alan 2 Adet Şube Müdürlüğünün
Muhabere ve Elektronik Dairesi Başkanlığına Bağlanması Hakkında Karar
2009/15191
Sürekli Görevle Yurt Dışında Bulunan Memurlara Ödenecek Aylıklara İlişkin Karar
2009/15205
Bazı İllerde Mahalli İdare Birliklerinin Kurulması Hakkında Karar
2009/15206
Kırıkkale İli, Bahşılı İlçesi, Karaahmetli Beldesi Hudutları Dahilinde Bulunan Alanın “Karaahmetli Tabiat
Parkı” Olarak Belirlenmesi Hakkında Karar
2009/15214
Yükseköğretim Kurumlarında Yabancı Uyruklu Öğretim Elemanı Çalıştırılması Esaslarına İlişkin Kararda
Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Karar
2009/15217
Akdeniz Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü Bünyesinde Bulunan Akseki Sağlık Yüksekokulunun Kapatılması
Hakkında Karar
2009/15218
2009/15219
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Rektörlüğüne Bağlı Olarak Mimarlık Fakültesi Kurulması Hakkında Karar
Yaşar Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü Bünyesinde Bulunan Mühendislik-Mimarlık Fakültesinin Kapatılarak Adı
Geçen Rektörlüğe Bağlı Olarak Mühendisilik ve Mimarlık Fakültesi Kurulması Hakkında Karar
2009/15232
İzmir Üniversitesi Rektörlüğüne Bağlı Olarak Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu Kurulması Hakkında Karar
2009/15233
1163 Sayılı Kooperatifler Kanununa Tabi Kooperatiflerde, Bir Ortaklık Payının Değerinin 100 (Yüz) Türk
Lirasına Yükseltilmesi Hakkında Karar
2009/15239
Gümrük Müsteşarlığının Taşra Teşkilatında Yer Alan, İzmir Gümrük ve Muhafaza Başmüdürlüğüne Bağlı
Aydın Gümrük Muhafaza Müdürlüğünün Kaldırılması Hakkında Karar
2009/15241
Ayakkabı İthalatında Geçici Korunma Önlemi Uygulanmasına İlişkin Karar
BAKANLIKLARA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ
—
Millî Savunma Bakanlığına, İçişleri Bakanı Beşir ATALAY’ın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere
—
Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığına, Bayındırlık ve İskan Bakanı Mustafa DEMİR’in Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere
YÖNETMELİKLER
—
Eczaneler ve Eczane Hizmetleri Hakkında Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik
—
Sağlık Meslek Liseleri Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Yönetmelik
— Sağlık Meslek Liselerinde Görevli Stajiyer Öğretmenlerin Yetiştirilmelerine ve Stajiyerliklerinin Kaldrılmasına Dair
Yönetmeliğin Yürürlükten Kaldırılması Hakkında Yönetmelik
—
Sağlık Bakanlığına Bağlı Okullarda Okutulacak Ders Kitapları ile Eğitim Araçları Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten
—
Sağlık Bakanlığına Bağlı Eğitim Kurumlarını Hizmete Açma, Kapatma ve Bunlara Ad Verme Usul ve Esaslarına
Kaldırılmasına Dair Yönetmelik
Dair Yönetmeliğin Yürürlükten Kaldırılması Hakkında Yönetmelik
—
Sağlık Bakanlığı Sağlık Meslek Liseleri Sınıf Geçme ve Sınav Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair
Yönetmelik
—
Sağlık Bakanlığı Sağlık Meslek Liseleri Ödül ve Disiplin Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair
Yönetmelik
—
Sağlık Bakanlığı Anadolu Sağlık Meslek Liseleri Yönetmeliğinin Yürürlükten Kaldırılmasına Dair Yönetmelik
—
Refik Saydam Hıfzıssıhha Merkezi Başkanlığı Merkez ve Taşra Teşkilatında Görevli Personele Döner Sermaye
—
Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu AR-GE Projeleri İhale Yönetmeliği
Gelirlerinden Ek Ödeme Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik
—
Türkiye Radyo-Televizyon Kurumu Sicil Amirleri Yönetmeliği
—
Türkiye Radyo-Televizyon Kurumunda Memur Statüsünde İstihdam Edilen Personel Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik
—
Atatürk Üniversitesi Ön Lisans ve Lisans Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliği
—
Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi Önlisans ve Lisans Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair
Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik
Yönetmelik
TEBLİĞ
—
İnsan Taşımak Üzere Tasarımlanan Kablolu Taşıma Tesisatının Ruhsatlandırılması, Bakım ve İşletilmesine Dair
Tebliğ (SGM: 2009/11)
DÜZELTME: (21/7/2009 tarihli ve 27295 sayılı Resmî Gazete’de Yayımlanan, Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumuna Yapılan
Sigortalı ve İşyeri Bildirimlerinin Bazı Kurumlara Yapılması Gereken Bildirimler Yerine Geçmesine Dair Usul
ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik ile İlgili)
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Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Volume 45, Issues 2-3, Pages 153-394 (August 2008)
Conservatism and Debt
Pages 154-174
Anne Beatty, Joseph Weber, Jeff Jiewei Yu
Abstract
Despite the unquestionable influence of conservatism, disagreement remains about what
economic demands lead to financial reporting conservatism. Research examining
lenders’ demands for reporting conservatism has been questioned for ignoring
conservative contract modifications. We document that these modifications exist but are
not ubiquitous. We find contract modifications are more likely when agency costs are
higher and litigation, tax and equity demands for conservatism are lower. However, we
find a positive association between unexplained reporting conservatism and contract
modifications, suggesting contractual modifications alone do not fulfill lenders’
demands for conservatism.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Background
2.1. Related research
2.2. Contractual mechanisms that make covenant calculations more conservative
3. Motivation and research design
3.1. Motivation
3.2. Measures of financial reporting conservatism
3.3. Measures of agency costs of debt
3.4. Measures of non-lender demands for financial reporting conservatism
3.5. Models of inclusion of conservative contract modifications
3.6. Model of reporting conservatism
3.7. Ex-post changes in reporting conservatism
4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
4.1. Sample selection
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4.2. Descriptive statistics
5. Results
5.1. The association between financial reporting conservatism and the use of income
escalators
5.2. Change in reporting conservatism from before to after the debt contract
6. Results on tangible net worth covenants
7. Conclusions
References
Conservative financial reporting, debt covenants, and the agency costs of debt
Pages 175-180
Wayne R. Guay
Abstract
Considerable research has documented the role of debt covenants and conservative
financial accounting in addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers.
Beatty, A., Weber, J., and Yu, J. [2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting
and Economics, forthcoming] document interesting, but mixed, findings on the relation
between debt covenants and conservative accounting, and the extent to which the two
contracting mechanisms act as substitutes or complements. In this paper, I discuss the
economic roles of financial reporting, debt covenants, and conservatism within the debt
contracting environment, and attempt to fit BWY's findings within this context.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Discussion of debt covenants and financial reporting conservatism in resolving
agency conflicts
3. Conservative adjustments to debt covenants
4. Discussion of the analysis by Beatty et al. (2008)
5. Conclusion
References
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Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC
deregistrations
Pages 181-208
Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis, Tracy Yue Wang
Abstract
We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies
cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark
that is largely attributable to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative
abnormal returns when going dark. We find that many firms go dark due to poor future
prospects, distress and increased compliance costs after SOX. But we also find evidence
suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to protect private control
benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor
protection are weak. Finally, we show that going dark and going private are distinct
economic events.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical foundation and research design
2.1. What triggers firms to go dark?
2.2. Going private vs. going dark
3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
3.1. Going-dark sample
3.2. Control sample
3.3. Going-private sample
3.4. Descriptive statistics
4. Results
4.1. The causes of going dark
4.2. The impact of SOX
4.3. The consequences of going dark
4.4. Post-deregistration analysis
5. Conclusions
Appendix A. The deregistration process
References
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Disclosure policy: A discussion of Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2008) on “going dark”
Pages 209-220
Jeffrey L. Coles
Abstract
LTW (2008) examine firms withdrawing from the SEC reporting system but continuing
to trade on Pink Sheets. The paper finds that Sarbanes-Oxley increased the propensity
of firms to go dark but, counter to conventional wisdom, had no significant effect on the
rate of going-private transactions. Agency costs, as well as poor growth opportunities,
proximity to financial distress, and increased compliance costs arising from SOX
increase the propensity to go dark. Suggestions to improve the empirical
implementation and interpretation involve including additional control and more
suitable explanatory variables, and more attention to causation issues and to the
quantification of economic significance.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. A simple empirical framework
3. Leuz et al. (2008) on going dark
3.1. The LTW model
3.2. Sample design
3.3. Results
4. Strengths
5. Concerns
6. Concluding remarks
References
Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence
Pages 221-247
Feng Li
Abstract
This paper examines the relation between annual report readability and firm
performance and earnings persistence. I measure the readability of public company
annual reports using the Fog index from the computational linguistics literature and the
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length of the document. I find that: (1) the annual reports of firms with lower earnings
are harder to read (i.e., they have a higher Fog index and are longer); and (2) firms with
annual reports that are easier to read have more persistent positive earnings.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Literature and hypotheses
2.1. Literature
2.2. The implications of annual report readability
2.2.1. Current performance
2.2.2. Future performance
3. Data and empirical measures of annual report readability
3.1. Sample
3.2. The readability measures
3.3. Summary statistics
3.4. Determinants of annual report readability
4. Empirical results
4.1. Current earnings and annual report readability
4.2. Earnings persistence and annual report readability
5. Beyond readability: additional lexical features of annual reports
6. Further analyses
6.1. Unexercised stock option holdings and incentives to obfuscate information
6.2. Future stock returns and annual report readability
7. Conclusions
Appendix A. Steps to calculate the readability indices
Appendix B. Steps to extract MD&A and Notes to the financial statements
References
Discussion of “Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings
persistence”
Pages 248-252
Robert Bloomfield
Abstract
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Li [2008. Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence. Journal
of Accounting and Economics, this issue, doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.02.003] finds that
firms with losses, or with transient income, write annual reports with long sentences
and big words. I begin by discussing some explanations for Li's primary results, using
his more detailed results, along with the results of related papers, to assess the
plausibility of those explanations. I then briefly discuss the 10-K's of a single company
over the course of 3 years, to provide more detailed insight into what might drive the
length and readability of annual reports. Finally, I present some possible directions for
future research.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Explanations
2.1. Obfuscation
2.2. Ontology
2.3. Attribution
2.4. Misdirection
2.5. Management by exception
2.6. Conservatism
2.7. Litigation
3. A simple case study
4. Future directions
References
The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political
economy of goodwill accounting
Pages 253-281
Karthik Ramanna
Abstract
I study the evolution of SFAS 142, which uses unverifiable fair-value estimates to
account for acquired goodwill. I find evidence consistent with the FASB issuing SFAS
142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting.
The result is interesting given this proposal was due in part to SEC concerns over
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pooling misuse. I also find evidence consistent with lobbying support for SFAS 142
increasing in firms’ discretion under the standard. Agency theory predicts such
unverifiable discretion can be used opportunistically.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Background to SFAS 142
3. Hypotheses development
3.1. Is goodwill impairment in SFAS 142 due in part to pro-poolers?
3.2. Does discretion potential explain firms’ support for goodwill impairment?
3.2.1. The number and size of reporting units
3.2.2. Reporting-units’ fair-value-to-book-value (FTB) ratios
3.2.3. The unverifiability of net assets
3.2.4. The magnitude of impairment charges that can be managed
3.3. Implications and alternate explanations
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Research design for H1a
4.2. Results for H1a
4.3. Research design for H1b and H2
4.3.1. Jointly modeling H2 (i.e., lobbying positions) and the lobbying decision
4.4. Distribution of firms lobbying on the original and revised EDs
4.5. Univariate results for H1b and H2
4.6. Multivariate results for H1b and H2
4.7. Robustness of multivariate results for H1b and H2
5. Conclusion
5.1. Summary of findings
5.2. Avenues for future research
Appendix A. Comparison of impairment proposals
Appendix B. High reporting-unit FTB ratios and the Comment Letter Position
Appendix C. Two-level multinomial logit for the decision to lobby and lobbying
positions
References
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Discussion of “The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence
from the political economy of goodwill accounting”
Pages 282-288
Douglas J. Skinner
Abstract
Ramanna [2007. The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: evidence from
the political economy of goodwill accounting, Journal of Accounting and Economics]
provides interesting and novel evidence on how firms use contributions from their
political action committees (PACs) to members of Congress as a means of lobbying for
preferred positions on the two exposure drafts that led to SFAS-141 and SFAS-142. My
discussion raises some concerns about his main conclusion: that pooling firms lobbied
the FASB to obtain a “fair-value”-based impairment rule to facilitate their ability to
manipulate financial statements. I offer a more benign explanation and make some
other observations about how this line of research could proceed in the future.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Main thesis of paper
2.1. Historical context
2.2. The literature on pooling and an alternative perspective
3. Evidence and results
4. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
References
The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts
Pages 289-316
Zhaoyang Gu, Jian Xue
Abstract
We show that although forecasts of independent analysts are less accurate ex post, they
yield forecast errors that are more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns. This
suggests that forecasts of independent analysts are superior to those of nonindependent
analysts in representing ex ante market expectations. We also show that forecasts of
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nonindependent analysts become more accurate and less biased, and produce forecast
errors more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns when independent analysts
are following the same firms than when they are not. This suggests that the presence of
independent analysts disciplines the behavior of nonindependent analysts.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Motivation
2.1. Analysts’ conflicts of interest and prior findings
2.2. Ex post vs. ex ante forecast superiority
2.3. Disciplining effect of independent analysts
3. Sample, variable measurement and research design
3.1. Sample selection
3.2. Variable measurement
3.3. Research design
4. Results
4.1. Superiority of independent analysts vs. nonindependent analysts
4.1.1. Forecast bias and accuracy tests
4.1.2. Market association tests
4.2. The disciplining effect of independent analysts
4.2.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate results
4.2.2. Multivariate regression tests on forecast bias and accuracy
4.2.3. Multivariate regression tests on market associations
4.3. Robustness checks
4.3.1. The 12 investment banks targeted in the Global Settlement
4.3.2. Alternative return accumulation periods
4.3.3. Alternative forecast horizons
4.3.4. The relative timing of forecasts
4.3.5. Alternative matched samples
4.3.6. The degree of independent analyst following
4.3.7. Managed actual earnings
5. Conclusions
References
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Endogenous entry/exit as an alternative explanation for the disciplining role of
independent analysts
Pages 317-323
Thomas Z. Lys, Jayanthi Sunder
Abstract
Gu and Xue [2008. The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, this issue, doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.02.002]
study the disciplining effect of independent analysts on the accuracy and forecast
relevance of the forecasts of non-independent analysts. One of the intriguing results is
that while independent analysts issue inferior forecasts, their presence appears to reduce
the forecast bias, improve the forecast accuracy and increase the forecast relevance of
forecasts issued by non-independent analysts. We explore alternative explanations for
the Gu–Xue results. Our evidence of endogenous entry and exit of independent analysts
provides a more compelling explanation for the reported results.
Article Outline
1. A straight-forward hypothesis with intriguing results
2. Evidence and interpretation of results
2.1. Findings
2.2. Measures of forecast quality
2.2.1. Measuring accuracy independent of bias
2.2.2. ERC as a measure of forecast quality
3. ERC tests
4. Alternative explanations
5. Endogenous entry and exit by independent analysts
6. Conclusion
References
Earnings quality at initial public offerings
Pages 324-349
Ray Ball, Lakshmanan Shivakumar
Abstract
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We show that, contrary to popular belief, initial public offering (IPO) firms report more
conservatively. We attribute this to the higher quality reporting demanded of public
firms by financial statement users and consequentially higher monitoring by auditors,
boards, analysts, rating agencies, press, and litigants, and to greater regulatory scrutiny
[Ball, R., Shivakumar, L., 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss
recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 83–128]. We also
question the evidence of Teoh et al. [1998b. Earnings management and the subsequent
market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935–1974]
supporting the alternative hypothesis that managers opportunistically inflate earnings to
influence IPO pricing. We conjecture that upward-biased estimates of “discretionary”
accruals occur in a broad genre of studies on earnings management around similar large
transactions and events.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Financial reporting by UK companies going public
2.1. Sample and summary statistics
2.2. Comparison of private-status and prospectus financials
2.3. Conditional conservatism
2.4. Analysis of discretionary accruals in IPO prospectuses
3. Re-examining the TWW data
3.1. Credibility of “discretionary” accruals magnitudes
3.2. Problems in estimating discretionary current accruals in the IPO year
3.3. Errors in estimating discretionary current accruals from balance sheet data
3.4. Use of pre-IPO total assets as a deflator
3.5. Bias in fitting the accruals model to out-of-sample data
3.6. Pre-IPO accruals
3.7. Are there frequent adverse post-IPO events?
4. Discussion and conclusions
References
Earnings management and earnings quality
Pages 350-357
Kin Lo
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Abstract
Viewing the detection of earnings management from the perspective of a crime scene
investigator sheds new light on prior research on earnings management and its close
relative, earnings quality. The works of Ball and Shivakumar [2008. Earnings quality at
initial public offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, in press.] and Teoh et al.
[1998. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public
offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935–1974.] are used to illustrate the application of
seven components of a crime scene investigation to earnings management research.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Did earnings management occur?
3. Who is responsible for earnings management?
4. By what methods have earnings been managed?
5. Who are the victims of earnings management?
6. What are the motives for earnings management?
7. Was there an opportunity to manage earnings?
8. What other explanations are there to explain what appears to be earnings
management?
8.1. Estimates of discretionary accruals are too large to be plausible
8.2. Factors triggering the decision to issue an IPO also affect accruals and bias
estimates of discretionary accruals in the IPO year
8.3. Estimating accruals using balance sheet data induces errors and bias
8.4. Using pre-IPO assets as a deflator creates a small denominator problem
8.5. Summary of alternative explanations
9. Conclusions
References
Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing
Pages 358-378
Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti
Abstract
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When liquidity plays an important role as in financial crises, asset prices may reflect the
amount of liquidity available rather than the asset's future earning power. Using market
prices to assess financial institutions’ solvency in such circumstances is not desirable.
We show that a shock in the insurance sector can cause the current market value of
banks’ assets to fall below their liabilities so they are insolvent. In contrast, if values
based on historic cost are used, banks can continue and meet all their future liabilities.
We discuss the implications for the debate on mark-to-market versus historic cost
accounting.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. The model
3. The autarkic equilibrium
3.1. The banking sector
3.2. The insurance sector
4. The functioning of credit risk transfer
5. Liquidity pricing and accounting
5.1. Historic cost accounting
5.2. Mark-to-market accounting, solvency and contagion
6. An example
6.1. Banks in autarky
6.2. Insurance companies in autarky
6.3. Credit risk transfer
6.4. Historic cost accounting
6.5. Mark-to-market accounting, solvency and contagion
7. Discussion
8. Concluding remarks
References
Do accounting measurement regimes matter? A discussion of mark-to-market
accounting and liquidity pricing
Pages 379-387
Haresh Sapra
Abstract
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Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, Allen and Carletti show that
marking-to-market interacts with liquidity pricing to exacerbate the likelihood of
financial contagion between the two sectors. In this discussion, I lay out the main
ingredients of their model and explain how they interact with liquidity pricing to
generate financial contagion. I then discuss some limitations of their model and propose
an interesting extension.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. The financial system
2.1. The banking sector
2.2. The insurance sector
2.3. Optimal banking and insurance portfolios
2.4. Liquidity pricing
3. Ingredients for contagion
3.1. Accounting measurement and contagion
4. Comments
4.1. Solvency constraints
4.2. A possible extension of AC's model
5. Conclusion
References
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